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 1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1. THE STRUGGLE AGAINST FRANCE 
 
The war had started against Revolutionary France in 1793 as a result of the French gaining 
control of the River Scheldt. Success, however, wasn’t exactly forthcoming – two coalitions 
had been forged, but each of them had failed. Through the Treaty of Amiens in 1802, peace 
was made with Napoleon, by then First Consul. The peace left the Netherlands in the hands of 
the French, though, and therefore did nothing to reduce the risk of invasion. This was to 
become a real menace after Britain reopened hostilities in the following year and did not 
relent until 1805, when Bonaparte, due to his defeat at Trafalgar, as well as the renewed 
outbreak of war on the continent, appears to have discarded the scheme of an invasion. In the 
meantime, a new coalition had been formed. Yet the Prussians were too halting, the Austrians 
too feeble, and the Russians too eagerly aspiring to their own interests. As for the British, 
their efforts were confined to the sea, neglecting the battle on the land. True, they had been 
ready to subsidise the coalition, but they were still holding back major contributions. The 
British victory at Trafalgar, which resulted in making Britain’s supremacy at sea nearly 
impeachable, was followed by the disaster of Austerlitz, which shattered the Austrian army 
and effectuated the Austrians to seek peace. Having been hesitant to take part in the hostilities 
against France, Prussia was soon persuaded not to wage war, for Napoleon promised her 
Hanover in return. Therefore, of the great powers, only Britain and Russia continued their 
struggle, the staunchness of the latter being rather doubtful. At any rate, Pitt, the British Prime 
Minister at that time, realised something of the utmost importance: as long as there was no 
concurrence with respect to war aims, any coalition was bound to break up as a consequence 
of conflicting ambitions of the powers. Through an exchange with Tsar Alexander, Pitt 
developed the basic lines for a European reconstruction, which had little effect at that time, 
but significance that would be seen in later years.1 
                                                 
1 CLARKE, John: British Diplomacy and Foreign Policy, 1782-1865, The National Interest 
(London/Boston/Sydney/Wellington 1989), p. 107, 111-113; HARLING, Philip: A Tale of Two Conflicts: 
Critiques of the British War Effort, 1793-1815, (19-40) in: PHILP, Mark (Ed.): Resisting Napoleon, The British 
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In 1806 Napoleon detracted Prussia of Hanover and founded the Confederation of the Rhine. 
The ensuing war against Prussia ended with her defeat at Jena-Auerstedt. It was then, in 
Prussia’s occupied capital, that the Emperor of the French dictated the Berlin Decrees. Trade 
with Britain was prohibited and British possessions were seized. This so-called Continental 
System was to prevent Britain from constantly seeking allies and subsidising them. Even 
more, Napoleon hoped that the trade-war would bring Britain to her knees. In the following 
year the Continental System was further expanded; even Russia agreed to join when the 
Emperors met at Tilsit. A couple of months later, Russia, a former ally, declared war on 
Britain. Yet, Great Britain was coping, primarily because trade could not be stopped 
completely. True, the continent was well sealed-off; nevertheless, it was not sealed off 
entirely. On the other hand, and even more crucially, Britain was seeking trade elsewhere. 
Even before, the United States had been the most important trade partner, with Britain’s 
exports amounting to about the same as they did to all of Europe collectively. However, in 
1808 Great Britain was to lose this vital connection. Britain’s answer to the Continental 
System, the Orders in Council, stopped neutral vessels to prevent them from trading with 
France and provoked the United States to place an embargo on British goods, which lasted 
until 1809. Thus, Britain’s trade was cut off from Europe as well as the United States of 
America. Later, in 1812, Britain’s former colonies were to declare war on their mother 
country. At any rate, even at this critical stage, Britain was able to manage because it found 
new markets, e.g., in Latin America. Still, though the Continental System failed in its main 
purpose – Britain’s downfall – it did do damage to Britain’s economy. Britain wasn’t the only 
one suffering; in the end the Continental System did more harm to Northern Germany and 
Holland, which made the population discontent with French rule.2 
 
In 1807 the French and Spanish had concertedly made an assault on Portugal - a measure that 
was partly intended to further enhance and extend the Continental System. Britain, however, 
was able to counterbalance the trading losses inflicted by the closure of the Portuguese market, 
because she got the permit to trade directly with Brazil, where the royal family had fled. This 
circumstance, together with illegal commerce between Great Britain and Spanish America in 
fact outweighed her losses by far. Before long, however, Napoleon also attacked Spain – the 
country aligned with him since 1796. He distrusted his ally, as Spain, in 1806, had secretly, 
                                                                                                                                                        
Response to the Threat of Invasion, 1797-1815 (Aldershot/Burlington 2006), p. 20f; PHILP: Resisting Napoleon, 
The British Response to the Threat of Invasion, p. 1f.  
2 BLACK, Jeremy: Trade, Empire and British Foreign Policy, 1689-1815 (London/New York 2007), p. 186f; 
CLARKE: British Diplomacy and Foreign Policy, p. 115-118, 121. 
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but not unnoticeably prepared to fight France, merely shirking to do so when the news of the 
Prussian defeat had reached Spain. A dispute between the Spanish King Charles IV and his 
son, who had declared himself King Ferdinand VII, afforded a brilliant opportunity for 
Napoleon to intervene. Under the pretext of mediation, he ordered both of them to France and 
when in France, he coerced them into abdicating, making his brother Joseph King of Spain. 
Napoleon, however, had not expected the fierce opposition of the Spanish. Commencing in 
May 1808, national upheavals occurred throughout Spain, and before long appeals were made 
to Britain for support.3  
 
The news of the upheavals in Spain produced a sensation in Great Britain, and the calls for 
help were zealously answered. An army was dispatched to the Peninsula, of which Sir Arthur 
Wellesley, who, in the course of the war was to become Duke of Wellington, was appointed 
as commander in 1809. Born in Ireland in 1769, the same year as his antagonist Napoleon, he 
had fought half a decade in India. In a Great Britain that was entirely absorbed by the war 
with France, his achievements had hardly attracted attention. Arthur’s eldest brother Richard, 
the Marquess of Wellesley, had been Governor-General of India until 1805, and from 1809 to 
1812 he was Foreign Secretary, and therefore in the right positions to promote Wellington. 
Next to his brother’s influence and his own capability, Arthur’s appointment was due to 
Viscount Castlereagh, a good friend of his, who also held a ministerial post.4 Wellington was 
popular with his army, and as one soldier confessed, “We would rather see his long nose in a 
fight than a reinforcement of ten thousand men any day.”5 He was nicknamed “the Beau,” 
“the Peer,” or, referring to his distinctive nose, “the Eagle” or simply “Nosey.”6 
 
Napoleon’s victory over Austria in 1809 enabled him to send more troops to Iberia, and the 
following years witnessed a series of victories and setbacks for the British army. Every winter 
Wellington retreated to Portugal, even after his triumphal entry in Madrid in 1812. This 
retreat to Portugal was, however, the last one, and in 1813 the liberation of Spain was to truly 
                                                 
3 MUIR: Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon, 1807-1815 (New Haven/London 1996), p. 29f, 32-34; PETRIE, 
Charles: Lord Liverpool and his Times (London 1954), p. 127; SCHROEDER, Paul W.: The Transformation of 
European Politics, 1763-1848 (Oxford 1994), p. 340-342. 
4 HAY, William Anthony: The Whig Revival, 1808-1830 (Basingstoke 2005), p. 23; LONGFORD, Elizabeth: 
Wellington, A new Biography (Stroud 2005), p. 18f, 24f; MUIR: Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon, p. 38, 43; 
SEVERN, John K.: The Wellesleys and Iberian diplomacy, 1808-12, (34-65) in: GASH, Norman (Ed.): Wellington, 
Studies in the military and political career of the first Duke of Wellington (Manchester/New York 1990), p. 34-
36; WEBSTER, C. K.: The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 1812-1815, Britain and the Reconstruction of Europe 
(London 1931), p. 3. 
5 Quoted in LONGFORD: Wellington, p. 34. 
6 Quoted in LONGFORD: Wellington, p. 37, 43f. 
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commence. 7  Yet, Britain not only fought against Napoleon – in 1812 she also became 
ensnarled in hostilities against the United States of America. 
 
 
2. THE WAR OF 1812 
 
The relationship between Great Britain and the United States had for quite a few years been 
strained, which was to a large extent a concomitant phenomenon of the war against France. 
As we have seen, the British government responded to the Continental System by issuing the 
Orders in Council, and therewith prohibiting trade (also by neutral countries) with Napoleonic 
Europe. This meant that America had to refrain from conducting her own commerce, lest her 
vessels be seized by the British. This naturally caused considerable damage and was seen as 
national provocation. Offence was also taken by the British “right of search,” according to 
which the Royal Navy was entitled to sift through vessels and compelled British seamen to 
serve in the navy. Thus, many British looked for work on American vessels and pretended to 
be American. Therefore, the Royal Navy also searched American ships, and as there was no 
effective method of how to differentiate between British and American citizens, it was 
inevitable that a lot of Americans also fell prey to impressment. While impressment, as well 
as the Orders in Council, was regarded in Britain as imperative devices in fighting the French 
and any debate on the maritime rights was adamantly rejected, these drove the United States 
to finally declare war on 18 June 1812.8  
 
The British government had abrogated the Orders in Council in the same month, thus they did 
not think that the United States of America would abide by their intention to fight Britain. 
True, the suspension was actually not made to soothe the Americans - it was due to home 
affairs, as the Orders in Council had also damaged British trade, while only the fact that the 
Continental System was now in disarray rendered this step possible. Still, as it eliminated one 
of the United States’ key complaints, the British Cabinet thought that when intelligence of the 
rescindment arrived in America, it would almost immediately bring about a cessation of 
hostilities. But they apparently underestimated the obstinacy of their erstwhile colonies. The 
Americans, for their part, expected that Britain would try to avoid hostilities at this time as 
                                                 
7 PETRIE, Charles: Lord Liverpool and his Times, p. 164. 
8 MUIR: Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon, p. 232, 234; WEBSTER, C. K.: The American War and the Treaty of 
Ghent, 1812-1814, (522-542) in WARD, A.W., and GOOCH, G.P. (Ed.): The Cambridge History of British 
Foreign Policy, vol. I (Cambridge 1922), p. 523-526. 
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they were fully engaged in the war against Napoleon. At any rate, even though American 
public opinion was mostly against hostilities, the Congress stayed with their decision to make 
war with Britain and endeavoured to find another reason to vindicate the hostilities. The 
vexed question of impressment still remained, and also the feeling of national humiliation 
caused by Britain’s treatment and the prospect of the acquisition of Canada played some part 
in the American government’s determination to wage war. As it was, the bulk of the 
American troops were apparently unsure why their country was engaged in hostilities with 
Britain, as well as unsure of what they were actually fighting for.9 
 
However, the resolution to declare war was simply foolish, as the American government had 
made no prearrangements, neither where money was concerned, nor for the training of the 
troops or logistics. This failure of the American government is even more remarkable in view 
of the fact that for years the relations of the two countries had deteriorated, and it was evident 
that this might eventually culminate in the outbreak of a war. There were only a few British 
troops stationed in overseas, but they did not degrade America’s endeavour as much as the 
lack of prearrangements did. As it was, the Americans did not manage to harm Britain 
seriously, whereas Britain, by making the whole coast of the United States subject to blockade, 
succeeded in demolishing American commerce. Indeed, if the British had not allowed exports 
of flour to the Peninsula intended for the British forces, American commerce would have 
suffered even more severely. Americans were aware that they were, in fact, nourishing the foe, 
but it did not stop them.10 Erstwhile, President Jefferson opined: “If we could by starving the 
British armies, oblige [t]hem to withdraw from the peninsular [sic!], it would be to send them 
here; and I think we had better feed them there for pay, than feed and fight them here for 
nothing.”11  
 
The British, for their part, strongly supported the war against the United States and called for 
revenge on the perfidious Americans, who had assailed Britain exactly at the time when she 
was deeply engaged in the war with Napoleon.12 One Briton remarked, “We [the British] 
seem to be leading the Yankees a sad life upon their coasts. I am glad of it with all my heart. 
                                                 
9 BELLESILES, Michael A.: Experiencing the War of 1812, (205-240) in: FLAVELL, Julie and CONWAY, Stephen 
(Ed.): Britain and America Go to War. The Impact of War and Warfare in Anglo-America, 1754-1815 
(Gainesville/Tallahassee/Tampa/Boca Raton/Pensacola/ Orlando/Miami/Jacksonville/Ft. Myers 2004), p. 205f; 
CLARKE: British Diplomacy and Foreign Policy, p. 118; MUIR: Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon, p. 234f; 
WEBSTER: The American War and the Treaty of Ghent, p. 525-529. 
10 BELLESILES: Experiencing the War of 1812, p. 208, 216; MUIR: Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon, p. 234, 
237f. 
11 Quoted in MUIR: Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon, p. 237. 
12 WEBSTER: The American War and the Treaty of Ghent, p. 528. 
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When they declared war they thought it was pretty near over with us, and that their weight 
cast into the scale would decide our ruin. Luckily they were mistaken, and are likely to pay 
dear for their error.” 13  The Opposition unsurprisingly tried to hold the Tory Cabinet 
responsible for the war, but they could not disavow the fact that the inevitable application of 
the British maritime rights had effectuated the hostilities. The War of 1812 was for Britain 
naturally aggravating, especially as it occurred at such an inconvenient time. Yet, thanks to 
the American government’s neglect of any preparations, it was not much more than an 
unpleasant diversion from the war against France and the subsequent settlement of Europe to 
which her main efforts were directed.14  
 
 
3. THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND 
 
Not only abroad, but also at home, times were turbulent. In late 1810 King George III had 
taken ill – he actually suffered from porphyria, but unknown then, his illness was mistaken for 
madness. He had experienced attacks before and had recovered from them, but this time he 
was not to convalesce. Consequently, a Regency of the Prince of Wales was implemented. 
Although Prince Regent had been attached to the Whigs all his life and it was in his authority 
to change the government, he did not do so. This was partly due to the King’s condition, 
which at times seemed to improve, but also owing to the discordance that had emerged 
between George and the Whigs on most important political issues. Where the Regent stood 
out for a vigorous prosecution of the war against Bonaparte, the Whig-leaders Lords Grenville 
and Grey were inclined to seek peace. Where the Whigs were frantic about Catholic relief, 
George thought it the wrong time for this matter to be addressed. Still, that didn’t mean that 
he had to take a liking to his father’s Cabinet. And although attempts were made to form 
alternative ministries, they all turned out unsuccessful. In the end, after a long period of 
political uncertainty, the Tories in 1812 were confirmed in office. Still, it was thought that the 
Ministry would not last long, as cabinets had changed so frequently during the Napoleonic 
wars. From 1803 to 1815 there were six different ones with the same number of prime 
ministers. The War Office and the Foreign Office were subject to even higher turnover - there 
were seven ministers for War and Colonies and nine different foreign ministers. These high 
                                                 
13 Quoted in MUIR: Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon, p. 239. 
14 MUIR: Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon, p. 240; WEBSTER: The American War and the Treaty of Ghent, p. 
528f. 
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fluctuations and converse expectations notwithstanding, the Cabinet was to remain in power 
for fifteen years.15 
 
The most significant ministers in view to foreign affairs were the Earl of Liverpool in his 
capacity as Prime Minister, the Earl of Bathurst, who became Minister for War and Colonies, 
and Viscount Castlereagh (later Marquess of Londonderry), who was appointed Foreign 
Minister as well as Leader of the House of Commons. All of them had held various different 
posts before; Castlereagh, for instance, had been Secretary for War, Bathurst briefly Foreign 
Secretary, and Liverpool both, as well as Home Secretary. Bathurst was a reliable man and an 
able Secretary for War, and Liverpool was a huge support in Parliament. Castlereagh 
entertained cordial relations with both of them and was genuinely trusted by all ministers. He 
was born in Ireland in 1769, just like his fellow countryman Wellington, his most important 
associate in fighting Napoleon and reconstructing Europe. He had played a prominent role in 
uniting Ireland with Britain - the so-called Act of Union - for which he was strongly 
condemned. At the same time, however, he sympathised with the Catholics and was one of 
few members of the Cabinet who favoured Catholic Emancipation. In his capacity of Minister 
for War, he had been entangled in some defeats Britain had faced in her struggle with 
Napoleon16, and it was probably this that caused The Times to refer to him as “the very 
darling of misfortune.”17 After his death - he committed suicide in 1822 - Lord Byron, who 
had passionately hated him, 18  stated that he “looked upon him as the most despotic in 
intention and the weakest in intellect, that ever tyrannized over a country. […] England has 
been insulted by a minister […] who could not speak English […].”19 The last comment 
alluded to the fact that Castlereagh never entirely got rid of his Irish accent and that he had the 
“habit of using the first word that came to hand without much regard to its signification,” as a 
contemporary observed. 20  Notwithstanding Byron’s negative opinion on Castlereagh, the 
latter was a real asset to the Ministry because of his reliability, courage, endurance, and hard-
working attitude. He was a composed and modest man, but also aloof to such an extent that he 
                                                 
15 BARTLETT, C. J.: Castlereagh (London/Melbourne/Toronto 1966), p. 102f; HALL, Christopher D.: British 
strategy in the Napoleonic War, 1803-1815 (Manchester 1999), p. 53, 55; MUIR: Britain and the Defeat of 
Napoleon, p. 137, 141-143, 160-162, 193-197; PALMER, Alan: The Life and Times of George IV. (London 1972), 
p. 94-97, 99, 102. 
16 BARTLETT: Castlereagh, p. 3, 101; HALL: British strategy in the Napoleonic War, p. 210f; MARRIOTT, J. A. R.: 
Castlereagh, The Political Life of Robert, Second Marquess of Londonderry (London 1936), p. 14; WEBSTER: 
The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, p. 3, 35f. 
17 Quoted in BARTLETT: Castlereagh, p. 3. 
18 BARTLETT: Castlereagh, p. 263; MARRIOTT: Castlereagh, p. 5f. 
19 Quoted in MARRIOTT: Castlereagh, p. 7. 
20 Quoted in BARTLETT: Castlereagh, p. 163. 
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seemed cold, perhaps even arrogant, which probably arose from his engrained coyness.21 
Bartlett describes him as “a warm and gentle personality beneath the frigid exterior,” and 
Bryant speaks of him as “a man of scrupulous integrity, incapable of deceit, simple, home-
loving, […] almost bourgeois in the propriety of his domestic life.” 22  
 
The Cabinet’s position in the House of Commons was anything but strong. However, after his 
breach with the Whigs in 1812, the ministers could count on the Prince Regent’s support and 
the Opposition was enfeebled by the fact that it often was at odds. There were the 
conservative Whigs led by Lord Grenville, the more progressive Whigs led by Lord Grey, and 
the Radicals. Frequently they could not agree on a common policy, and even together they did 
not possess any majority. A large fraction in the Commons, indeed about half of its members, 
was actually not affiliated to any party, and thus provided uncertain majorities. The 
independents generally had an aversion to the possibility of a government formed of Whigs 
and Radicals, but that did not stop them from voting against the Government on some cases as 
they saw fit. In late 1812 the position of the Cabinet improved while that of the Opposition 
weakened as the progress of the war was becoming increasingly favourable. Therefore, in 
1813 and early 1814, Parliament witnessed quite calm years.23 
 
At first the bulk of the Opposition had viewed Britain’s engagement in Iberia favourably;24 
Grey, for example, called it “morally and politically one of the highest duties a nation ever 
had to perform.”25 The enthusiasm was mainly down to the fact that it was the Spanish people 
who had taken up arms against Napoleon, which stood in sharp contrast to any of the efforts 
of autocratically ruled Russia, Prussia, and Austria. The enthusiasm, however, quickly faded 
and by early 1809 there were many who opposed the British war effort in Iberia and 
considered it doomed to failure.26  
 
Relations with Spain were not always harmonious and were further strained when, in the 
spring of 1810, an upheaval took place in Venezuela. Before long the calls for independence 
took hold of other Spanish colonies, and the rebels asked for British aid. Although not 
                                                 
21 BARTLETT: Castlereagh, p. 101; MUIR: Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon, p. 10, 314; WEBSTER: The Foreign 
Policy of Castlereagh, p. 36, 486. 
22 BARTLETT: Castlereagh, p. 1f; BRYANT, Arthur: The Age of Elegance, 1812-1822 (Edinburgh 1958), p. 214. 
23 BARTLETT: Castlereagh, p. 103, 165-167, 173; HAY: The Whig Revival, p. 34; PALMER: The Life and Times 
of George IV, p. 82. 
24 HALL: British strategy in the Napoleonic War, p. 62. 
25 Quoted in HAY: The Whig Revival, p. 22. 
26 HALL: British strategy in the Napoleonic War, p. 62; HAY: The Whig Revival, p. 22f; SEVERN: The Wellesleys 
and Iberian diplomacy, p. 36f. 
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unexpected, this obviously created an exceedingly delicate situation. After all, Britain was 
aligned with Spain. However, in the event Britain would ignore the pleas for help it was likely 
that the revolting colonies would side either with the United States or with France. Besides, 
there was also the economic aspect – the Government had to be careful not to disrupt the 
admittedly unlawful trade. Therefore, reconciliation between the Spanish kingdom and her 
colonies was viewed most desirable, and the Marquess of Wellesley as well as Castlereagh, 
when succeeding the former as Foreign Secretary, tried to mediate. The Spanish, however, 
preferred an aggressive approach and demanded British support, pointing to their alliance. Yet 
Britain was adamantly against such measures, remonstrating that a dispatch of troops to Latin 
America would naturally impair Spain’s position in the war against France.27  
                                                 
27 SEVERN: The Wellesleys and Iberian diplomacy, p. 50f, 54, 58, 60; WEBSTER: The Foreign Policy of 
Castlereagh, p. 71. 
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II. BRITAIN AND THE 
CONTINENTAL POWERS 
 
 
4. THE FORMING OF THE COALITION 
 
Meanwhile, the war on the Continent was taking an auspicious turn. Napoleon, whose 
relations with Russia had started to degrade in early 1811, invaded the eastern power in June 
1812, but, not even four months later, he had to withdraw. At the end of the year the harsh 
winter and the constant Cossack attacks had taken their toll: his enormous army was shattered 
– estimations number his losses (including prisoners) at more than half a million soldiers. 
Napoleon’s defeat in Russia provided a golden opportunity to take up arms and restrain 
France’s power. Yet, it was unclear if the Russians would pursue the Grande Armèe, or if 
Austria and Prussia - who at this time were in fact aligned to France - would pit their forces 
against the Corsican. 28 
 
However, Alexander, the capricious, vain, and self-indulgent Tsar of Russia, engaged his 
country in a crusade against the Emperor of the French. Although he changed his mind on 
many instances, he did not falter in this case. After all, Russia would never be truly safe 
unless the French were driven out of Central Europe. Thus, the invasion of Russia was 
followed by a French retreat with the Russians hard on their heels. With her energies mainly 
directed at Iberia, Britain could not do much to aid Russia, but she did try. Her efforts were 
mainly directed at Sweden, because the British ministers were of the opinion that if Sweden, 
too, would take up arms against France, the central European powers might follow. With a 
considerable amount of money and the promise of Norway and Guadeloupe to Sweden, 
Bernadotte, the French marshal who had become Swedish Crown Prince, was won over and in 
early March pitted his country against France. Unfortunately, this did not result in the quick 
and efficient blow to the French that the British government had hoped for.29  
                                                 
28 CLARKE: British Diplomacy and Foreign Policy, p. 118; MUIR: Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon, p. 224, 
229, 243; PETRIE, Charles: Lord Liverpool and his Times, p. 170. 
29 KISSINGER, Henry A.: A World Restored (London 1973), p. 90; MUIR: Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon, p. 
243-245; NICOLSON, Harold: The Congress of Vienna, A Study in Allied Unity: 1812-1822 (London 1970), p. 
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Months beforehand, at the end of 1812, the Prussian General Yorck had proclaimed his forces 
neutral, only to side with the Russians later. Frederick William III, the King of Prussia, and 
Hardenberg, the Prussian Chancellor, were aghast at this open display of disobedience. 
Neither of them was anything like Francophile; they were merely petrified. Due to the lost 
war in 1806, Prussia had to surrender two-thirds of her territory and consequently descended 
to a second-rate power. As there was still the possibility that the Tsar would enter into an 
agreement with Napoleon, Frederick William III and Hardenberg regarded a Prussian 
engagement in the war against France at this stage as simply too perilous. Eventually, 
however, in late February Prussia formally aligned with Russia in the Treaty of Kalish. 
According to the treaty, Russia promised to fight against France with a force of  
150,000 men, and Prussia with one of 80,000. Prussia would regain the territorial extent she 
had held in 1806, though not the same borders. Nearly two decades had passed since Poland 
had been entirely divided between Russia, Austria and Prussia. After the latter’s defeat, 
Napoleon had taken her Polish lands and founded the Duchy of Warsaw, which he had further 
augmented in 1809 by some of Austria’s Polish territories. Now, under tacit assumption it was 
agreed that Russia would receive the major part of Prussia’s Polish lands, while Prussia would 
instead regain her relative size of 1806 at the expense of Saxony. This was the source of the 
Polish-Saxon question, which was to put a grave strain on the relations of the Continental 
Powers during the following two years. Great Britain had not particularly influenced these 
recent events, but she did aid Prussia and Russia with ordnance as well as subsidies. 
Castlereagh also sent a representative to the Prussian court – his half-brother Sir Charles 
Stewart. It must have been brotherly affection that blinded Castlereagh, for this was a peculiar 
appointment. Stewart was a military man and Muir describes him as being “brave to a fault, 
wildly indiscreet, hot-tempered and also fond of intrigue.” He was not much of a diplomat 
and was definitely out of his league with Hardenberg, Humboldt, Metternich, and 
Alexander.30 Nor was he to get on well with Cathcart, the British ambassador to Russia - after 
a couple of months on the Continent he complained: “Lord C[athcart] takes two days to 
consider a despatch, and two to write one, and he never begins to think till other people have 
done.”31 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
102, 285; SCHROEDER: The Transformation of European Politics, p. 448; WEBSTER: The Foreign Policy of 
Castlereagh, p. 119f. 
30 KISSINGER: A World Restored, p. 47, 89; MUIR: Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon, p. 247-249; SCHROEDER: 
The Transformation of European Politics, p. 452-454; WEBSTER: The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, p. 126. 
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The news from Prussia was for the British Cabinet even more reason to rejoice, as Austria 
still did not show any signs that she would follow suit. Francis, the Emperor of Austria, was a 
benign man who was popular among his people. Political matters, however, he mainly left to 
Prince Metternich. The latter had become Foreign Secretary in 1809, a position he was to 
occupy for nearly forty years, and was an embodiment of the aristocratic stereotype of the 
century that had just elapsed. He was a conservative to the bone, an artful diplomat, and an 
adept manipulator. 32 Comparing Metternich to Castlereagh, and describing both of them, 
Kissinger says: “Metternich was elegant, facile, rationalist; Castlereagh, solid, ponderous, 
pragmatic; the former was witty and eloquent, if somewhat pedantic; the latter cumbersome in 
expression, although effective in debate; Metternich was doctrinaire and devious; Castlereagh, 
matter-of-fact and direct.”33 While Kissinger also asserts that Metternich “for three years was 
in effect Prime Minister of Europe,”34 Schroeder points out that Metternich’s influence was 
limited to responding to events and therefore states: “Perhaps Metternich was, as he believed, 
the coachman of Europe; if so, his efforts went mainly to keeping the horses under control, 
the coach upright, the passengers reasonably peaceable, and himself at the reins rather than 
bringing the coach to his choice of destination.”35  
 
With the Peace of Schönbrunn in 1809, Austria had to surrender a considerable part of her 
territory and was so broke that Napoleon did not even bother to constrain the size of her 
forces, as he knew Austria could not afford a significant army anyway. Only one year later 
Napoleon married a daughter of the Austrian Emperor in his incessant quest for legitimacy, 
and thus the two countries were bonded together by family relations. Indeed, every one of the 
great Continental Powers had fought Napoleon, but also every one of them had at other times 
been aligned with him. At the same time they were often in discord with each other, a fact that 
was viewed as perilous in Britain, because it weakened the Continental Powers while 
strengthening France. And for Great Britain it was all quite simple: France was the foe; 
therefore France had to be defeated. Britain, however, had a sea between them and the point 
of peril, and an island to retreat to if things went wrong. The European Powers did not. In a 
way, Castlereagh was right when doubting Metternich’s resolve. The Austrian Minister was 
not looking for a glorious campaign, but for the restoration of the equilibrium. In other words 
he did not aim at the downfall of France, only at restraining her. Nevertheless, Castlereagh 
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misinterpreted Metternich’s hesitancy. The Austrian knew full well what a danger France 
posed, but he also feared Alexander’s aspiration – something that had hitherto gone 
completely unnoticed in London. Metternich, on the other hand, had always mistrusted 
Alexander, and although Russia was now at war with France, the memory of Tilsit impeded 
Austria and Prussia to count on Russia’s steadiness. Prussia, geographically situated in the 
middle of events, had hardly any other choice than to declare for one side, but Austria was set 
on keeping her freedom of action as long as she could. On one hand, Metternich was thrilled 
with the prospect of diminishing France’s hegemony; on the other hand he had no intention to 
see it replaced by a Russian one. Prussia’s recovery of her Polish lands had not been 
mentioned in the Treaty of Kalish; instead, it had indicated that Frederick William III should 
look for indemnification elsewhere, perhaps in Saxony. Despite Alexander’s persistent silence, 
Metternich had a premonition of the former’s aspiration. If the treaty itself was more than 
sufficient to arouse his suspicion, an intercepted letter, indicating the creation of a Polish 
kingdom under the Tsar’s sovereignty, substantiated his suspicion. Such growth of Russian 
influence into Central Europe would make the Prussian King a hireling of the Tsar. Yet the 
thought of Prussia making up for her territorial losses by annexing lands in Germany was 
equally unpleasant, as this would inevitably lead to rivalry between the two German Powers 
for preponderance. Therefore, even though Metternich aimed at a reasonable reduction of 
French power, he was not overly keen on seeing the Russian plans succeed. What he wanted 
was not only the reduction of French, but also of Russian power. This, however, also meant 
that France should not be too enfeebled, because it was needed as counterbalance to Russia. 
Experience had taught Metternich not to get Austria involved in hostilities unless all danger 
had been eliminated or at least considerably reduced. He had to be quite careful, as Austria 
might not survive a mistake. In his quest to preserve Austria, Metternich thus was constantly 
trying to maintain as much room for manoeuvre as possible. Aligning Austria with the Allies 
would have meant forsaking the alliance with France, and would therefore have been nothing 
else but an open breach of faith. But in suggesting peace talks in which Austria would be the 
mediator, Metternich was able to get Austria out of the alliance with France and into a state of 
neutrality – and this subtly and with Napoleon’s assent. At first, however, his offer of 
mediation fell on deaf ears because none of the belligerents were interested in peace. 36 
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The first quarter of 1813 had hardly witnessed any clashes of arms, and the soldiers fell prey 
to the harsh climate and sickness rather than to the foe. Napoleon’s field army in the spring of 
1813 amounted to 200,000 men, but the bulk of them were new recruits who lacked 
experience and were prone to illness. Another problem was that Napoleon was unable to 
countervail the loss of horses sustained in Russia. This not only caused the cavalry to be 
feeble (leading to ineffective pursuits of the enemy and consequently to fruitless victories 
throughout the campaign) but also took its toll with regard to the artillery as well as the 
logistics. In May, the Battles of Lützen and Bautzen took place and both were won by 
Napoleon. While the Allies were crestfallen, Napoleon’s position was none too good either, 
for he was unable to actually use the victories to his advantage. It was now that Metternich’s 
proposal was heard, as the belligerents expected to utilise the truce to tend to their armies and 
win over Austria. Thus, on 4 June, an armistice was agreed upon. Only Great Britain still 
rejected Austrian mediation, with the result that her representatives were hardly provided with 
any information, let alone called in on the negotiations. Although Alexander vindicated 
accepting Austrian mediation as necessary to persuade Austria to join the Allies37, Stewart 
was distressed and told Castlereagh: “I fear political treachery and the machinations that are 
in the wind more than any evils from Bonaparte’s myrmidons. We must keep a sharp look-out, 
especially since our refusal of Austrian mediation. We are not considered (from all I see going 
on) in the Cabinet.”38 Although Britain did not make any payments during the truce, the 
subsidy treaties were finally concluded in the middle of June at Reichenbach. According to 
the treaties, Britain pledged to pay two million pounds as subsidies, of which two-thirds were 
given to Russia and the rest went to Prussia. In return the former pledged to provide 160,000 
men and the latter 80,000 men. Subsidies, so it was hoped in London, might discourage the 
Allies from making peace. The treaties, as it was a custom feature, included an official pledge 
of all the Allies not to make separate peace. In truth, if Russia and Prussia wanted to make 
peace, Britain could do nothing to avert it.39 
 
While the Cabinet was entirely against peace, opinions were different within the Opposition. 
Whitbread had already agitated for a negotiated peace in late 1812, but even among the 
Opposition he hardly found any like-minded people. However, when it became clear how 
hard the Russian campaign had hit Napoleon, and as things were looking up for the Allies in 
                                                 
37 MUIR: Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon, p. 252, 255-257, 287; WEBSTER: The Foreign Policy of 
Castlereagh, p. 137. 
38 Stewart to Castlereagh, 6 June 1813, C.C. IX, p. 22. 
39 MUIR: Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon, p. 253, 257f; SCHROEDER: The Transformation of European 
Politics, p. 457. 
 15 
the first quarter of 1813, voices calling for peace became louder. The pessimistic Grey 
expected the Coalition to be short-lived and pressed for a speedy conclusion of peace, even on 
lenient conditions. In sharp contrast to Grey, Grenville thought that they were witnessing a 
golden opportunity to shake France’s power and did not want to pass it up. The Cabinet was 
in a rather strong position in 1813. Although the Whigs increasingly favoured peace, 
Grenville successfully prevented them, Whitbread aside, from urging it. Grenville did so 
because he was well aware that public opinion was against a speedy, lenient peace – and 
demanding it would only enkindle antipathy. Curiously, it was the other way around where 
the Peninsular War was concerned: Grey at this stage - as actually most of the Whigs now - 
endorsed Britain’s efforts in Iberia, while Grenville still believed them to be a lost cause. That 
the theatres of war were inevitably linked to each other was either not comprehended, or 
simply ignored.40  
 
As Britain did not participate in the armistice, she did not have to suspend hostilities in the 
Peninsula. As a result of his heavy losses sustained in Russia, Napoleon was in dire need of 
veterans, and thus summoned a force of 20,000 men from Iberia. This naturally strengthened 
Wellington’s position. On 21 June 1813, Wellington won the Battle of Vitoria, which meant 
that most of northern Spain was now freed of the French. After Vitoria, Wellington could 
have crossed over to France, but instead, he decided to lay siege to San Sebastian and 
Pamplona. Further opportunities to invade France were to follow, but Wellington refrained 
from doing so throughout 1813. His reluctance derived from various reasons: he was worried 
that his army, most of all the Spanish part of it, would badly misbehave in France and unleash 
a revolt. In addition, he doubted the resolution of the Allies and dreaded they would conclude 
peace with Napoleon. This would enable the French to turn against him with a much larger 
force and he would be left with no other option than to withdraw.41  
 
Meanwhile at Reichenbach, Russia and Prussia had not only concluded their subsidy treaties 
with Britain, but had at the same time also come to an agreement with Austria. The latter 
power promised to engage in the war on the allied side in case Napoleon rejected the 
following conditions: the Duchy of Warsaw should be dismembered, Prussia’s territory 
should be increased, Illyria should be returned to Austria, and Hamburg and Lübeck should be 
free. Thus Napoleon’s acceptance or refusal of these terms would determine whether Austria 
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would join the Allies. Metternich also promised to champion the dissolution of the 
Confederation of the Rhine and to restore Prussia to her size of 1805. In case Napoleon 
refused those terms, Austria was not bound to get herself involved in the war. However, even 
in the event of Napoleon’s acceptance, neither Russia nor Prussia was committed to make 
peace. The terms of the agreement are remarkable insofar as they clearly display the disregard 
of British interests. The Austrian Foreign Minister wanted the peace terms to be as moderate 
as possible, fearing Napoleon would otherwise not accept them. Also, he was concerned that 
France should remain a considerable power because she should be able to counterbalance 
Russia. And as Britain’s goals hardly appealed to Metternich, he merely viewed the insular 
power as a hindrance to peace. On 26 June 1813, Metternich had a stormy, yet unfruitful 
meeting with Napoleon. The latter did not see why he should relinquish land – after all it had 
been he who had won the last two battles. Thus, he did not accept the peace conditions, but he 
agreed with Metternich on a prolongation of the truce. He did so because he wished for more 
time to tend to his army, and Metternich, too, knew that also the Austrian forces would 
require a bit more time to get ready. Consequently, the truce was extended until 10 August 
and negotiations were planned at Prague, which, too, were to prove unproductive. Neither 
Prussia nor Russia was impressed by the prolongation of the armistice, but they wanted to 
mollify Austria, hence they could do naught but lament and acquiesce. However, all 
Metternich’s efforts for peace had been in vain. Accordingly, after the expiration of the 
armistice, Austria declared war. Napoleon was taken aback – he had never thought that 
Emperor Francis would engage his country in hostilities against his son-in-law. But as it was, 
he now had to face all of Europe’s great powers and their allies: Spain, Portugal and Sweden. 
For the British Cabinet, the news that the war continued was cause for great rejoicing and so 
was the fact that Austria was now part of the Allies, which had not really been expected in 
London. 42  Mere weeks beforehand, Castlereagh had actually agreed to Metternich’s 
arbitration, as he believed that “the risk of treating with France is great, but the risk of losing 
our Continental Allies and the confidence of our own nation is greater.” 43  Until the 
instructions had reached the British representatives, however, it was too late to have any 
influence on Austrian mediation. At the end of July, Castlereagh had also selected a British 
ambassador to Austria: the young Earl of Aberdeen. This was another peculiar appointment; 
even more than Cathcart, indeed even more than Stewart, Aberdeen was utterly unsuitable for 
his position. He could not speak French properly and was definitely out of his league with 
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Metternich. Dispatched in August, he only reached headquarters a month later, and before 
long Metternich had completely fooled him. 44 On 23 September he told Castlereagh:  
“Metternich continues to be as cordial and as confidential as possible, I think this man 
must be honest; yet it may be after all that he is only a most consummate actor. I will 
be sufficiently cautious, but I will also retain the favourable opinion I have of him 
until I see some good ground to change it.”45  
 
In November he even saw fit to inform Castlereagh: 
“Do not think Metternich such a formidable personage, depend upon it, I have the 
most substantial reasons for knowing that he is heart and soul with us: but, my dear 
Castlereagh, with all your wisdom, judgment, and experience, which are as great as 
possible and which I respect sincerely, I think you have so much of the Englishman as 
not quite to be aware of the real value of foreign modes of acting. […] Living with 
him at all times, and in all situations, is it possible I should not know him? If indeed he 
were the most subtle of mankind, he might certainly impose on one little used to 
deceive, but this is not his character. He is, I repeat it to you, not a very clever man.46 
He is vain; but he is a good Austrian. He may, perhaps, like the appearance of 
negotiation a little too much, but he is to be trusted.”47  
 
On 9 September at Teplitz, the three continental powers formally concluded their alliance. 
While it provided for the strengthening of Prussia and Austria in a degree that would make 
them as powerful as they had been in 1805 and the dismemberment of the Duchy of Warsaw, 
the agreement, however, disregarded nearly all matters of British interest. Only the restoration 
of Hanover 48  was stipulated, whereas nothing was said about Holland, Norway, Sicily, 
Portugal, or Spain. This demonstrates the deficiency of Britain’s sway on the Continent. 
Partly out of mistrust of Napoleon, but partly also because he hoped to enhance Britain’s 
influence on the Continent, Castlereagh suggested a prolongation of the alliance, even in case 
of peace with France. The project, however, when it finally arrived in mid-October, was not 
to find the favour of the Allies, and this was simply another proof to the Cabinet that Britain 
was in dire need for a more qualified representative. At any rate, in spite of the evident 
disregard, Great Britain remained the paymaster of the Coalition. On 3 October, Britain 
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concluded a treaty of alliance with Austria. The latter pledged herself to furnish a force of 
150,000 men, while the former promised support valued at one million pounds.49  
 
 
5. THE AUTUMN CAMPAIGN AND  
THE FRANKFURT PROPOSALS 
 
The belligerents had utilised the truce to enforce their troops. Estimations number Napoleon’s 
army in Germany at 450,000 soldiers, plus an additional 250,000 in development, while the 
forces of the Allies amounted up to some 500,000 men as well as 350,000 soon to come. It 
was the first time Europe witnessed such masses of soldiers. The Allies had agreed, though 
not without a dispute, to appoint the Austrian Prince Schwarzenberg generalissimo of the 
allied armies. His command, however, was in name only, and Blücher and Bernadotte, the 
other generals, were not at all inclined to obediently take his orders. Alexander and Frederick 
William III also continued their meddling in military affairs, which did not make 
Schwarzenberg’s task any easier.50 It was not for naught that Blücher, after Leipzig, toasted to 
“the Commander-in-Chief who had three monarchs at his headquarters and still managed to 
beat the enemy!”51 At Trachenberg in mid-July, the Allies agreed on how to proceed in the 
following campaign. There were to be three armies – the Army of the North (consisting of 
roughly 100,000 soldiers) led by Bernadotte, the Army of Silesia (consisting of roughly  
90,000 soldiers) led by Blücher, and the Army of Bohemia (consisting of roughly 230,000, 
mostly Austrian, soldiers) led by Schwarzenberg. All of them were to avoid a clash of arms 
with Napoleon, while striking the smaller French contingents. Only when the French were 
worn out would the armies merge and attack Napoleon. This finally was the case on 16 
October, when Schwarzenberg gave battle at Leipzig (Napoleon’s base of operations). Not 
only Blücher’s and Bernadotte’s armies joined him, but also the Bavarian forces (who 
changed sides in early October) as well as the Saxon forces (who only defected Napoleon in 
the course of the battle). The battle lasted until 19 October and based on the sheer size of the 
armies it was the biggest of the entire Napoleonic Wars. The Emperor of the French was 
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defeated and had to flee across the Rhine with the remainder of his army – merely some 
110,000 men.52  
 
In the aftermath of Leipzig, the Austrian Foreign Minister expected to find Napoleon more 
pliable and again wished for peace negotiations. Probably with the expectation that the French 
Emperor would decline (which in turn would facilitate the vindication of allied troops 
marching in France), Alexander agreed. Having the latter’s assent, Metternich seems not to 
have bothered asking the Prussians and probably would have acted similarly regarding Britain, 
but as Aberdeen was won over easily there was no need. Metternich, therefore, did not have 
to worry about the other British representatives, who would most likely not have agreed to the 
Frankfurt Proposals, as Aberdeen himself was set on keeping them in the dark. As to the 
terms, the Allies were prepared to conclude peace on the natural frontiers, viz. the Pyrenees in 
the west and the Alps as well as the Rhine in the east. The proposal also provided for an 
independent Holland; there was, however, no mention of where its border would be. True, 
Napoleon would have to surrender Holland, Hamburg, and the northern Italian lands, but after 
Leipzig these conditions were still exceedingly moderate. The conditions were far more 
generous than justified, in view to the auspicious campaign, for Metternich wanted to make 
sure France stayed an important factor in the balance of power.53 He did so, as Kissinger aptly 
put it, “not indeed because Metternich wanted to save Napoleon, but because he wanted to 
save Saxony and Poland.”54 The peace proposal thus might be used to constrain Alexander’s 
ambitions, as well as create difficulties for Napoleon at home in view of the war-weariness 
inside France. The British Cabinet did not apprehend Metternich’s motive; they were not even 
aware that a conflict regarding Poland was in the offing. They just wanted to restrict France to 
the frontiers she had controlled before the revolution 55 , as Castlereagh pointed out to 
Aberdeen: “You will not be surprised to learn, after such a tide of success, that this nation is 
likely to view with disfavour any peace which does not confine France strictly within her 
ancient limits.”56 
 
In truth, even if Napoleon had at once agreed to the proposal, it is not clear if Metternich 
would have been able to convince his allies. Napoleon, however, did not. Only in early 
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December was the proposal positively answered by Caulaincourt, the new and pacific French 
Foreign Secretary. It remains, however, unknown if Napoleon seriously wished for peace or if 
he simply regarded the proposals as a means to make mischief and then exploit allied 
dissensions. Yet, things for the Allies had meanwhile undergone another auspicious shift as a 
Dutch upheaval in mid-November had freed Holland of the French. As it was, the Allies now 
started to waver and claimed that peace negotiations would have to wait until a British 
representative in possession of the necessary authority would join them, and accordingly a 
request was sent to London. 57 Meanwhile, the military operations continued, and Bernadotte 
had turned his attention towards Denmark. This had been arranged, but it did not make him 
popular among the British, who had wished for the marshal’s aid in freeing the Low Countries. 
When the Allies drew nearer to France, Bernadotte showed himself unsettled – partly 
attempting to spare France, partly envisioning himself as new Emperor of the French. At any 
rate, Schwarzenberg entered Switzerland in late 1813, and Blücher crossed the Rhine on 1 
January, 1814. The invasion of France had begun.58 
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III. INSIDE FRANCE 
 
 
6. CASTLEREAGH’S MISSION TO THE CONTINENT 
 
With Caulaincourt’s acceptance of the Frankfurt proposals as the basis for peace negotiations 
in early December, it was assumed that concordance was underway. The British government 
was scared that a peace would be made in a way that would neglect British interests. For, as 
we have seen, Britain’s sway on the continent was marginal. Reasons for this lack of 
influence can be found in Britain’s up-to-then displayed attitude of persistence towards the 
war: the Allies were aware that Britain would not conclude a separate peace with France; 
hence, her bargaining position was diminished. Also the fact that she was represented by 
ineligible plenipotentiaries, who did not get on with each other, did nothing to improve her 
standing on the Continent: Cathcart, Stewart and Aberdeen were constantly in dispute with 
each other and therefore, in no position to represent Great Britain efficiently. And even if they 
had been, they were short of the necessary authority. Therefore, a request on part of the Allies 
had been made to assign a person equipped with the necessary capacity. With decisions 
needing to be made on the spot, directing from London was no option since the distance did 
not allow communication in reasonable time, and decisions had to be made then and there. In 
addition, reports about allied dissension were alarming. For all these reasons the 
indispensability of a sole, authoritative representative became evident. Somebody had to be at 
the heart of events to mollify the Allies, to make sure Britain had her say, and to make the 
gravest decisions as to war or peace. At a cabinet meeting on the 20 December the person 
who would take on this difficult mission was chosen; no one else but the Foreign Minister 
himself had to go. 59 
 
The importance of Castlereagh’s task was not only displayed in the decision that he was 
singled out, for it was a most unusual thing for a Foreign Secretary to leave the country, but 
also in the fact that the ministers were meeting every day from 24 to 26 December, in the 
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midst of the Christmas holidays, to discuss the issues as well as to review and approve the 
instructions Castlereagh himself had mapped out.60 
 
The Allies had already consented on expelling French rule of Italy as well as the Peninsula 
and had also agreed not to debate the maritime rights. Britain’s principal aims were, therefore, 
reduced to first, a more permanent alliance, and second, the independence and enlargement of 
Holland. It was a matter of utmost importance to extract as large a piece of Belgium from 
France as anyhow doable. Presumably this territory would not be able to bear up against 
French influence, thus one option, namely that of a free Belgium, was no option at all. It was 
a desirable possibility to give it to Holland, but the Cabinet would also be content if Emperor 
Francis, who had not revoked his ancient rights as yet, decided to retain the former Austrian 
Netherlands. Belgium’s fate was thus quite unclear, nonetheless were the Cabinet irrevocably 
set on the policy that Holland should get a barrier, which at least had to include Antwerp. 
What dimension exactly the barrier was to have was left to Castlereagh. To secure these 
objects Castlereagh was allowed to barter Britain’s colonial conquests, except for Guadeloupe, 
Les Saintes, Bourbon, Malta, and the Cape, which were to be retained for their strategic 
importance, respectively, as Guadeloupe had been promised to Sweden. In favour of Holland, 
two million pounds would be paid for the Cape, on condition that the money was utilised in 
order to fortify the new barrier. Regarding the colonial conquests that were to be given back, 
the slave trade had been abolished under British rule. Nonetheless, the instructions did not say 
anything about this matter – a neglect which was soon to attract critics, ahead of all 
Wilberforce. However, for the return of the colonies it was stipulated that a more permanent 
alliance should be concluded, which should transcend the war and shelter Europe in case of 
further French aggression.61  
 
It was believed that peace was to be concluded with Napoleon, who was more loathed in 
Great Britain than in any other country. In spite of the fact that the whole Cabinet regarded 
peace with Bonaparte hazardous, whereas the restoration of the Bourbons was thought of as 
being very desirable, nothing of this was mentioned in the instructions. Webster explains this 
exclusion as probably due to the ministers preferring to omit this tricky question in an official 
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document, as this might be subject to the Parliament’s examination. As it was, the press was 
already disputing a possible overthrow of Napoleon. However, the Cabinet regarded any 
interference in French domestic matters as being foolish. There was no trace of a strong 
movement on the part of the French against Napoleon and, apart from Austria, who had 
declared herself against any step to overthrow Napoleon, the stance of the Allies on this issue 
was unclear. Besides, even though the prevailing mood in the country was such that opposed 
negotiations with Bonaparte, the Government also had to take the Liberals into account, who 
were most certain to criticise the Cabinet if it made the re-establishment of the Bourbons a 
precondition for peace with France. For all these reasons Castlereagh disregarded the hatred 
the public bore towards Napoleon and, though he was convinced of the necessity of keeping 
the acts of war going even during peace negotiations, he sought to obviate any doubt as to the 
sincerity with which Great Britain was handling the negotiations. 62  Upon reports of 
Wellington about probable favourable sentiments of the French towards the Bourbons, 63 
Castlereagh remarked that no steps should be taken to encourage these, since “[…] it will be 
considered as a trick on our part to get rid of the negociation [sic!] […]” and he concluded 
that, “should France reject the Allied terms, we are then all free to do what we like; but, 
having gone the length with our Allies to accept a basis on which we have declared that we 
are ready to negociate [sic!], I think our line ought to be an unembarrassed one till the 
question of negociation [sic!] is disposed of.”64 As matters stood, peace was negotiated with 
Napoleon, which implied that it was him who would continue to rule France, which hence 
made it impracticable to favour the Bourbons in public. Thus, even though the ministers were 
at one in their desire to see the Bourbons back on the throne of France, they also agreed that 
unless the French would revolt in favour of the ‘legitimate’ dynasty, no open support could be 
given.65 Castlereagh said that his “[…] impressions are against any step, which should, even 
in appearance, mix our system with that of the Bourbons, whilst we are embarked in 
discussions for peace, and ignorant how our Allies would relish such a step at the present 
moment […]” 66  This again underpins the importance that was addressed to harmonious 
relations with the Allies and Britain’s desire of maintaining the alliance, Kissinger speaking 
of: “[…] a cardinal principle of Castlereagh’s policy: the unity of the alliance superseded all 
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but the most basic British interests; or better, the Coalition of Europe was a basic British 
interest.”67 
 
So, as we have seen, the instructions placed emphasis on the alliance as well as the 
Netherlands, respectively Antwerp, while others in Great Britain quite frequently discussed 
matters like the abolition of the slave trade and the question of Napoleon’s rule, were left out 
altogether. What else was mentioned in the instructions? Concerning European objectives 
they were quite vague - Hanover was even left out altogether. For other issues, even the major 
ones that the Allies were so fiercely in controversy about, the ministry did not care too much, 
thus Castlereagh was free to handle them as he pleased. This demonstrates on the one hand 
just how much the Cabinet trusted their Foreign Minister. On the other hand, it also exposes 
the lack of interest in continental matters; there was hardly any minister who was interested in 
the disputes of the continental powers and the issue of the European settlement. 68  This 
demonstrates quite well the point of view of an insular power, who over and above had been 
isolated for the past years. As Kissinger rightly points out: “[…] Britain spoke of common 
interests, but it meant the military defeat of France; it advocated a European equilibrium, but 
was really thinking about Antwerp.”69 Experiences, particularly the one made in the face of 
continued serious threats of invasion from 1803-1805, had taught the British that Antwerp 
was a point of peril, which just could not be left in French hands.70  
 
Bad weather conditions caused the sea voyage to be quite slow; thus Castlereagh, together 
with his wife, Robinson, Planta, and two more office clerks reached The Hague only on 7 
January, 1814. Here the British Foreign Minister consulted with the Prince of Orange about 
the wedding of the Prince Regent’s only child, Princess Charlotte, and the Hereditary Prince 
of Orange. Moreover they arranged for The Cape being incorporated permanently into the 
British Empire according to the instructions and also talked about Belgium. The next day, 
leaving his wife in The Hague, Castlereagh carried on his journey through a terribly bad 
winter – the Thames as well as the Rhine was frozen - moving as fast as possible on the 
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dreadful roads. Still, it gave him time for consideration of the European issues, which had 
been only vaguely mentioned or had been left out altogether in his instructions.71  
 
Castlereagh sought to bring the allied statesmen into formal and forthright discussions to 
improve their relations and since Great Britain had no territorial interest as such for herself on 
the Continent, he hoped to be able to act as a mediator. This was not going to be an easy task, 
given that the Allies were on the brink of dissolution. Kissinger explains that a coalition, 
which only holds together by the threat of a common enemy, will run the risk of 
disintegrating itself as soon as the enemy is weakened to an extent that it is no longer any 
more powerful than a single member of the alliance. As matters stood it seemed likely that 
Bonaparte would be overpowered – the real question was: what would happen then? Could 
the Allies reach an agreement or would a victorious war end in chaos?72 Aberdeen, describing 
the tense situation in a letter to Castlereagh, opined: “Although there is much to say, and 
much that is most important, in a word, with relation to the enemy, our situation is as good as 
possible-among ourselves it is quite the reverse. Everything which has been so long 
smothered is now bursting forth.” 73  The controversy that so endangered the continued 
existence of the Coalition regarded the question of proceeding further. Should there be peace 
negotiations with Bonaparte or should the Allies march on to Paris? Napoleon had waited too 
long to accept the exceedingly moderate terms of the Frankfurt Proposals. Ever since the 
allied armies had entered France, Alexander’s confidence and ambition had been growing 
excessively. Strong sentiments against the Frankfurt proposals and in favour of the 
prosecution of war were now prevailing amongst Russians and Prussians; Metternich, who 
suspected their claims to be rising, was anxious to make peace with Napoleon, lest France be 
too weakened to be a weight in the equilibrium, which would render it possible for Alexander 
to achieve his goals by himself and could result in a Russian instead of a French supremacy 
on the Continent. Alexander had now even adumbrated that he planned to overthrow 
Napoleon and thought of Marshal Bernadotte as his successor. Seeing as Bernadotte was the 
Tsar’s fosterling, the Tsar would gain a good deal of influence over France if the marshal 
really was to be Napoleon’s successor.74 
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To make Castlereagh’s task even more difficult, the conditions at headquarters were anything 
but inviting. The allied headquarters were situated amidst hostile domain; consequently, 
during the whole campaign the military operations distressed everyone, including the 
monarchs as well as the diplomats, leading to abrupt breakups of the meetings, not to speak of 
the lack of comfort and the acerbity of the weather.75 
 
However, the British government could hardly have chosen anyone more suitable for this 
mission than Castlereagh. Robinson claimed that “the suavity and dignity of his manners, his 
habitual patience and self-command, his considerate tolerance of difference of opinion in 
others, all fitted him for such a task; whilst his firmness, when he knew he was right, in no 
degree detracted from the influence of his conciliatory demeanour.”76 If this dithyramb was a 
bit overstated, Robinson was still far from wrong. For Castlereagh was indeed extremely well 
suited for his task and was to become “perhaps the most European of British statesmen.”77 
Moreover, he as well was to be the “arbiter of Europe” because, as will be seen, he was to 
steady the contradicting impulses of Alexander on the one side, and Metternich on the other.78 
 
As already mentioned, the enemy’s weakness had further enhanced Alexander’s craving for 
pressing onwards. This wish was evidently even greater as the one to meet Castlereagh at the 
soonest time possible, despite the fact, that it was quite obvious that Castlereagh would play 
an important role in forging the Ally’s destiny. Thus, when Castlereagh reached Basle on 18 
January, the Tsar had already left following the army. Still, the British Foreign Minister was 
finally able to meet the majority of the monarchs and statesmen personally. Despite 
longstanding mutual suspiciousness and even animosity, Metternich and Castlereagh tried to 
create a harmonious connection – the former in the hope of winning an ally in restraining the 
Tsar’s aspirations, the latter to sustain good relations within the alliance. Unexpectedly both 
thought one another quite pleasant - an understanding was reached in a few interviews only79, 
Muir referring to them as the “by far […] most important of Castlereagh’s meetings - indeed 
one of the turning-points of his life […].”80  
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Metternich put an astonished Castlereagh in the picture about Alexander’s desire to see 
Bernadotte on the French throne. Castlereagh, contrary to popular British opinion, had been 
prepared to come to terms with Napoleon as the ruler of France for he had thought this 
necessary to maintain allied unity. He still favoured the old dynasty to rule France, yet, 
deciding from a European perspective, he was ready to leave the door open for negotiations 
with Bonaparte, though he precluded a regency under Marie Louise. Of any additional options, 
he had been completely unaware, hence his astonishment at the possibility of the installation 
of marshal Bernadotte as France’s future ruler. The Austrian Foreign Secretary was indignant 
at the Tsar’s scheme, for he dreaded an alliance between France and Russia, the latter in this 
scenario being in the leading position. At the same time, again to Castlereagh’s surprise, he 
didn’t show himself too keen on the prospect of a Habsburg regency. Metternich, scared of 
another social uprising, would rather have preserved Napoleon as the leader of France; 
however, to please Britain, he also embraced the idea of the Bourbon’s return to power. 
Consequently, it was agreed that France could only be ruled by either Napoleon or Louis. In 
truth, these were the only real possibilities, for any other ruler might provoke political 
destabilisation in France, which could result in additional wars, or connect the country too 
closely to another power – in case of a regency under Marie Louise this would be Austria, in 
case of an installation of Bernadotte this would be Russia – and thereby play havoc with the 
equilibrium. Castlereagh and Metternich also agreed that whether the future French ruler was 
to be Louis or Napoleon should be decided by the French. For the time being negotiations 
should be made with Napoleon.81  
 
Thus, Metternich was happy to have found support against Alexander’s ambitions and not 
only showed himself disinterested in regaining the Austrian Netherlands, but also made 
concessions to suit British views about this corner of the Continent. This pleased Castlereagh, 
as well as the fact that the Austrians did not wish for a Regency and would not stand against 
the deposing of Napoleon, should it prove necessary. Therefore, at the end of their discussions 
at Basle, both ministers had cause for happiness.82 In his memoires, Metternich recalled his 
first meeting with Castlereagh: 
“Our stay in Basle had nothing remarkable in it but the arrival of Lord Castlereagh. It 
was here that a few hours’ conversation sufficed to lay the foundation of a good 
feeling between this upright and enlightened statesman and myself, which the 
following eventful years cemented and enlarged. I found Lord Castlereagh not quite 
thoroughly informed of the real state of affairs on the Continent. His straightforward 
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feeling, free from all prejudice and prepossession, and his justice and benevolence 
gave him a quick insight into the truth of things.”83  
 
Castlereagh, was not quite so full of praise for Metternich; he thought him to be timorous and 
delaying matters. All in all, however, Castlereagh thought him to be quite pleasant. This 
feeling of mutual amity was a valuable asset, because, as will be seen, Basle had only been 
the calm before the storm, which was soon to erupt at Langres. In the upcoming discussions it 
was to become evident that Great Britain had assumed a virtual part and its representative, 
Castlereagh, was to make a big step on his way to evolve into a European statesman. 84 
 
 
7. THE CLASH WITH ALEXANDER 
 
Castlereagh and everyone else at Basle moved forward, following Schwarzenberg’s army and 
the Tsar to Langres, where they arrived on 25 January. The outlook of the military situation 
was now such an auspicious one that a march on Paris was deemed possible. The enemy 
basically seemed to be powerless, thus pressing the army onwards would only lead to an 
additional enfeeblement of France, while rigidifying Russia’s position. As the British were 
completely riveted on the fight against Bonaparte, they could not as yet grasp that peace 
might be endangered by anyone else. Castlereagh was not aware of the incredible extent of 
Alexander’s scheme concerning Poland, because he had been ill-briefed by Cathcart. The 
Foreign Minister, therefore, had no reason not to favour the further proceeding of the 
campaign; not so the Austrian Foreign Minister though. Distrusting Russia and dreading the 
obliteration of the equilibrium, Metternich sought to avert the struggle from turning into a 
total war. Since the growing feebleness of France was sapping his chances to achieve this by 
diplomatic means, he tried to hobble the military operations and instructed Schwarzenberg to 
that effect by ordering him not to press forward any further. For Langres was, as 
Schwarzenberg pointed out to the Austrian Emperor, the last breakpoint before France’s 
capital city and, therefore, represented the last opportunity to make peace with Bonaparte.85 
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Realising the hampering effect on military operations, Castlereagh addressed the Tsar, 
inquiring about his war aims. And thus “his first real diplomatic battle,” how Webster called it, 
came about at Langres.86  
 
Sure, the Tsar also tried to establish good relations with Castlereagh, showing his amity by 
sending his sister Catherine to visit Great Britain and planning on doing the same himself 
later on. However, as being the head of an “acquisitive power,” he evaded stating his war 
objectives since, as Kissinger explains, by predicating the peace terms on the achievements on 
the battlefield, its potential gains would increase parallel to military success. Thus, when 
Castlereagh frankly asked Alexander about the latter’s rumoured wish for a France ruled by 
Bernadotte, the Tsar avoided a straight answer, though he expressed his aversion of both 
Napoleon as well as the Bourbons and stated that the matter of a future French government 
should be decided by the French. Opposing any peace negotiations, he wanted to advance 
further and postpone debates about this issue as well as Europe’s future boundaries, until 
Paris was reached, constantly pointing out his good faith as well as the hopelessness of 
concluding peace with the existent French ruler.87  
 
Castlereagh’s response was partly an advocacy of the Bourbons, claiming they would 
facilitate a peaceful Europe, and partly a warning, stating his fear that a march on France’s 
capital city might provoke a Jacobin insurrection. Additionally, he was not blind to the 
dangers an overhasty advance would pose to the long lines of communication, writing to 
Liverpool: 
“I am confident our advantages are solid with management; but we must not 
undervalue our difficulties, with a line of wagons rolling day and night in our rear, 
from Berlin, Bohemia, and Hungary, which a small corps of cavalry thrown round our 
flanks might at once arrest, if strength is thrown too rapidly in advance.”88 
 
The cautious Schwarzenberg, in a letter to his wife, complained about Blücher’s course of 
action, claiming that the Prussian general was driven by childish wrath and completely 
disregarded all rules of the art of warfare.89 Castlereagh was not so hard on Blücher, calling 
him “a true hero,” who, however, “may sometimes err.” 90  So, although supporting the 
prosecution of armed hostilities, Castlereagh firmly stood up for simultaneously opening 
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peace negotiations. He was aware that Alexander sought to retaliate upon the French for the 
capture of Moscow, which is probably the main reason why the Tsar was unflinchingly bent 
on capturing Paris. He could then demonstrate his magnanimity, for he did not intend to 
expose Paris to the same fate that Moscow had encountered. 91  His words to Liverpool 
exposed his deep concern about Alexander’s rashness: 
“I think our greatest danger at present is from the chevalresque tone in which the 
Emperor Alexander is disposed to push the war. He has a personal feeling about Paris, 
distinct from all political or military combinations. He seems to seek for the occasion 
of entering with his magnificent guards the enemy’s capital, probably to display, in his 
clemency and forbearance, a contrast to that desolation to which his own was devoted. 
[…] I hope […] that we may not suffer from his precipitancy.”92  
 
Also, others at headquarters believed the Tsar’s attitude to be dangerous. Though Blücher 
wanted to bring about a result solely based on the success on the battlefield and King 
Frederick William simply did not dare to oppose Alexander, Hardenberg and Humboldt were 
in favour of peace negotiations. Metternich at this stage was so alarmed that he threatened to 
conclude a separate peace. Even Alexander’s own generals and diplomats opposed him. 
Considering that the Austrian troops played a decisive part in the campaign and that the Allies 
were all reliant on Britain’s money, in a combined effort Castlereagh and Metternich were 
able to deter the Tsar and the Prussian generals. So, in the end, His Imperial Majesty was 
overcome and it was decided that negotiations should take place while at the same time 
military operations should continue. This was a compromise, and both Alexander and 
Metternich had to make sacrifices – while the former now agreed to peace negotiations with 
Napoleon, the latter agreed to alter the terms on which basis peace could be made to less 
generous ones than the Frankfurt proposals. It was decided that the basis for the peace 
negotiations with France should be her borders of 1792, called the ‘ancient limits’, though 
with the chance of small concessions. Therewith, the Frankfurt proposals were discarded. 
Both the Austrian Minister and the Tsar were not too happy; the former would have liked to 
see better terms presented to France and the latter none whatsoever. Castlereagh, however, 
was quite content. 93 
 
Furthermore, Alexander’s suggestion that the territorial arrangements outside of France 
should not even be transmitted to Bonaparte was refused by Castlereagh; they were to be 
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presented, though only for acceptance, for they were not to be challenged, which meant a 
diplomatic exclusion of the enemy from the balance of power. The reason why Castlereagh 
was adamant on this point is found in his realisation of the peril arising out of the Allies’ 
disagreements, especially regarding Poland and Saxony. On the matter of Poland, he had 
meanwhile learned from Metternich a great deal about Alexander’s ambitions and started to 
grasp how far-reaching they were and what incredibly strong dissension prevailed between 
the Tsar and Metternich. The whole point of his insistence on submitting intelligence about 
the future territorial shape of Europe to France was that for this purpose, the Allies had to 
reach an agreement amongst themselves first, hoping this would consequently diminish the 
extent of potential upcoming differences. Yet it proved to be impossible for now to achieve a 
settlement outside of France, and as will be seen it would take over one year - and a lot of 
pain - to finally fulfil this formidable task.94 
 
The Tsar, as we have seen, had his reasons for avoiding stating his war aims. Additionally, 
since the Austrian army was still needed, he naturally wanted to avert a clash with Austria, 
which, needless to say, would most probably have been the result if he particularised his 
intentions about Poland, which were anyway already subject to the greatest suspicions on the 
part of the Austrians and had already caused much distrust. However, the Tsar’s actions also 
effectuated that Castlereagh’s suspicions of Russia increased, which in turn resulted in 
Castlereagh drawing closer to Austria – Muir even calling her “Britain’s most favoured ally.” 
This represents an amazingly fast alteration, seen as Marie-Louise’s wedding to Bonaparte 
and Austria’s conduct in the first months of 1813 had provoked profound resentment in Great 
Britain, whereas the Tsar had been extolled for his crusade against Napoleon and his heroism 
was subjected to great admiration. 95 Indeed, Metternich had every reason to be pleased. 
Already in Basle he had perceived the reconcilability between his and Castlereagh’s policy, 
recalling in his memoires: “I soon saw that his ideas about the reconstruction of France in a 
manner compatible with the general interests of Europe did not materially differ from 
mine.”96 Even more so, he eulogised the British Foreign Minister, exposing: “I cannot praise 
Castlereagh enough. His attitude is excellent and his work as direct as it is correct. I cannot 
find a single point of difference with him and […] his mood is peaceful, peaceful in our 
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sense.”97 And also in Langres, Metternich was anything but sparing with praise, announcing 
to Schwarzenberg rife with contentment: “Castlereagh behaves like an angel.”98 
 
Anyway, Castlereagh was out of luck in bringing the Allies to reach an agreement concerning 
the outline of a reconstructed Europe. The result was exceedingly sketchy - only the 
independence of both Switzerland and Holland, which would also be enlarged, was agreed 
upon, and some provisions were made as to the freedom of states in Germany and Italy. 
Castlereagh was not impressed by this scanty result and rejected particularising the colonial 
conquests Great Britain would restore. Instead, he even appended another condition for their 
restoration. Besides the extension of Holland and peace on the basis of 179299, he now also 
demanded an “amicable agreement of limits between the three Great Powers, that, having 
reduced France by their union, they were not likely to re-establish her authority by differences 
amongst themselves.”100 For unity of the Great Powers, regarding the settlement was crucial 
in order to diminish future conflicts, and Castlereagh conceived peace on the Continent as 
decisive for Great Britain. This shows that, as Kissinger aptly puts it, “he intended to seek 
British security in Continental stability, even if he still tended to identify stability with the 
restraint of France.” No wonder he therefore tried to bargain the colonial conquests to enforce 
this object. Still, the Allies were unable to achieve an agreement. Nevertheless, Castlereagh at 
least had already succeeded in achieving a few of his objects. The Allies had accepted the 
independence and an extension of Holland; again, the maritime rights would not be subject to 
debates, and France was to be given her ancient borders as a basis for the subsequent peace 
negotiations.101 
 
On 1 February, just a few days after the Allies had finally come to terms, Blücher, facing 
Napoleon’s army at La Rothière, bore the palm. The victory was not crucial, but Bonaparte 
had to retreat and gather his troops and it was expected that it would not take another fortnight 
until the allied armies would arrive at Paris. Therefore, the Battle of La Rothière naturally had 
an effect on the now ensuing peace negotiations at Châtillon.102 
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8. PEACE TALKS 
 
The negotiations at Châtillon were the last attempt to make peace with Napoleon. Other 
reasons put aside, these were doomed to failure simply because of the abyss between the 
legitimizing principles. The Allies could not feel secure without reducing Napoleon’s rule to 
France’s ancient limits, whereas Napoleon felt he could not agree to these terms lest it would 
cost him his position as ruler.103 The question was: Could he surrender his conquests and still 
reign as a King of France? A son of an ancient, ‘legitimate’ dynasty could maybe weather this 
opprobrium; Napoleon, “the son of the Revolution,” could not – or at least so he claimed. For 
Schroeder points out that none of the ‘legitimate’ sovereigns were entirely safe on their throne 
and argues that it was Napoleon’s unwillingness to make peace rather than any military 
defeats that eventually led to his deposition. 104 Thus, Schroeder concludes, 
“Napoleon’s claim that he had to fight to the bitter end because his throne and Empire 
could not survive without glory, together with his twin claim that treason and 
defection among his followers brought him down, were simply self-serving, stab-in-
the-back legends […] the fact that they have retained some credibility even among 
historians merely proves that Napoleon was one of the most remarkable, persuasive, 
and imprudent liars in history.”105  
 
Only when his fortune was completely at the mercy of the Allies, at the start and at the 
closing stages of the negotiations, Napoleon was prepared to conclude peace. Other than that, 
namely when his achievements on the battlefield gave him back a proportion of power, he 
was unwilling to come to terms with the Allies. Actually, whichever side temporarily got the 
upper hand on the battlefield was discontent with the terms upon which peace was to be made. 
And after La Rothière, the allied side was the fortunate one. This was the situation when the 
Congress commenced on 5 February at Châtillon. Each of the Great Powers sent a 
plenipotentiary to the peace conference – the Russians had appointed Razumovsky, the 
Austrians, Stadion and the Prussians, Humboldt. Only Britain, probably because Castlereagh 
felt that Aberdeen was too easily influenced by Austria, was represented by all three 
ambassadors, though Cathcart and Stewart were moaning because they would rather have 
stayed with the armed forces. Castlereagh, to supervise them, also travelled to Châtillon.106 
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Caulaincourt, who represented France, hardly could have had any doubt that the peace offer 
had been altered to the disadvantage of France. After all, since the Frankfurt proposals the 
allied armies had invaded France, the French had been forced to leave Holland, and Murat had 
deserted Napoleon by concluding a peace treaty with Austria on 11 January in return for the 
assurance of his sovereignty over Naples. Still, Caulaincourt was somewhat taken aback when 
he learned the nature of the new proposal. The Allies announced their offer of the ancient 
limits and the return of some colonial conquests to Caulaincourt, who obviously requested 
additional information, because, the French Foreign Minister would consider reducing France 
to its ancient borders only if the colonial conquests would be returned. However, the 
plenipotentiaries were unable to provide any information, simply because they did not know 
themselves. Castlereagh had rejected particularising what conquests were to be returned 
unless the Allies would come to an agreement concerning the settlement of Europe; in turn, 
Alexander was adamant about postponing until peace had been concluded with France, but to 
conclude peace, Caulaincourt needed to know what terms he could expect regarding the 
colonial conquests. Thus, the plenipotentiaries were trapped in a vicious circle they could not 
escape.107 Induced by the bizarre state of affairs, Stadion reported to Metternich: “We are 
playing a comedy […].”108 
 
Caulaincourt was really hoping to achieve peace, for he did not share the illusions that 
infested his master. Distressed, he sent word to Metternich on 9 February, proposing to 
acquiesce to the peace offer provided that the Allies would grant a truce. Napoleon, when he 
learned of this, was furious. However, at the same time the Tsar ordered Razumovsky to 
return to headquarters, which had meanwhile moved to Troyes. Ever since, La Rothière 
Alexander was absolutely sure that the Allies would be victorious, and had therefore no 
intentions to see the peace negotiations be successful. For this purpose, his plenipotentiary 
had done everything in his power to slow the discussions down. Now, with Razumovsky’s 
recall, the conference was suspended. This once more produced an angry Metternich, who 
now in despair sent for Castlereagh. The Coalition was on the brink of disintegration.109 
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9. THE CRISIS OF THE COALITION 
 
The controversy at Troyes was one quite similar to that fought out at Langres. Even though 
the French Foreign Minister had by now agreed to the allied terms of the ancient borders, the 
Tsar was unwilling to treat with Bonaparte. Induced by the auspicious military situation, the 
Tsar insisted again on pressing forward towards Paris and ousting Napoleon. In Paris, 
Alexander then planned to call in the notables and let them decide on the question of who was 
to rule France, again alluding to his dislike of Louis XVIII and the, in his mind, desirable 
possibility of Bernadotte’s accession to the throne. Metternich, using his preferred method of 
procedure, devised a questionnaire, posing questions like what to answer the French Foreign 
Minister, how to handle Paris if conquered, how to ascertain whom the French desired to be 
their ruler, and what to do with the Bourbons. Castlereagh, who had earlier supported the 
negotiation with Napoleon for the sake of the allied harmony, was still in favour of 
negotiations, though on different grounds. Now he favoured negotiations because he regarded 
an effort to oust the existent French ruler as being dishonourable and foolish, since in his 
mind the war had not been fought to change France’s domestic structure, and his concern was 
now directed at establishing a balance of power. In this war aim he had adapted Metternich’s 
point of view, which, as will be seen, was quite different from the British one. 110 
 
Prussia’s answer to the questionnaire was similar, but Russia’s was not. The Tsar’s objectives 
- even now in hindsight of the events - provoked the presumption that Alexander aimed at the 
establishment of Russian predominance over Europe – back then at least a lot of Austrians 
and also some Britons and Prussians most certainly deemed this to be the case. However, 
much of the Tsar’s aspirations actually stood in contrast to Russia’s national interests. This is 
the reason why Nesselrode was in disagreement with his sovereign on quite a few issues. For 
instance, he argued that peace with Napoleon on the basis of the natural borders would not 
threaten Russia, but Austria, Prussia, and the German states, which would all then have to 
look up to Russia as their protector. Additionally an early peace would give Russia the 
advantage of time, rendering a speedy settlement of the Polish issue possible, whereas a 
prolonged campaign would draw Russia into European affairs and therefore inevitably 
complicate the question of Poland. Alexander, however, made his decisions from a European, 
rather than a Russian point of view. Besides, Alexander was driven by contradicting impulses 
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- his personality compounding mysticism, autocracy, and liberalism - making his modus 
operandi one marked by discrepancy and unpredictability. And this, not the desire to gain 
power and territory, was exactly what Castlereagh conceived as the most threatening aspect of 
Alexander’s policy. At any rate, Alexander claimed Paris to be the objective of the war and 
suggested a Russian to oversee the elections and for the interim also govern France’s capital 
city. Metternich contradicted the Tsar’s war aim, averring that it was the re-establishment of 
the balance of power instead, what the Allies had fought for. The equilibrium, however, 
would be damaged by any further enfeeblement of France. And if it should really come to the 
overthrow of Napoleon, the only option was a Bourbon France with Louis XVIII as her king. 
Again, Metternich threatened to take Austria out of the war, but Alexander now considered it 
possible to vanquish Bonaparte and enter Paris without the Austrian army. After all, he had 
the option to detach the 61,000 Russians fighting in Schwarzenberg’s Bohemian army and 
unite them with Blücher’s Silesian army, of which two thirds consisted of Russians anyway. 
Prompted by the escalating tension, Castlereagh stopped acting as arbitrator. In the face of the 
evident threat of the Coalition’s dissolution, he suggested agreeing with Caulaincourt’s 
proposal and recommencing the Congress at Châtillon. Over and above, he endeavoured to 
persuade the Tsar to give his consent. 111  Kissinger points out this incredible change in 
Castlereagh’s policy: “Six weeks after he had set out for the Continent with the vision of a 
Europe united by the self-evident threat of French supremacy and stabilized by British-
Russian co-operation, Castlereagh emerged as a contestant for the equilibrium against the 
Tsar.”112 
 
On 13 and 14 February, Castlereagh had two tempestuous meetings with Alexander. Again 
Alexander repeated his unwillingness to treat with Bonaparte as well as his insistence on 
marching on to Paris and assembling the Notables to decide on a new ruler. Besides posing 
questions of where to get and how to choose notables, Castlereagh pointed out that there was 
no movement against Bonaparte and that a refusal to negotiate with him even though the 
French Foreign Minister had come to terms with their conditions might lead to chaos. 
Moreover, faced with dethronement, Napoleon was likely to carry on military operations even 
after the capital city was captured. And what if a new ruler was chosen – how would he be 
backed against the existent one? Would Russia be prepared to keep her troops in France? The 
Tsar, at a loss of arguments, accused Castlereagh of not representing the wishes of his country. 
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This allegation Alexander backed up with a letter he had received from his ambassador in 
London stating that both the Prince Regent as well as Lord Liverpool declared themselves 
against peace with Napoleon and instead supported the Bourbons. Castlereagh, as you would 
expect, was outraged at the Tsar’s allusion that he was acting without his Government’s trust, 
which implicitly put his authority into question.113 
 
The Tsar was not wrong with respect to the animosity prevailing in Great Britain against 
Napoleon, nor the widespread desire to see the Bourbons return to power. This was nothing 
new to Castlereagh – he himself had written as early as 13 November, 1813 to Aberdeen: 
“[…] peace with Buonaparte [sic!] on any terms will be far from popular, distrusting, as the 
people naturally do, his submitting to his destiny for any length of time […]”114 Indeed, 
aversion to Napoleon had in the meantime only intensified, Cooke speaking of “[…] the 
general, I may say universal, principle is – no peace with Bonaparte!” 115 and Liverpool 
exposing that: “the disposition in this country for any peace with Bounaparte becomes more 
unfavourable every day. I hear it from all quarters and from all classes of people.” 116 
Liverpool also dwelled on this subject in another letter in February:  
“You can scarcely have an idea how insane people in this country are on the subject of 
any peace with Buonaparte [sic!], and I should really not be surprised at any public 
manifestation of indignation upon the first intelligence of a peace with him being 
received. This ought not to make any substantial difference in the course of our policy-
but it renders it necessary that we should not lower our terms.” 
 
These sentiments were so dominant that the Prime Minister even felt the Government 
threatened, claiming: “Indeed, I should not doubt that, if the Opposition could take up the 
Bourbon cause against Buonaparte [sic!], they would, upon a peace with the latter, overturn 
the Government.”117 The Whigs were, however, unable to utilise the public opinion to their 
advantage, for they were noted for their aversion to the Bourbons as well as their advocacy of 
peace. Still, it did affect the Government insofar as the Prince Regent seemed to grow 
apart. 118  Liverpool in his letter went on defining the Government’s position regarding 
Napoleon: 
“The only material point on which we differ with you is as to the overthrowing of 
Buonaparte [sic!]. We incline to the opinion that this even is desirable whatever might 
be the immediate result of it. No individual in France is capable of succeeding him, 
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and if the ancient dynasty was not restored in the first instance, it would be the 
ultimate consequence. 
No Government, but it was it may, could be so bad for Europe as Buonaparte [sic!]; 
the very hatred which is borne to him by the people of other countries, and which he 
knows to exist, is for the same reason an obstacle to the continuance of peace, which 
would not be applicable to any other Government, however implacable in other 
respects. I admit, however, that if France continues to support Buonaparte [sic!], we 
must make peace with him, and that we ought not to look to his destruction by any 
means which, in progress, will tend to separate the allies.”119 
 
Still, the Government supported their Foreign Minister and adhered to the policy they had 
agreed upon in Castlereagh’s instructions. This last mentioned dispatch was delivered to 
Castlereagh only after the confrontation with the Tsar, yet Castlereagh could have had no 
doubt about the issue. Still, Castlereagh stood firm and informed Alexander that he would not 
let himself be influenced by British public opinion, which hardly possessed the knowledge 
about the real state of affairs, and instead would rely on his own discernment. This 
demonstrates on the one hand Castlereagh’s ability to not give in to public pressure, but on 
the other hand it also displays his probably greatest weakness, namely that he was unable to 
communicate his point of view to the public, let alone persuade them of his opinion. 
Castlereagh was well aware, though, that any doubt of his authority weakened his position in 
headquarters. Thus, he sent word to Liverpool inquiring on what grounds Lieven, the Russian 
ambassador, had come to make such an assumption and asked the Prime Minister to disprove 
the outrageous letter. Liverpool admitted to have expressed his aversion to peace with 
Napoleon, while the Prince Regent was known to support the Bourbons, not leaving any 
doubt in an interview with the Comte d’Artois, Louis XVIII’s brother, which was printed in 
British papers. However, these were statements of their private opinions and had nothing to 
do with the official line of the Government. Liverpool was afflicted in that he and the Prince 
Regent had caused Castlereagh embarrassments and reaffirmed to him again that he had the 
Government’s full confidence. At any rate, Castlereagh was as well out of luck in persuading 
Alexander. Both of them remained firm; consequently, no agreement could be achieved.120 
 
The incident had other consequences though. Alexander’s accusation affected the relations to 
the British Foreign Secretary, whose mistrust had now only further increased. Moreover, 
Alexander’s intransigence caused Russia to now stand alone. Indeed, Britain, Austria, and 
Prussia stood united in opposing the Tsar’s plans. For the protection of the equilibrium they 
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decided that, even in case of a decisive victory, the peace terms should correspond exactly to 
the Châtillon proposals, which meant, no matter what, the claims would not be increased. 
Furthermore, peace should be made with Bonaparte, save the French would turn against him. 
In this event Louis XVIII was the only alternative. Thus, no matter who would be ruling 
France, he was surely not on kind terms with the Tsar. These conditions were proposed to 
Alexander, urging him to agree if he wanted to see the campaign carrying on, for, in case of 
his refusal, Austria would conclude a separate peace.121  
 
In this manner Alexander’s eagerness to reach Paris was successfully utilised to get his 
acquiescence to the domestic and territorial matters and on 15 February he agreed. He finally 
backed down and gave his consent to the continuance of the Congress of Châtillon. A decisive 
factor for the Tsar’s decision was the news that reached headquarters from the front - and 
which kept coming. For Napoleon again demonstrated his military genius, winning three 
battles against Blücher and another one against Schwarzenberg between 10 and 18 of 
February. This made it evident that Napoleon would not be easily overpowered and that the 
aid of the Austrian army was essential. Napoleon’s victories over a force, which by far 
outnumbered his, had revived his prestige and put the allied forces into a state of panic.122 In 
his diary, Hardenberg exposed that “the Tsar has gone to pieces and the King talks all the time 
like Cassandra.”123 Schwarzenberg now urged that Caulaincourt’s proposal of a truce should 
be accepted. Alexander, who was now as terrified as he had been bellicose before, completely 
changed his course - devastated as he was that his overwhelming desire to march in Paris 
seemed to be shattered, he also desired to conclude an armistice, which was now proposed to 
France.124  
 
When the negotiations continued at Châtillon, the Allies put forward a draft of a peace treaty 
and bid an armistice; the latter Caulaincourt previously had asked for as prerequisite for an 
acceptance of the ancient limits. Castlereagh now particularised the colonial conquests Great 
Britain was to return, but also demanded the abolition of the slave trade in these colonies. An 
agreement regarding the future settlement of Europe, which Castlereagh had primarily 
insisted upon for the specification of the colonies to be returned, could, however, not be 
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accomplished, for the quarrels between Austria and Russia had gotten even worse.125 Even the 
ever so aloof and cool Castlereagh now had to admit being annoyed, telling Liverpool: “The 
criminations and recriminations between the Austrians and Russians are at their height, and 
my patience is worn out combatting [sic!] both.”126 The Tsar suspected Schwarzenberg’s 
army to have been instructed to suspend further warfare, which actually was a false accusation. 
Still, as Webster quite aptly put it “[…] the idea bred suspicions that each was now reserving 
his own forces to win Poland rather than Paris.” With respect to the Prussian army, the story 
was a different one. Already in the last campaign, but even more so in the current one, 
Frederick William actually secretly informed his generals that he thought it wise to, if 
possible, spare the Prussian forces, for any losses might weaken Prussia’s position in peace 
negotiations.127 
 
From Chaumont, whereto the Allies had retreated, Castlereagh sent a letter, which quite 
clearly displays that he was far from impressed. “Two propositions of armistice, proceeding 
from us, which I cannot too much condemn, and a retreat, perhaps not unwise, if boldly and 
candidly avowed, have materially injured our authority […]”, and the outcome was not 
pleasant either, only “haughty and insulting letters” from the French. The British Foreign 
Minister roasted his Allies, claiming they were “at one time too proud to listen to anything; at 
another, so impatient to be delivered from the presence of our enemy, as to make our 
prolongation at Chatillon almost ludicrous.”128 
 
However, the peace negotiations were star-crossed anyway. On 17 February the peace 
proposal had been presented to Caulaincourt, but because of his victories on the battlefield 
Napoleon was far from inclined to agree to the peace conditions the Allies demanded.129 In a 
letter to Caulaincourt, Napoleon claimed that “providence has blessed our armies; sign 
nothing without my orders since I alone know the situation.” To no avail the French Foreign 
Minister tried to caution his master, stating, “I see the dangers which threaten France and your 
Majesty’s throne and I entreat you to prevent them. We must make sacrifices, and we must 
make them in time.” His warnings unsuccessfully trailed off though, with Napoleon only 
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commenting: “I do not read Caulaincourt’s letters; […] they tire and bore me beyond 
limit.”130 
 
Indeed, the question was if peace was at all possible with Napoleon. The Allies were prepared 
to make peace on the basis of the ancient borders, but Napoleon, feeling confident because of 
his successes on the battlefield, was far from impressed, telling his brother Joseph: “Had I, 
before the last operations, concluded a peace with the old frontiers, I would have taken up 
arms in two years’ time […]”131 The Allies were not unaware of the potential threat peace 
with Napoleon would pose, Liverpool writing: “we ought at the same time not conceal from 
ourselves or our Allies that any peace with Buonaparte [sic!] will only be a state of 
preparation for renewed hostilities.”132  
 
On the other hand, any effort to depose the existent French ruler also bore dangers, for 
instance a Jacobin upheaval or a civil war. 133 Besides, even though Castlereagh had the 
impression that the French were somewhat discontent with Napoleon, there was hardly any 
sign of a movement against their ruler and even less of one in favour of the Bourbons. As 
Castlereagh reported to Liverpool at the end of January: “The people quiet everywhere, and 
good-humoured. They look to the invasion as favourable to peace. They spoke freely against 
Buonaparte [sic!] to me on the journey; but I traced little disposition to an effort, and no 
apparent interest about the old family.”134 
 
Meanwhile there was not only still no sign of any movement in favour of the Bourbons, but 
also the attitude of the French towards their invaders had changed. Unlike Wellington’s army, 
which remunerated everything it took and oppressed pillage, the allied armies were short of 
the necessary money and discipline. Additionally, a lot of the troops were seeking revenge for 
past misdeeds, resulting in violence and habitual plundering.135 Castlereagh observed that 
“The temper of the people is getting very sour. In the towns, the Allied troops are now 
fired at in their retreat; and, in the villages, small parties are attacked and driven out. 
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Want of magazines leads to pillage, and pillage to hostility. I see no spirit, except in 
favour of peace, and the getting rid of the troops.”136  
 
Indeed, the brutality of the allied forces only caused the allied generals harassment and 
induced the peasants, so at least Castlereagh believed, again to seek guard in the person of 
Napoleon, while all along the allied invasion a movement in favour of the Bourbons failed to 
appear.137 
 
Stewart recollected the Allies’ modus operandi, stressing its foolishness: “Anything, my dear 
friend, more madly inconsistent and childish than our proceeding has been I cannot figure to 
myself, first accepting or rather giving the Frankfort basis, then changing it to immense 
sacrifices for France, then finding we could have this we are not pleased, we must have a Bow 
at Paris.”138 “Whatever of bad happens to us we rightly deserve it; whatever of good we must 
thank Providence and Castlereagh.”139 
 
Castlereagh, in spite of Napoleon’s military success, stood firm and played a decisive role in 
the Allies’ regaining their self-assurance. Already at Troyes, he made sure that a committee 
wrote down all resources available to the Allies, and therewith mitigated the alarmism that 
had befallen headquarters. At the end of February he arranged for the detachment of 50,000 
men from Bernadotte’s army to reinforce Blücher. Gradually the Allies again gained 
confidence, and by 1 March the allied armies once more felt up to advance. Also, an 
ultimatum was issued to Napoleon, with 10 March being the deadline. But it had become 
apparent that peace with Napoleon was not possible, for in reality it would not be more than a 
temporary truce. Therefore, it seemed even more important to Castlereagh to prolong the 
alliance. For not even Napoleon could menace a concerted continent, whereas, no matter what 
sort of peace could be accomplished, a discordant Europe would soon provoke new clashes. 
As this important aim was as yet unachieved and the House of Commons was only to get 
seriously busy in April, Castlereagh, whose leave had originally been until 1 March, was now 
given more time.140 
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10. SEEKING UNITY 
 
In Chaumont, Castlereagh at last was able to implement what he had so long been striving for 
– a prolongation of the alliance. Induced by Napoleon’s military success in February and in 
need of financial aid from Great Britain - Castlereagh made it clear that a subsidy treaty must 
also include the issue of the alliance, or he would not sign it - the Allies on 9 March (though 
pre-dated 1 March) signed the Treaty of Chaumont,141 which, in Schroeder’s words “laid the 
foundations for victory, peace, and post-war security.”142 It also demonstrated that the Allies 
had finally reached a compromise, each of them setting their own aims aside. Alexander was 
prepared to forgo his desire to capture Paris, the Prussian generals theirs for a military victory 
and vengeance, the Prussian statesmen and the Austrians theirs of a quick conclusion of peace 
and Castlereagh his country’s not to make peace with Napoleon.143  
 
In the Treaty of Chaumont, Castlereagh engaged Britain to pay five million pounds in 
subsidies to her Allies. In undertaking the payment of such a vast lump of money, Castlereagh 
jumped over his instructions. However, the British government was in such high spirits that 
the alliance had finally been concluded and was willing to make every endeavour to defeat 
France that they did not complain about Castlereagh’s financial pledges. The Allies 
committed themselves not to make separate peace and to maintain a force of 150,000 men on 
the field each whilst at war with France. The ground-breaking aspect of the treaty was, 
however, the prolongation of the alliance after the war – for twenty years, the Allies pledged 
that they would each keep an army of 60,000 and protect Europe from any future assault on 
the part of France. This reflects just how much the Allies dreaded France, especially since it 
was still thought that Napoleon would continue to rule.144 
 
The treaty was drawn up by Austria, Prussia, Russia, and Great Britain, whereas the other, 
less powerful Allies were only asked for their accedence. This is to show that the Great 
Powers - this expression was actually quite frequent then - laid claim to represent the whole of 
Europe.145 In a letter, Castlereagh wrote: “We four Ministers, when signing, happened to be 
sitting at a whist-table. It was agreed that never were the stakes so high at any former party.” 
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According to his estimates, Great Britain’s effort was equal to that of Austria, Russia, and 
Prussia combined, calculating: “We give 150,000 men and five millions, equal to as many 
more-total, 300,000. They give 450,000, of which we, however, supply 150,000, leaving their 
own number 300,000.”146 He did admit though that the allied troops did exceed the 150,000 
each they had engaged themselves to furnish, owing to illness, etc., because the subsidies 
were only paid for active forces.147 Still, Britain’s engagement was an enormous one and 
Castlereagh could not dissemble his pride: “What an extraordinary display of power,” he 
declared. “This, I trust, will put an end to any doubts as to the claim we have to an opinion on 
continental matters.”148 
 
As to the reconstruction of Europe, an article enacted Spain, Switzerland, Italy, and Germany 
as well as Holland to be free, and the latter was to be enlarged by Antwerp at least and also 
have an appropriate barrier, which was an allusion to Belgium. Regarding the German states, 
they were to be grouped into a confederacy. Poland and Saxony were left unmentioned. 
Castlereagh had tried to use the subsidies to reach an agreement about the settlement of 
Europe, but he was out of luck. The delicate questions proved to be intractable at the time. 
Thus, Castlereagh had spent both of his weapons, the colonial conquests as well as the 
subsidies, without achieving an agreement about the reconstruction of Europe. Still, he had 
achieved Britain’s most vital interests, namely the prolongation of the alliance as well as 
Holland’s independence and extension including Antwerp. 149  Webster refers to the 
completion of the treaty of alliance as the “greatest diplomatic act of his career,”150 which 
“will always be a monument to his patience and diplomatic skill.”151 Admittedly, the Russian 
consent to Holland’s enlargement had only been obtained because Castlereagh had pledged to 
try to get Britain to incur the debt the Russians owed to Holland. Still, Alexander’s 
accordance to this vital British objective had resulted in improved relations between him and 
Castlereagh.152 
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11. THE REVIVAL OF FORTUNE 
 
At the same time on the battlefield, Blücher’s newly reinforced army won the battles of 
Craonne and Laon against the French Emperor and news arrived from Wellington’s victory 
against Soult at Orthez. Wellington had recommenced his advance in mid-February, which 
actually was later than he had promised and had caused complaints on the part of the Allies 
because it had enabled Napoleon to summon a force of 25,000 men from south-western 
France and put them in the field against the Allies. With his capital endangered it was only 
natural though that he ordered reinforcements from the peripheries; in fact, it is astonishing 
that he did not order more. To continue, after taking Bayonne, Wellington’s army faced Soult 
at Orthez on 27 February, where Wellington himself was wounded, though not seriously. 
Soult lost the battle and had to withdraw. Wellington then divided his army and tracked Soult 
with the bigger part of it, whilst sending Beresford with 12,000 men to capture Bordeaux. 
With 90,000 inhabitants, Bordeaux was France’s fourth largest city and therefore was of 
political importance. Wellington had hoped for quite some time that a strong movement in 
favour of the Bourbons would occur, and it finally became reality when Beresford captured 
Bordeaux on 12 March and the city declared herself for the Bourbons. Wellington actually 
thought that, with a little bit of encouragement on the part of the Allies, the French nation in 
general would declare herself against Napoleon. Whilst embarked in negotiations with the 
latter, the British government, however, was adamant not to give any encouragement for they 
could not offer any protection to the royalists in case peace would be concluded with 
Bonaparte.153 Wellington did not share this point of view, writing to Liverpool: 
“Any declaration from us would, I am convinced, raise such a flame in the country as 
would soon spread from one end of it to the other, and would infallibly overturn him 
[Napoleon]. I cannot discover the policy of not hitting one’s enemy as hard as one can, 
and in the most vulnerable place. I am certain that he would not so act by us, if he had 
the opportunity. He would certainly overturn the British authority in Ireland if it was 
in his power.”154 
 
Still, Wellington followed his orders and made sure that no open support was given, which 
might be the reason why the enthusiasm in Bordeaux faded quite swiftly. However, as will be 
seen, the declaration of Bordeaux was to produce an immense sensation at headquarters, in 
Paris and London. Obviously, this was only yet to happen, but for the news of Orthez, as well 
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as Blücher’s victories at the battles of Craonne and Laon it was quite evident that luck was 
again on the allied side. Indeed, Blücher’s victories once more opened the road to Paris.155  
 
In the meantime, the negotiations with regard to an armistice had been abandoned on 4 March, 
whereas the peace negotiations at Châtillon had continued, although there was hardly any 
hope of a pleasant outcome. At Châtillon, Caulaincourt still had not received instructions 
from Napoleon by 10 March, the day the Allies had designated for an ultimatum. Hence, word 
was sent to the plenipotentiaries at Châtillon ordering them to end the negotiations, unless the 
French Foreign Minister accepted the ancient limits. Castlereagh, as most of the Allies, 
wished now to end the discussions, whilst Metternich asked to give Caulaincourt some more 
time.156 On 17 March, Metternich made a last endeavour to conclude peace with Napoleon, 
exposing to Caulaincourt: “Austria’s wishes are still for the preservation of a dynasty with 
which it is closely connected. The peace still depends on your master. In a little while this will 
no longer be true. I will do my best to keep Lord Castlereagh here for a few days. Once he is 
gone, peace will be impossible.”157 Later, at Elba, Napoleon blamed Castlereagh – and only 
Castlereagh - on having thwarted peace on the lines of the natural borders, but this is not 
completely true, in view of the fact that the Tsar’s aspirations had risen excessively ever since 
the invasion of France and he was set on advancing onto Paris. Besides, Caulaincourt as well 
as Metternich praised Castlereagh’s endeavour to conclude peace. Only in March, the British 
Foreign Secretary was beginning to lose patience and was growing slightly more 
belligerent.158 And in spite of the long and unfruitful negotiations, Castlereagh was pleased, 
for they must have removed any “reasonable doubt in the view even of the French nation, that 
Napoleon is the true and only obstacle to an early, honourable, and solid peace.”159 Thus, on 
20 March the negotiations were finally broken off, Castlereagh opining that: 
“It was clear that Buonaparte [sic!] was using these discussions as an instrument of 
war, and not of peace. The impression that he could at any moment command peace, 
and that he only fought for advantageous terms, was too palpable an advantage to 
confer upon an opponent. It became indispensably necessary, under these 
circumstances, to bring his intentions to a distinct issue, which terminated in the 
rupture of the Conferences.”160 
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Not even a fortnight after Laon Napoleon had to take another blow, this time dealt by 
Schwarzenberg at Arcis-sur-Aube on 20-21 March, another allied victory followed at Fère-
Champenoise on 25 March over Marmont and Mortier.161 Nonetheless, although Napoleon 
now attempted in vain to make peace, he still could not bring himself to surrender Antwerp,162 
stating, “I am ready to give up all the colonies if by this sacrifice I can keep the mouth of the 
Scheldt for France.”163 By now Napoleon’s situation was despairing, but he refused to give up, 
claiming: “I am still the man that I was at Wagram and Austerlitz.”164 His swift movements, 
intended to strike the allied lines of communication, caused disorder at headquarters, which 
affected Castlereagh, Francis, Metternich, Hardenberg and others to be parted from 
Schwarzenberg’s army and having to flee to Dijon, which they reached on 24 March, while 
Alexander and Frederick William stayed with the army.165 
 
Now, as the peace negotiations at Châtillon had been broken off, the Allies received 
communications from Paris of utmost importance. A scheme was being plotted in the capital, 
aiming at Napoleon’s overthrow and replacement with the Bourbons. Soon afterwards, on 26 
March, words also arrived of Bordeaux’s overt declaration for the Bourbons, which caused a 
stir at Dijon and eliminated any last doubts. Thus, on 28 March, the ministers at Dijon, 
Castlereagh, Metternich, Stadion, Hardenberg, and Razumovsky as well as representatives 
from Spain, Holland Bavaria and Hanover, drank a toast to Louis XVIII and the restoration.166 
 
Also in London, the news of Bordeaux’s declaration had a great impact and even affected 
governmental policy. Having spent their exile in Britain, the old dynasty had established close 
relations with its host country and the Cabinet had always considered their return to power as 
being the best security for a peaceful Continent. However, as has been seen, the Government 
were prepared to relinquish their desire of a Bourbon France for the Allies’ sake. Public 
sentiments in Great Britain had steadily grown more intense where peace with Napoleon was 
concerned, yet the Cabinet had supported Castlereagh’s policy. Napoleon’s military success 
in February had produced silence and uncertainty, leaving only a few crying out for his 
overthrow and the re-establishment of a Bourbon France. When the tide turned once more and 
luck seemed to be on the allied side, the British ministers, in the middle of March, finally 
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gave in to the all-over-again ferocious urging of the public and ordered Castlereagh to finalise 
the negotiations at Châtillon or retract the offer of the colonies to be returned. Still, the 
Foreign Minister was not restrained from concluding peace with Napoleon, thanks to 
Liverpool, who held on to the policy resolved upon before Castlereagh’s departure, though 
this was becoming excessively difficult given the ever growing acrimony of the press and the 
Prince Regent’s fondness of the Bourbons. Though the British Prime Minister, as has been 
seen, personally was strongly in favour of a Bourbon France, he had at first even impeded the 
departure of the Comte d’Artois (the later Charles X) as well as the Duc de Berri and the Duc 
de Angoulême, his sons, by refusing them passports as well as the crossing aboard of vessels. 
Then, in early February, the Duc de Angoulême was allowed to affiliate with the British army, 
with the pre-condition that he was doing so anonymously, which he did until the events at 
Bordeaux. Also, the Duc de Berri and the Comte d’Artois had departed from Britain, the 
former going to Jersey, the latter to Switzerland. Yet as we have seen, all along the allied 
invasion a movement in favour of the Bourbons failed to appear in north-western France. 
However, the news of Bordeaux’s declaration for the Bourbons made even Liverpool abandon 
the policy with respect to Napoleon – word was sent to Castlereagh on 22 March that Great 
Britain now would not, even if the Allies desired it, make peace with Napoleon. 167 
 
However, by the time Castlereagh received this letter, the dice had already been tossed. The 
Congress of Châtillon had been called off and Castlereagh had already taken on the Bourbon 
cause. Thus, for Castlereagh the whole issue had panned out well. For the sake of the Allies 
and the absence of any sign of an anti-Napoleonic movement, he had entered peace 
negotiations with the French Emperor. Those, however, had not only shown to the French that 
it was Napoleon who frustrated all efforts regarding the peace negotiations, but also to 
everyone in Parliament, including the critics of the Cabinet.168 
 
Meanwhile, by harassing the lines of communication of the Allies, Napoleon had sought to 
lure the Allies away from Paris and enable himself to gather his troops, which were stuck in 
the fortresses alongside the Rhine.169 Later on, Wellington was to observe the Emperor’s 
strategy in these last weeks and called them “Excellent-quite excellent.”170 Still, his strategy 
featured an Achilles’ heel, namely that he, as Schroeder puts it, “demanded in typical 
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Napoleonic fashion that his marshals sacrifice themselves and their armies to aid his coup.” 
Indeed, everyone should “go down with him if his desperate military gamble failed.”171 The 
odds were against him. The Allies were able to intercept a letter from the French Minister of 
Police, which quite clearly displayed Napoleon’s hopeless position:  
“The treasury, arsenals, and powder stores are empty. We have no resources left. The 
population is discouraged and discontented. It wants peace at any price. Enemies of 
the imperial government are sustaining and fomenting popular agitation. Still latent, it 
will become impossible to suppress unless the Emperor succeeds in keeping the Allies 
away from Paris.”172 
 
But Napoleon failed in this respect – he could not hold the now congregated allied armies off 
from Paris. Thanks to the Tsar, who was adamant to march on to Paris, the generals, who 
actually intended to track Bonaparte and push him away from their lines of communication, 
gave way and advanced to the capital. On 29 March the allied armies were in front of Paris. 
The following day saw an intense skirmish against Marmont’s and Mortier’s seriously 
outnumbered forces, which did not stand a remote chance and retreated, heading for 
Fontainebleau, though not before signing the capitulation of Paris in the morning hours of 31 
March. The Emperor, who had hurried back to reach his capital before the Allies, had come 
too late and also withdrew his troops towards Fontainebleau.173 
 
 
12. RESTORATION AND ABDICATION 
 
The time had come - Alexander’s dream of a glorious entry finally came true on 31 March 
1814. Flanked by King Frederick William III on one side and Schwarzenberg on the other, the 
Tsar entered Paris. Amongst the now-pouring in allied troops were Cathcart and Stewart. 
Emperor Francis and the ministers though were still in Dijon. They had stayed there under the 
pretext of the hazards of travelling. The truth was that they were all but keen on being in Paris. 
The Austrian Emperor’s attendance of any discussions, where he would have to disregard his 
daughter’s and grandson’s claims would surely be quite uncomfortable, whereas Castlereagh 
tried not to be too openly involved in the restoration. He was keen on the re-establishment of 
the Bourbons, but at the same time he sought to avoid any moves that would give the 
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Opposition the opportunity to condemn the Cabinet on grounds of keeping the French from 
deciding upon their ruler. Any appearance on the part of the Allies to force the Bourbons 
upon the French would not only produce discontented French, but also attract critics at home. 
Thus, on the one hand Castlereagh was quite content not to be present at Paris; on the other 
hand, however, he was worried what actions Alexander would take - after all, it was still 
unclear if Alexander would actually support the ancient dynasty.174  
 
At any rate, the Tsar was thrilled to be able to act without being confined by either 
Castlereagh or Metternich. Neither King William Frederick, nor Schwarzenberg had a voice 
in the subsequent discussions. All the vital decisions, like Marmont’s capitulation, the 
rejection to negotiate with Napoleon and the character of the new government were made by 
Alexander and Talleyrand. Talleyrand, a former bishop who had forsaken the Church in the 
period of the Revolution and had served some time as Napoleon’s Foreign Minister, now 
made an effort to bring back the old dynasty. His inclination to change his course according to 
circumstances brought upon him people’s mistrust. 175 Kissinger, comparing Talleyrand to 
Metternich, characterised him as a man who “possessed same nonchalance, same subtlety and 
an even more trenchant wit.” 176 Napoleon had once called him “a piece of dung in silk 
stocking,”177 and now the time was ripe for revenge. On 1 April the Senate was assembled 
and, headed by Talleyrand, it produced a constitution. The scope of the constitution exceeded 
what both Castlereagh and Metternich had envisaged; however, since they were not present at 
Paris they lacked the possibility to alter the terms. At any rate, even more, the Senate also 
resolved the issue of the reappointment of Louis XVIII as the King of France. In retrospection 
of these events, which ended with the restoration of the Bourbons, there is often an inclination 
to be found to think that the overthrow of Napoleon and the re-establishment of the ancient 
dynasty had been planned from the outset and that this object had been vigorously pursued. 
However, this, as has been seen, is untrue. This result was simply born out of events. As we 
have seen, Metternich had endeavoured to conclude peace with Napoleon, whereas the Tsar 
had not had the slightest motivation to aid the restoration of the dynasty he so much disliked. 
Fortunately for the Bourbons, though, Alexander let himself be guided by Talleyrand, who 
convinced him that Bernadotte was not the most suitable candidate for the throne while 
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enlightening him that the French nation desired the Bourbon’s resumption of power. Only 
interference on part of the Allies would have rendered any other regime possible; but none of 
the Allies wished to interfere in French domestic affairs. Thus, in the end, a sovereignty of 
Louis was the only real option. Besides, as things were, the Bourbons were so keen on their 
re-establishment, that they were prepared to make concessions. Thus, ironically, even though 
the Tsar had the most objections to the Bourbon’s return to power and severely disliked the 
whole family, especially Louis, it was Alexander who now placed Louis on the throne of 
France for Louis. Finally, on 3 May Louis XVIII returned to Paris after twenty-three years of 
absence and was cheerfully received in the city in which his brother had been guillotined.178 
 
Meanwhile, in Fontainebleau, Napoleon had originally still not intended to back down. 
However, Marmont on 3 April decided to detach his army from Napoleon’s and therewith any 
moves Napoleon could make would be entirely hopeless. On the following day his marshals 
insisted on his resignation. Also, news from Paris about his dethronement had arrived. 
Napoleon’s might had been shattered at last. He had borne up against an immensely bigger 
force, but now the time had come that he had to realise that he had lost his gamble. Deprived 
of any hope, he could do naught but sign his abdication. Initially, he attempted to relinquish 
the throne to his son, but on 6 April he had to abdicate unconditionally.179  
 
Together with the French Foreign Minister, the Tsar now arranged the treaty of Fontainebleau, 
according to which Napoleon had to abdicate. He was, however, allowed to keep his title as 
Emperor, was to be paid two million francs per annum by the French exchequer, and was 
given Elba to be his princedom, whereas the Duchy of Parma was to be yielded to Marie 
Louise. These terms were quite generous, partly because Alexander wanted to demonstrate his 
graciousness and grandeur, but partly also out of anxiety of the French troops, who were still 
to be found all over Europe and were all but impressed with Napoleon’s successor. Since the 
conclusion of a truce was still outstanding, it would obviously have been imprudent to take 
any steps, including a penalisation of Napoleon, which might affront the army. Also, the 
treaty rendered it possible to get rid of Napoleon and furthermore prepared the ground for the 
armistice, which was concluded on 23 April.180  
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When Castlereagh and Metternich reached Paris on 10 March the treaty was a fate accompli. 
Castlereagh, as well as Metternich, were discontented with the choice of Elba, the former 
because he deemed the island to be of great strategic importance as the preeminent naval port 
in the Mediterranean sea, the latter because he believed it to be too dangerous for its close 
proximity to France and Italy, even foretelling a further conflict in the next two years to 
follow. The other option Napoleon was reported to have frequently talked about, namely a 
refuge in Great Britain, Castlereagh believed to be hardly viable.181 The press was malicious 
on this subject, The Times writing: “We should be really sorry, if any British possession were 
polluted by such a wretch. He would be a disgrace to Botany Bay.” 182  The only thing 
Castlereagh was actually able to accomplish was that Bonaparte’s title would cease to exist 
with his death and would thus not be inherited by his son183; Great Britain never recognised it 
anyway and referred to Napoleon as “General Bonaparte” until the day he died184 – which 
could have been far earlier than it was in the end, for Napoleon made a suicide attempt on 12 
April, did, however, not succeed.185  
 
All in all, these eventful months, marked by defeats and victories, by feelings of desperation 
and transcendence, by dissensions and unity, had ended with a very pleasant outcome from a 
British point of view. Not only had Britain gotten rid of her arch nemesis, but Louis had also 
ascended the throne of France. 
 
Britain’s contribution to this successful campaign had been quite significant. Even though it 
might seem that the war was decided in the northern part of the country, one cannot overlook 
the fact that a French force of at least 80,000 men was caught up fighting Wellington’s army 
in the south. Had Napoleon had these troops at his disposal, the relative strength of the armies 
in the north would have been quite an altered one, and one can only speculate if the final 
outcome would have proved to be the same or not.186 Additionally, we have seen what great 
impact the declaration of Bordeaux brought with it and what advantageous effects it had on 
the whole Bourbon cause. Again, it remains subject to speculation what it would have meant 
for the Bourbons had Wellington not ordered the city’s capture. 
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As to the relations in the allied camp - if it was not for Castlereagh, who consistently exerted 
a conciliatory influence on the Allies, their alliance might well have been short-lived. Even 
though Robinson might exaggerate when opining that Castlereagh “decided the fate of the 
campaign,”187 it is beyond doubt that his presence at headquarters was a huge benefit for 
allied unity as well as for the prosecution of the campaign. 
 
The Allies had managed to momentarily overlook their differences for harmony’s sake, but 
still Castlereagh had failed time after time to bring the Great Powers to an agreement about 
the settlement of Europe. This demonstrates that the conflicts had not been dissolved, only 
repressed, and were thus still smouldering underneath the surface. Now, as the war had come 
to an end the time had come to restructure Europe - and diplomatic battles were about to 
commence for the pacification of the continent. 
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IV. PACIFICATION AND CELEBRATION 
 
 
13. THE PACIFICATION OF ITALY 
 
Napoleon’s abdication naturally also completely changed the state of affairs in Italy. Here an 
Austrian army of 50,000 men had been fighting a French force of about the same size under 
Eugène, but had hardly made any progress. While Austria was engaged on the mainland of 
the Italian Peninsula, Britain was in Sicily, her major base in the area, with her chief aim not 
being offensive operations, but protecting the island from the French. Since 1811 the position 
of Commander-in-Chief of the Anglo-Sicilian troops and Minister to Sicily was occupied by 
Bentinck, who, with great headiness, endeavoured to turn Sicily into his own project and 
designed schemes for Italy, which were in disaccord with what the British Cabinet wanted. He 
seized the opportunity, given by inner conflicts on the island, to bring the Sicilian King to 
implement the English constitution. This was also influenced by the fact that Bentinck, acting 
on his own authority, made the King’s acceptance of the constitution a prerequisite for 
attempting the retrieval of Naples. However, at the earliest time practicable, the King was to 
try to get rid of the constitution. 188 
 
Naples was under the sovereignty of Napoleon’s brother-in-law Murat, who after the Battle of 
Leipzig had again defected from the French Emperor (he had previously already done so after 
the disaster in Russia) and made overtures to the Allies. The outcome was the peace treaty 
between Murat and the Austrians, concluded on 11 January. While Austria warranted his 
sovereignty over Naples and tried to acquire Great Britain’s acceptance, Murat agreed to 
allocate 30,000 troops to the Allies – a pledge he was not to fulfil. Bentinck only reluctantly 
gave his consent to a truce, which caused the appearance of unsteady relations with Great 
Britain and most probably played some role in Murat’s conduct of not settling for either side. 
Thus, in spite of the treaty with Austria, he clandestinely tried to conclude an armistice with 
Eugène and sent letters to Napoleon affirming his allegiance189; on 1 March, for instance, he 
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insisted “Love me always. Never was I more worthy of your affection. Your friend till 
death.”190 As a result of his conduct, the Austrians grew suspicious and admonished him to 
adhere to the treaty lest he might be deposed. Murat’s reaction was to command an assault on 
Eugène’s forces, but as Bentinck - against Castlereagh’s wishes - in March, besides appealing 
to the Italians to upheaval for their freedom, also announced that Britain supported the claims 
of the Sicilian King to Naples, Murat once more changed his course and again sought an 
armistice with Eugène. This uncertain state of affairs continued until intelligence arrived from 
Napoleon’s abdication. Murat then went back to Naples, while Eugène concluded a truce with 
Austria on 16 April and withdrew his troops from Italy.191 
 
Castlereagh had also ordered Bentinck early in 1814 to capture Genoa on behalf of the King 
of Sardinia-Piedmont. Nevertheless, Bentinck did not shy away from pledging the 
independence of Genoa on 26 April, 1814. At the Congress of Vienna - in disregard of 
Bentinck’s promises of the instauration of the old Republic - Piedmont’s absorption of Genoa 
was formally arranged, and Castlereagh had, as a consequence, to face up to severe criticism 
in Parliament. As to Bentinck’s actions that aimed at an uprising of the Italians - in this he had 
actually competed with Murat as well as the Austrians - Castlereagh informed him such might 
be helpful when fighting against Napoleon, but as the latter had now been deposed, Italy 
ought to find repose, hence liberalism and nationalism should not be further encouraged. 
Therefore, Castlereagh urged Bentinck to stop his agitating actions and instead let the 
upcoming Congress deal with the Italian settlement. In truth, the matter had been already 
decided. Sardinia-Piedmont would be resurrected and enlarged and Lombardy and Venetia 
would fall to Austria. However, as Schroeder points out, it is not entirely true to think that 
Austria and Great Britain just forced their wishes on the Italians. Surely, Great Britain as well 
as Austria was adamant about freeing Italy from any French influence, and Austria also 
aspired to enlarge her dominions. However, apart from these goals they simply sought to 
create a stable and peaceful Italy. And this - not any of the schemes Bentinck, Murat, and the 
others were promoting - was exactly what most Italians strived for.192  
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14. A MODERATE PEACE 
 
As the war had ended, Liverpool was keen on seeing Castlereagh return as soon as possible, 
for parliamentary sessions were about to recommence. Castlereagh, however, saw more 
importance in his presence at Paris and refused to return until peace was reached. Tough 
Castlereagh was as laboriously as possible, delay was caused by the time consuming 
jollifications and social obligations, which allowed only slow progress in the negotiations.193 
No wonder Castlereagh found Paris to be “a bad place for business.”194 Besides, most of the 
work Castlereagh had to carry out without much help. Stewart, Cathcart and Aberdeen were 
again of little use; and Wellington, who was to be ambassador to Paris, came to the city in 
early May, but could not stay long. Proposing this position to Wellington had been one of the 
first things Castlereagh had done after entering Paris. Wellington had embraced his new task 
with cheerfulness, though he had shown himself astonished that he had been selected and had 
claimed in an uncharacteristically moderate manner, “I am very much obliged and flattered by 
your thinking of me for a situation for which I should never have thought myself 
qualified.”195 Indeed, it was a peculiar choice. Castlereagh expected that the glory and fame 
Wellington had gained on the battlefield would prove advantageous in this position, but did 
not take into account that by putting a triumphant field-marshal in the position of ambassador 
at the defeated nation’s capital, he upset the feelings of the French. Starting from August, 
when Wellington commenced his new post, he turned out to be a capable ambassador. 
However, the manner in which he handled his private sphere proved to be far from 
impeccable. Indiscretions about affairs with a number of women, not even refraining from 
erstwhile lovers of the fallen Emperor, created a furore. In addition, his being present at Paris 
alone irritated former soldiers and every remaining loyal follower of Napoleon. All this made 
the Cabinet question the appropriateness of his appointment - more so as conspiracies for 
assassinating Wellington became known - and urged him to return to Great Britain. 
Wellington, however, postponed his departure until being assigned to take Castlereagh’s place 
at the Congress of Vienna in January 1815.196 
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At any rate, now peace had to be concluded with France. In spite of the presence of other 
powers’ representatives, the Great Powers were set on deciding the issues themselves. It was 
hoped that a settlement with France could be obtained quickly. However, not only the social 
events caused delay. The task of the peacemakers was also made more difficult because the 
new king had not arrived as yet, and because Prussia tried to comprise the European 
settlement into the peace treaty, for it was becoming perceptible that France would again have 
to be taken into consideration regarding any negotiations as to the European reconstruction as 
soon as the peace treaty had been concluded.197  
 
Thus, the thorny questions about Poland, Saxony, and Mainz were raised again. As all three 
ministers were suspicious of Alexander’s Polish scheme, Hardenberg drew up a plan for the 
reconstruction of Europe according to which Prussia would obtain the whole of Saxony 
together with the left bank of the Rhine, Austria, the Tyrol, and territory in Italy, while most, 
but not all of Poland was to be left to Russia. Alexander, however, rejected the suggested 
settlement. Since Alexander’s aspirations in Poland posed a danger to Austrians and Prussians 
alike, Castlereagh sought to consolidate the two powers to build a united front against the 
Tsar - a strategy he was to pursue in the conferences to come. However, their disputes about 
Saxony and Mainz posed an immense obstacle. Metternich had shown himself prepared to 
acquiesce in a Prussian sovereignty over Saxony, but not over Mainz. The Prussians had 
occupied Mainz and were set on keeping this key fortress. The Austrians, on the other hand, 
persisted on giving Mainz to Bavaria, first, because Bavaria was not prepared to surrender the 
Tyrol to Austria unless she could obtain Mainz, and second, because Austria was anxious to 
keep Prussia’s influence out of South Germany as much as possible.198  
 
In all these intricate matters no agreements could be reached, so their settlement had to be 
adjourned to London. The Prince Regent had invited Alexander, and at Castlereagh’s 
instigation, the other sovereigns and statesmen to the British capital city. It was also agreed 
that all belligerents were to send representatives to Vienna, where a Congress would take 
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place in August. This Congress was, however, only meant for the ratification of a settlement, 
which was thought to be devised at London.199  
 
Anyway, a solution to a few questions as to the reconstruction of Europe, such as the Austrian 
frontiers in Italy and Holland’s extension, could be achieved at Paris. In secret articles it was 
stipulated that Genoa should be incorporated into Sardinia as a compensation for Savoy, 
which should go to France, while Austria was to acquire Milan and Venice. Castlereagh, for 
his part, favoured Austrian extension in Italy for it would keep French influence out and 
would not menace British supremacy in the Mediterranean Sea as France might. Also, the 
enlargement of Holland - including Antwerp - was included in the treaty, though not the exact 
frontiers which were still up for discussion. Anyway, Antwerp was thus placed under the 
sovereignty of the Prince of Orange, and by the marriage that had been arranged between the 
Hereditary Prince of Orange and the Prince Regent’s daughter the countries would be linked 
to each other.200 
 
The peace with France was concluded on the ancient limits, though some concessions were 
made. France had to relinquish all territorial claims as to Italy, Switzerland, Belgium, Holland, 
Germany, and Malta, but, exceeding the borders of 1792, she was given part of Savoy and 
was also allowed to incorporate enclaves such as Avignon, which meant a territorial 
expansion of about 150 square miles, with approximately half a million inhabitants. France 
was not confined in the number of her forces and even more, she was permitted to keep two-
thirds of her fleet at Antwerp, for the ever so dreaded fleet was exposed as being not so 
threatening after all, due to the poor quality of the ships. No demands were being made as to 
reparations and with regard to the treasures of art Napoleon had taken from all over Europe; it 
was decided that France did not have to hand them back. As for the colonies, Castlereagh 
pleaded with his Government for generosity, with the result that France got back nearly all of 
her overseas possessions; only Tobago, St. Lucia (instead of Les Saintes) and Mauritius were 
kept in British hands - mainly for strategic reasons. Together with the Cape, which was 
bought from Holland, Great Britain thus saw her waterways to India and the West Indies 
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safeguarded, while Malta, which France had acknowledged as a British possession, was the 
key to supremacy in the Mediterranean Sea. 201  
 
As we have just seen, France got back nearly all of her overseas possessions. However, there 
was a catch: Castlereagh demanded from France the abolition of the slave trade. The trade, 
one of the sources of British wealth during the previous century, had been abolished in Great 
Britain in 1807. This was due to the fact that the British public adopted a humanitarian view, 
demanding the abolition, and as the British colonies were well stocked with slaves there was 
no economic necessity to keep up the trade. Now Britain aspired to achieve a worldwide 
abolition of the slave trade. Given the frenzied sentiments of the English public and that all 
parties in Great Britain supported the abolition, Castlereagh and the Government were well 
aware that a pleasing outcome on this matter had to be achieved. Therefore, Castlereagh had, 
as we have seen, demanded the abolition of the trade already in the Châtillon proposals made 
to Caulaincourt. Both King Louis and Talleyrand were sympathetic of the project, but they 
could not support it, for the disposition in the country was such as to completely oppose it. 
The French suspected the British Cabinet of merely using the national sentiments to avert the 
French Colonies from becoming as wealthy as the British ones, and thus keeping competition 
in check. A prohibition of the slave trade would, in the eyes of the French, make the return of 
the colonies worthless. Such peace conditions seemed humiliating.202 Castlereagh informed 
Liverpool that he felt “that on grounds of general policy we ought not to attempt to tie France 
too tight on this question. If we do it will make the abolition odious in France and we shall be 
considered as influenced by a secret wish to prevent the removal [sic!, probably meant 
revival] 203 of her colonial interests.” Regarding a universal abolition, he pointed out the 
importance of gaining French support, opining, “If we get France on our side we shall have a 
preponderance of authority; without her aid I shall despair of bringing Spain and Portugal into 
our views.” 204 Thus, Castlereagh and Talleyrand agreed upon a compromise – namely that the 
slave trade would be abolished in five years time, therewith rendering it possible to equip the 
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colonies with the necessary number of slaves in the meantime. This compromise, however, as 
will be seen, was to attract critics in Great Britain.205 
 
All in all the peace was quite a generous one. Only the Prussians attempted to press for more 
severe terms, but were overcome.206 Yet the generous peace had less to do with the character 
of the statesmen, to which Bryant ascribed it, stating they were “just and moderate men,”207 
but was more due to political considerations. Aspiring for peace and safety, it was hoped that 
by moderation, a friendly bond with the Bourbons could be knitted, while also solidifying this 
dynasty. The statesmen were aware that, for the French, peace on the basis of the ancient 
limits was not exactly easy to come to terms with. Any additional demands might only 
enfeeble the restored monarchy, while strengthening supporters of the fallen Emperor. So 
instead of aiming for revenge, the ministers sought to create such a peace as would fit the 
balance of power.208 
 
The moderation is remarkable, especially when Napoleon’s exploitation of Europe in all these 
years of war is considered. Not less astounding is that Castlereagh, the representative of the 
country in which public furore hit hardest, was one of the principal promoters of a moderate 
peace. His efforts to arbitrate between the powers were eased with the completion of the first 
Peace of Paris on 30 May because, as France had been stripped off Belgium as well as the left 
bank of the Rhine, Britain had achieved her essential objectives and was thus free of having to 
endeavour placating any of the other powers to accomplish her own interests. 209 
 
However, that no reparation was demanded, leaving France debt-free, while Britain’s debt had 
amounted up to seven hundred million pounds was not easy to stomach and demonstrates that 
whatever fine qualities Castlereagh possessed, handling money was not one of them.210 Cooke 
brought it to the point, when writing to Castlereagh, “It will be hard if France is to pay 
nothing for the destruction of Europe, and we are to pay all for saving it.”211 
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Indeed, the generosity of the treaty created some dissatisfaction in Great Britain, but so great 
was the rejoicing of finally, after over twenty years of warfare against France, having defeated 
the arch nemesis that the minutiae of the treaty meant little to the ordinary people. Only the 
inefficiency of Castlereagh’s endeavour to bring the French to abolish the slave trade right 
away caused uproar of discontentment. Especially that the slave trade had already been 
abandoned in the colonies that were now returned to France, under whose sovereignty the 
trade would be reintroduced, made the compromise to allow France five years time to abolish 
the trade seem even shoddier.212 In the House of Commons, Wilberforce, himself actually a 
Tory, condemned Castlereagh when the latter returned in June, accusing him of being 
responsible for “the death warrant of a multitude of innocent victims […].”213 The whole 
country was bent upon achieving the abolition of the slave trade, thus Wilberforce and his 
followers were able to launch a campaign that produced hundreds of petitions with nearly a 
million signatures, demanding the Cabinet should make additional allowances to bring France 
to abolish the trade straight away.214 Castlereagh remarked, “I believe there is hardly a village 
that has not met and petitioned upon it [the issue of the slave trade]; both Houses of 
Parliament are pledged to press it; and the Ministers must make it the basis of their policy.”215 
The public frenzy did nothing to help the cause, for it not only amplified suspicions regarding 
British motives, but also provoked countries to increase their demands, as Castlereagh was 
pointing out: 
“The more I have occasion to observe the temper of foreign Powers on the question of 
the abolition, the more strongly impressed I am with a sense of the prejudice that 
results not only to the interests of the question itself, but of our foreign relations 
generally from the display of popular impatience which has been excited and is kept 
up in England upon this subject. It is impossible to persuade foreign nations that this 
sentiment is unmixed with the views of colonial policy, and their Cabinets, who can 
better estimate the real and virtuous motives which guide us on this question, see in 
the very impatience of the nation a powerful instrument which they expect to force, at 
a convenient moment, the British Government upon some favourite object of policy. 
“[…] I am […] firmly persuaded, that we should be at this moment in fact nearer our 
object if the Government had been permitted to pursue this object with its ordinary 
means of influence and persuasion instead of being placed in the predicament of being 
expected to purchase concessions on this point almost at any sacrifice.”216  
 
At any rate, the following months the Government again endeavoured to bring the universal 
abolition of the slave trade into being. While it proved not too hard to come to terms with 
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Holland, Denmark, and Sweden, an agreement with France, Spain, and Portugal was very 
difficult to reach. France declined a lump sum of money as well as the return of Trinidad, and 
not being prepared to abolish the trade at once, did however ban it on the northern part of the 
globe. Portugal agreed to similar terms as France for a payment of 300,000 pounds, whereas 
Spain turned down 800,000 pounds out of fear of strengthening the voices which called for 
the independence of her colonies. At Vienna, Castlereagh saw that all powers signed an 
agreement disapproving the slave trade; however, the question of execution remained 
unsolved. It was not to be until 1815 and by Napoleon that the trade was completely abolished 
in the territories ruled by France, while Portugal and Spain were to abandon the trade not 
earlier than 1820.217 Still, even Wilberforce was by 1815 convinced that Castlereagh “really 
takes much pains for the cause”218 and thought “all done that could be done.”219 
 
Anyway, apart from where the issue regarding the slave trade was concerned, Britons were 
generally very pleased – and had every reason to be. France and Holland had gotten back the 
majority of their colonies, but Britain held strategic key-necessities and her sea supremacy 
was unchallengeable. The response of the Opposition varied, ranging from Grey’s displeasure 
of the Bourbon’s restoration and even sorrow for Napoleon’s fate at Holland House, to 
Grenville’s as well as Whitbread’s satisfaction with the peace treaty, 220  the latter even 
admitting: “[…] ‘Tis more than I dared to hope!”221  
 
 
15. INTERLUDE AT LONDON 
 
The allied sovereigns, generals and statesmen had all received an invitation to London, which 
was, with over one million inhabitants, not only Europe’s biggest city, but also said to be the 
richest in the world. In June, the Tsar and the King of Prussia, together with Blücher and 
Hardenberg as well as Metternich, thus set out for England. The latter had been dispatched by 
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Francis, who had declined his invitations, probably because he was aware that the Britons 
disliked him for marrying off his daughter to the French Emperor.222  
 
The state visit rekindled the marital conflict between the Prince Regent and his wife Caroline. 
The cousins had married in 1795, only to split up one year later just after their daughter 
Charlotte’s birth. Ever since, the British public felt compassion towards Caroline, while the 
Prince of Wales was subject to ridicule. As George did not want to see his wife, he insisted 
that she was not to attend any of the social gatherings. Yet Caroline still turned up at the 
Opera one night the Prince Regent and his guests were there too - and was cheered by the 
crowd. George, on the other hand was, whenever he showed his face, scoffed at223 and often 
met with the words: “Prinny, where’s your wife?”224 Needless to say, this evidence of public 
disdain before the eyes of his guests left George deeply humiliated. Also, politically, the 
marital conflict was a continuous source of hassle. Ever since the Prince Regent had turned 
against the Whigs, some of them, but even more the Radicals had taken up Caroline’s cause in 
order to embarrass George and his Ministry.225 Caroline, however, was aware of why she was 
being supported, as she exposed to an acquaintance: “You see, my dear, how I am plagued; it 
is not the loss of the amusement which I regret, but being treated like a child, and made the 
puppet of a party: what signify if I am applauded in his hearing or not-that is all for the 
gratification of the party, not for my gratification […].”226 
 
On the planned wedding of her daughter to the Hereditary Prince of Orange, Caroline’s 
opinion had not been obtained, but as her husband was clearly supporting it, Caroline 
naturally objected. She was not the only one: in mid-June Princess Charlotte wrote to her 
fiancé to cancel their engagement. The Prince Regent was anything but impressed and 
endeavoured to persuade Charlotte to marry William. But his attempts were without success: 
Charlotte ran away to her mother’s and eventually George discarded his plan. Though the 
Princess’ decision not to marry William of Orange was probably due to her being smitten 
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with the Prussian King’s nephew, it was thought that it was due to the influence of Grand 
Duchess Catharine.227  
 
Grand Duchess Catharine, the Tsar’s beloved sister, had preceded her brother and had been in 
England for some time now. Almost instantly she and the Prince Regent had developed 
mutual resentment.228 “Handsome as he is,” she described George in a letter to Alexander, “he 
is a man visibly used up by dissipation and disgusting rather. His much boasted affability is 
the most licentious, I may even say obscene, strain I have ever listened to […].”229 Barely 
hiding her feelings of disgust and aversion, she closely associated with Princess Charlotte and 
would even have visited the Princess of Wales, if not dissuaded by Lieven, the Russian 
ambassador to London. Lieven, however, could neither stop her from making most 
unwelcome remarks upon George’s obligations as a husband and father, nor from seeking the 
company of Whig leaders. When Alexander arrived in London he turned out to conduct 
himself in the same way as his sister. For, while being discourteous to the Ministry and 
invidious to the Prince Regent, he was openly consorting with the opponents of the Cabinet, 
including Grey and Holland, who George was known to specifically dislike. Whether this 
conduct was more due to the personal antipathy he felt for the Prince Regent, or more due to 
political considerations - perceiving the unpopularity of George as well as several members of 
his Cabinet he might have made the presumption that a Whig-government was soon to replace 
the Tory one, which was possibly his motivation for seeking good relations with the 
Opposition - the result was that, within the few weeks Alexander stayed in London, he 
managed to earn the hatred of the Prince Regent and the aversion of the Ministry. The Tories, 
however, were to remain in power, directing, together with the Prince Regent, Britain’s policy 
throughout the Tsar’s life.230 Besides, Alexander was not even successful in impressing the 
Opposition, Grey calling him a “vain silly fellow.”231 For, by affronting George, he had also 
alienated the Whigs, because it was seen as being a prerogative of Englishmen to criticise the 
Regent – the Tsar doing so was an offence to the Nation.232 George’s indignation about his 
guest obviously did not remain unconcealed, Creevey stating that “all agree that Prinny will 
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die or go mad; he is worn out with fuss, fatigue and rage.”233 Alexander’s behaviour appears 
also to have had an impact on the mass of people. Being welcomed as the hero at his arrival, 
the applause and hoorays lessened more and more as the days went by – the biggest 
enthusiasm now being directed at Blücher.234  
 
That Alexander, in this careless manner, trifled his popularity away, was, however, a huge 
asset to Metternich, who displayed an impeccable demeanour, avoiding the Opposition, while 
treating the Ministry with every kindness and flattering the Prince Regent235 – inducing the 
latter to even call Metternich “the wisest of Ministers.”236 Formally, the Cabinet had been 
inclined to eye Austria, and particularly Metternich, with suspicion, while the attitude towards 
Alexander was one of friendliness. For, although Castlereagh had drawn closer to Austria, the 
same could not be said for his Ministry. Had Alexander not aroused everyone’s disfavour, it 
might have rendered it impossible for Castlereagh to fight the former’s aspirations the way he 
was to do. However, as it was, the interlude at London altered the appreciation with respect to 
the Guests of State. While the Ministry was still not entirely confiding in Austria, relations 
definitely improved, whereas Alexander had lost all sympathies. These changes well excelled 
the political talks in their significance. For, due to the social whirl, hardly any conferences 
could be held.237  
 
It was decided that the Congress at Vienna should be postponed until autumn, allowing 
Alexander to visit his country before the Congress commenced and giving Castlereagh some 
more time for parliamentary business. In Parliament, Castlereagh had to deal with queries as 
to Princess Caroline and the abolition of the slave trade, as previously mentioned. 
Furthermore, expenses were subject to discussion as well as the Government’s conduct in the 
matter of Sweden’s incorporation of Norway. This had caused considerable trouble, as the 
Norwegians were unwilling to be incorporated into Sweden and instead proclaimed their 
independence and chose the Hereditary Prince of Denmark to be their King. Only after a 
blockade against Norway, in which Britain had taken part, and Bernadotte’s agreement to the 
Norwegian constitution, the resistance of the Norwegians was overcome. As the Norwegians 
had been wartime enemies while Sweden had been fighting on the allied side, the 
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Government really had no choice other than to support Sweden – and this was also accredited 
in Parliament. All in all, Parliament at this stage was rather sedate. The Opposition was in a 
dispirited state, while the Cabinet had reason to feel safe, because their forceful warfare and 
successes had boosted the standing of the ministers.238 
 
 
16. PEACE WITH THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
Shortly before the Congress commenced at Vienna, discussions were also opened at Ghent. In 
1812 Russia had proposed acting as mediator between Great Britain and America, and the 
latter had actually accepted, but Great Britain had declined. The British did not wish any other 
power to interfere in her dispute with her erstwhile colonies, and definitely not Russia, who 
had in the past displayed a similar view on the issue as America and might only endeavour to 
talk Britain out of her maritime rights, while the latter was adamantly set on keeping these, 
under all circumstances, out of negotiations. It was mainly due to the desire to keep the 
American question out of any Continental discussions lest British maritime rights might 
become subject to negotiations that prompted Castlereagh on 4 November 1813 to propose to 
President Madison peace talks, to which the latter agreed. It was to take several months, 
however, until all American commissioners reached Ghent, where the negotiations were to 
take place.239  
 
Meanwhile, peace had been concluded on the Continent, which naturally made the Americans 
fear that Britain would now turn with all her resources against the United States. Indeed, 
Britain reinforced their navy as well as the number of their troops, the latter mostly by 
soldiers who had fought in the Peninsula. Given this augmentation of their forces, the 
Government were confident that the military situation would sooner or later be ameliorated, 
which would consequently produce an advantageous standing in the negotiations. Thus, 
although the question as to the fate of Europe had not yet been settled and voices were raised 
against the war as inflicting damage upon the economic interest, the Cabinet at this stage felt 
no hurry for the commencement of the peace talks. While the American representatives were 
at Ghent by July 1814, the British ones still took another month to turn up. True, the Cabinet 
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had, as we have seen, obviously been busy with attending to the guests of state, but one has to 
question whether the late arrival was not at least partly on purpose. When the peace 
negotiations, which were held while the military operations were proceeding, finally 
commenced, both British and American commissioners did not believe that a pleasant 
outcome could be achieved, because apparently neither side was ready to make compromises. 
On the contrary, Britain was now under the impression of the victorious war on the Continent 
and of the belief of being exceedingly more powerful than the United States. Thus, the British 
claims were of such demanding character, including the surrender of territory, that they did 
not leave any doubt that Britain simply tried to enhance her standing overseas. After 
intelligence of a British setback was received in October, it was considered to send even more 
soldiers across the Atlantic and to place Wellington at the head of them. The Duke, dutiful as 
always, did not decline but made no secret of the fact that he was anything but keen on this 
post. What he did, however, was to make an assessment of the military situation. Wellington 
opined that actual preponderance could only be achieved through a lot of money and time,240 
and quite frankly expressed, “I confess that I think you have no right, from the state of the war, 
to demand any concession of territory from America.”241  
 
Wellington’s assessment, the war expenses when Parliament was calling for a reduction of 
costs, jealousies among the Great Powers, and the by now climactic situation at the Congress 
all contributed to the Ministry becoming more reconcilable and ceasing to demand territorial 
concessions. Castlereagh, for his part was all busy with the, as he believed, substantially 
graver issues at the Congress and considered the conflict with America to be an annoying and 
distracting abashment. Certainly influenced by the quarrelling at Vienna, he strove to get on 
good terms with the United States. After a few more weeks of negotiations, peace was finally 
concluded on 24 December. The Treaty of Ghent was made on the status quo ante bellum and 
oddly enough, omits exactly those points of dispute that were responsible for the declaration 
of war. Therefore, some people, particularly in America, considered the agreement to be 
merely a truce. As there was no reason for Britain to exercise impressment etc. during peace 
times, the harassments had stopped and consequently there was, so the U.S.-representatives 
could argue, no cause to sustain hostilities. Upon Napoleon’s return, Castlereagh anyway was 
quite attentive not to anger the United States again. Some voices in Great Britain, particularly 
from the Tories, decried the treaty as it did not punish the United States for their perfidious 
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assault on Britain at a time when it was so deeply engaged in the struggle with Napoleon, and 
for decades Britons were anxious that America might again try to capitalise on any problems 
Great Britain might face on the Continent. Nevertheless, since the maritime rights were 
retained, overall satisfaction prevailed at the conclusion of peace, especially within the 
commercial classes.242 
 
However, the discussions at Ghent were eclipsed by those at Vienna. Though not in theory, 
they were somehow interlinked, because the growing tensions among the Allies prompted 
Britain to be more placable at Ghent and, in turn, the peace agreement with America was to 
produce considerable impact at the Austrian capital.243  
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V. THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA 
 
 
17. FESTIVITIES, ESPIONAGE AND STRATEGIES 
 
The Congress of Vienna produced a social whirl – splendid balls, dinners and concerts were a 
daily occurrence as well as tittle-tattle, intrigues, and love affairs. As the Great Four were 
again set on keeping the negotiations to themselves, the numerous noble guests did not really 
have anything else to do other than plunge in and enjoy the festivities. These were also 
frequently attended by some of the principal negotiators in spite of the workload. 244 
Castlereagh exposed that “we are […] impeded by the succession of fêtes and private Balls – 
they waste a great deal of valuable time, and prevent P[rince] Metternich from giving his 
mind to subjects that ought to engross him.”245 In sharp contrast to Metternich and Alexander 
who thoroughly enjoyed the company of women, Castlereagh was wary enough not to provide 
any food for the scandalmongers at Vienna and besides, was deeply devoted to his wife, who 
had come to Vienna with him. However, Metternich appears to have regarded the never-
ending festivities not only as entertainment, but also as a means to gain diplomatic benefit for 
he tried to disrupt the bond between Russia and Prussia.246 His strategy was, as he put it, to 
“barricade myself behind time, and make patience my weapon.”247 Talleyrand observed that 
“Metternich’s greatest art is to make us waste our time, for he believes he gains by it.” For 
weeks Metternich in this manner delayed business – earning him the nickname “Prince 
Scamperlin.”248 
 
Another aspect the Congress of Vienna is renowned for is the espionage of the Austrian 
Police. There were various different agents, from coachmen to housemaids – the latter, for 
example, being responsible for sifting through wastepaper bins. This resulted, however, more 
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in general mistrust than in valuable information. Reports were mostly quite dull 249 , for 
instance it was observed that “the Emperor of Russia went out at 7 p.m. with one of his aides-
de-camp. It is believed he went to visit the Princess Thurn and Taxis. Every morning a large 
block of ice is brought to the Emperor with which he washes his face and hands.”250 Couriers 
were also employed, copying all diplomatic correspondence. This again did not produce too 
much useful information, but only made it more complicated for the representatives, who 
were aware of the espionage, to exchange forthright words with their respective courts. 
Therefore, the cautious British delegation employed its own housemaids as well as 
couriers.251 
 
Liverpool informed Castlereagh more or less frequently on public sentiments and the opinions 
of the ministers on the matters discussed in Vienna. However, as the principal British interests 
had already been achieved, the Government was not too interested in the reconstruction of 
Europe. The progress of the abolition of the slave trade was heedfully watched and also 
questions as to the future of Poland, Saxony, Genoa, and Naples, as well as, as we have seen, 
Norway, attracted interest, but apart from these issues discussions on domestic affairs 
prevailed in Parliament. And even though especially the Prime Minister and Bathurst as 
Secretary for War kept track of the negotiations, they could hardly hope to control the quickly 
altering state of affairs at the Congress from far-away London – with correspondence from 
London to Vienna taking two weeks. Actually only once, in November, the Cabinet was to 
send an official instruction to Castlereagh – which he, as will be seen, was to completely 
disregard.252 
 
Castlereagh’s aims for the settlement were largely those of Pitt, an erstwhile British Prime 
Minister who had greatly influenced him. Pitt had been prompted by the forming of the third 
coalition against France to work on a scheme for the reconstruction of Europe, which 
Castlereagh had helped to develop. According to Pitt’s plan, both Austria and Prussia should 
be strengthened, Austria by extending her territories in southern Europe, Prussia by doing the 
same in the North. Also, Sardinia and Holland should be enlarged, therewith rendering it 
possible for them to act as barriers against France in southern and northern Europe, with 
Austria backing Sardinia up and Prussia guarding Holland, while Central Europe should be 
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jointly defended by the two German Powers – not only against French, but also against 
potential Russian aggression. Therefore, it was obviously of the utmost importance that 
Austria and Prussia should reconcile their differences, which had been one of the causes that 
enabled French supremacy on the Continent in the first place. However, as the Coalition of 
Russia, Great Britain and Austria (Prussia could not be persuaded to join in) was defeated by 
Napoleon in the battles at Ulm and later at Austerlitz, Pitt’s efforts for a future settlement of 
Europe seemed to have been in vain. Meanwhile, Pitt had died and nearly ten years had 
passed by – Castlereagh, however, had not forgotten the scheme. Recalling Pitt’s plan of 1805, 
he aspired for the creation of an equilibrium, as would render it impossible for one country to 
menace the others. The Napoleonic wars had diminished the Austrian State and, even more 
severely, the Prussian one, whereas both France and Russia had gained land excessively. 
While France, through the Treaty of Paris, had been confined to its prerevolutionary 
boundaries, Russia had acquired Finland, Bessarabia and a huge part of Poland – and now it 
wanted to add even more of Poland to its territories. To guard the Continent not only against 
French, but also against Russian ascendancy, Castlereagh sought to create a strong Central 
Europe. Such a strong Centre could not, however, be achieved through a mere territorial 
extension on the part of Austria and Prussia, but required a friendly bond between these two 
powers, which, needless to say, in turn preconditioned first of all that the German Powers 
reconciled their differences – a task Castlereagh was to be working on all October.253 
 
 
18. THE POLISH-SAXON QUESTION 
 
Of all the issues discussed at the Congress, the Polish-Saxon question was the most crucial 
one. For almost two years, Alexander had kept silent about the exact nature of his Polish 
scheme – now he finally broke his silence. In an interview with Castlereagh he announced 
that he meant to re-establish the Polish Kingdom, including the fortresses Thorn and Cracow, 
and by bestowing a constitution on his new kingdom, it would be solely connected through 
his person to Russia. A long time before, the Tsar had befriended the Polish patriot 
Czartoryski, who had aroused the desire in Alexander to aid the Poles. This desire had only 
grown stronger as time had passed and, meanwhile, Alexander was convinced that it was his 
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moral obligation254, claiming “that if it was merely a question of territory, he would yield it 
without a struggle, but that it involved the happiness of the Poles, and the people would never 
forgive his ceding them.”255 Allowing that Alexander meant well – he was definitely sincere 
when he stated that he felt that it was his moral obligation to help the Poles – good faith could 
hardly be a sufficient safeguard given that an implementation of his scheme would mean 
Russia’s expansion deep into Central Europe. Not only the territorial aggrandizement, but also 
Alexander’s ambition to bestow a constitution on his Polish lands would thus severely 
threaten the German powers, as this would produce disgruntled Poles on Austria’s and 
Prussia’s remaining Polish territories with potentially exceedingly dangerous 
consequences.256 These potential consequences were given attention in a memorandum that 
Liverpool sent to Castlereagh in mid-October: 
“[…] if the Duchy of Warsaw is to be an independent State under the Emperor of 
Russia, the independent principle will not only be preserved, but it will be preserved 
under a monarch whose power will be sufficient to give encouragement to the 
disaffected in the Austrian and Prussian Polish provinces, to seize the first opportunity 
of resisting their acknowledged Sovereigns, and of reuniting themselves under a head 
whom they will consider as strong enough to protect them, and who will be the 
Sovereign of a country which will be regarded as the parent stock of Polish 
independence.”257 
 
Napoleon, who was at Elba informed of Alexander’s aspirations, painted an exaggerated 
horror vision: 
“If the Russians succeed in uniting the Poles heartily in a common interest, the whole 
of Europe ought to dread them. It will be impossible to foresee or to limit the 
consequences. Hordes of Cossacks and barbarians having seen the riches of more 
civilised countries, will be eager to return. They will overrun Europe, and some great 
change will probably result from it, as has been the case in former times from the 
incursions of barbarians.”258  
 
How dangerous the implementation of Alexander’s scheme might be, the British Ministry still 
had to pay attention to public opinion, which favoured an independent Poland. The Duchy of 
Warsaw becoming an independent State under Alexander’s sovereignty would, therefore, the 
Memorandum went on,  
“be less unpopular in this country than the measure of complete partition, and 
consequently of Polish annihilation. If we are to come to either of these alternatives, I 
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think it would be very desirable that there should, if possible, be some record of our 
having expressed our opinion how desirable it would be to restore Poland on the 
principle of 1792, and of our having made some effort for that which we are more 
entitled to ask, the independence of the Duchy of Warsaw under a neutral 
Sovereign.259 
 
Castlereagh, therefore, in his interview with the Tsar, argued that Britain looked upon an 
independent Poland favourably – therewith making the Tsar’s assertions of moral obligation 
seem like mere pretence, for Alexander was not prepared to allow Poland to become entirely 
autonomous. Castlereagh had been well aware that Alexander would hardly surrender 
territory that had belonged to Russia for a considerable period of time just for winning the war 
and had made this suggestion merely for the satisfaction of British public opinion. In this 
manner he was to repeatedly propose an independent Polish state simply as a means to 
forestall criticism in Parliament. Castlereagh as well addressed the Russian point of view, 
pointing out that most Russians also objected to Alexander’s scheme. That the Tsar 
apparently did not demand indemnities for the struggle and suffering that Russia had to 
endure during wartime obviously outraged the Russians. And to establish an independent 
country, whose inhabitants would be granted privileges, which Alexander refused his own 
peoples, was seen to be simply ludicrous. This, by the way, might be the reason why, 
although Nesselrode was still minister and also present in Vienna, the discussions mostly took 
place with Alexander himself260, as Castlereagh explained: 
“It is unfortunately his habit to be his own minister, and to select as the instrument of 
his immediate purpose the person who may happen to fall in most with his views. This 
has been particularly the case on the present question, all the Russians, I believe 
without an exception, being adverse to his projects, considering them both as 
dangerous to himself and injurious to his Allies.”261 
 
Anyway, Castlereagh’s estimation of the situation, as he told Liverpool, was that  
“[…] from my experience of His Imperial Majesty’s character, I expect nothing from 
his friendship to his Allies, and as little from his generosity or his sense of justice, yet 
I still hope for something from his fears. The general sentiment of dissatisfaction and 
alarm occasioned by his conduct is becoming too strong and too universal to be any 
longer a secret from him. It exists extensively amongst his own subjects, and I have 
reason to believe that this fact has not been concealed from him.”262 
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Still, Castlereagh’s endeavours to bring Alexander to his senses were to no avail. The latter 
emphasised that he held Poland and intended it to stay that way, even alluding to his, in the 
area of question, stationed troops.263 
 
Talleyrand observed that Castlereagh “thought that he was in a position to bend the Emperor 
of Russia, but only succeeded in irritating him.”264 As his private interviews with Alexander 
had been unfruitful, Castlereagh put his efforts again into bringing Austria and Prussia closer 
together for the purpose of forming a united front against Alexander’s aspirations. Though the 
Austrian as well as the Prussian Minister was determined to reach an understanding, it was a 
formidable task, for both of them lacked support in their respective countries. Hardenberg’s 
position was hampered by Frederick William III, who showed himself too subservient to 
Alexander to impede the latter’s ambitions, as well as by the Prussian generals, who were set 
on not only acquiring the whole of Saxony, but also Mainz. Regarding Metternich, he was, 
although reluctantly, prepared to let Prussia incorporate Saxony, but most Austrians, 
including Stadion and Schwarzenberg, opposed this, and even considered it to be a graver 
menace than surrendering Galicia to the Tsar. However, as Alexander had at Kalish arranged 
with Prussia for her incorporation of Saxony, it necessitated that Austria would also give her 
consent lest Prussia would hang on to the Tsar’s side. Therefore, Metternich had, in spite of 
the prevalent sentiment in Austria as well as in the smaller German states against such a 
settlement, agreed to Prussia’s claims already at the beginning of 1814 - though only verbally 
and quite grudgingly. Only through a painful endeavour could an agreement in form of a 
written warranty be reached: Hardenberg, for the time being, relinquished his demand of 
Mainz, while Metternich assented to a Prussian possession of Saxony, but stipulated that his 
approval depended on the success in restraining Alexander. 265  He also included another 
condition, namely that the incorporation of the Saxon Kingdom ought not to produce a 
“disproportionate aggrandizement.” Hardenberg, greedy for Austria’s acquiescence, probably 
overlooked the true meaning and consequences of these stipulations. For Metternich truly 
lived up to his reputation of being a minister of finesse and trickery – if the Tsar could be 
restrained, Prussia would get her Polish lands back and make thus a Prussian incorporation of 
Saxony a “disproportionate aggrandizement.” But if the Tsar could not be restrained, Prussia 
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would also lose her right to Saxony, as the success of their undertaking was the precondition 
of Metternich’s assent.266 
 
At any rate, for the moment, the two German Powers were reconciled and now it was 
Metternich’s turn to address the Tsar, among other things again suggesting the complete 
independence of Poland.267 Alexander’s reaction was cursing at Metternich “with a pride and 
violence of language which would have been thought extraordinary even towards one of his 
own servants” as Talleyrand wrote in a letter to Paris.268 Though the Austrian Minister had 
grown used to fits of temper when dealing with Napoleon, Alexander’s behaviour was 
apparently even too much for Metternich, who haggardly retreated. A couple of days later the 
relations between Metternich and Alexander reached another low, with the latter even 
menacing the Austrian Minister with a duel and refusing to talk to him for several weeks. 
Alexander also complained to his brother monarchs about their ministers. Though he failed to 
affect Francis, he succeeded with Frederick William, who now instructed Hardenberg to end 
the outrageous policy of ganging up on the Tsar. Though the issue wore on for a bit longer, 
with Hardenberg still trying to find a common understanding, it was to no avail. As 
Metternich had acquiesced in the incorporation of Saxony into Prussia only in the event that 
the Tsar could be restrained in his ambitions, the controversy was now to shift to the Saxon 
Kingdom. Given that Castlereagh had misjudged the state of affairs and his policy had turned 
out to be unsuccessful, it was naturally a trying time for the British Foreign Secretary. By 11 
November he conceded that his strategy had not worked and that nothing more could be done 
to prevent Alexander from annexing most of Poland.269  
 
Talleyrand described his British colleague as someone “who had lost his way” and thought it 
likely that Castlereagh would return to London. 270  Indeed, the British government had 
assessed the situation better than Castlereagh had done.271 Already in October Liverpool had 
warned Castlereagh that the matter of Poland “becomes a question of serious embarrassment, 
and it is very material that we should lose no character by the part we take in it. I am inclined 
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to think that the less we have to do with it, except as far as regards giving our opinion, the 
better.”272 Castlereagh explained himself, stating that  
“I should have wished that this species of discussion had fallen into more able hands, 
and especially that it could have been conducted by the minister of one of the Powers 
more immediately interested in the Polish question; but when I saw the service 
suffering from inaction, I found it difficult to be passive, and Your Lordship may be 
assured that England is still the only Power that either can, or dares, raise her voice 
against the powerful and the oppressor.”273 
 
The Cabinet were, however, far from impressed by Castlereagh’s conduct for once because 
they naturally had to take British public opinion into account. True, the British public did not 
care much about any of the issues discussed at the Congress. Still, there was a widespread 
sympathy for the Poles, and a Polish Kingdom under the sovereignty of Alexander was 
believed preferable to the alternative of another partition, whereas a Prussian acquisition of 
Saxony was looked upon to be highly iniquitous. This attitude of worrying for a ‘legitimate’ 
sovereign was by the way regarded by Prussians as pure hypocrisy in view of Britain’s 
conduct in India, where one by one the ‘legitimate’ sovereigns had been deposed so Britain 
could establish her realm. At any rate, Castlereagh’s support for Prussia’s claims, which 
violated the rights of the poor Saxon King, as well as his objection to the Tsar’s most noble 
plans to establish an independent Polish State, were conceived by the British public as well as 
by the Opposition to be nothing but ignominious conduct. While the Opposition had been 
rather reticent in the first months of the year until the completion of the peace treaty, it viewed 
the inability of the statesmen at Vienna to reach an agreement as a superb opportunity to 
attack the Cabinet in Parliament. When intelligence was received in Britain about 
Castlereagh’s attitude towards the Saxon question, Whitbread instantly seized the moment to 
endorse the preservation of the King of Saxony and his lands 274 , claiming that “it was 
impossible to contend for an instant that this act of robbery had not been perpetrated in the 
very spirit of Buonaparté [sic!]” while Lambton called it “the acts of rapine and aggression of 
the club of confederated monarchs at Vienna, who appear to have met, not to watch over the 
interests of Europe, but as contemners [sic!] of public faith and justice, as the spoliators of 
Saxony and the oppressors of Norway.” 275  On the Polish question, the Whigs strongly 
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advocated Alexander’s aspirations as a reinstatement of independence276, Whitbread stating 
that “the rumours are that the Emperor Alexander has strenuously contended for the 
independence of Poland and that he has been opposed in his benevolent views by the British 
Ministers.” He further opined that “if the Emperor Alexander, beside the splendid triumphs he 
had gained, has added this fresh glory to his character, in what disadvantageous contrast must 
the Noble Lord appear who is resisting this plan of liberty and happiness.”277 
 
It was difficult for the ministers to defend the policy carried out at Vienna, especially because 
they did not share Castlereagh’s view and were none too happy about his performance 
themselves. They hardly took an interest in continental matters and did not regard 
Alexander’s Polish ambitions to be upsetting the balance of power, nor did they see any threat 
to their special interests. Thus, all the ministers could do in Parliament was to simply refuse to 
talk about the ongoing discussions at Vienna, while the Prime Minister repeatedly pointed out 
to Castlereagh the trouble the Cabinet was facing in the House of Commons and pleaded for a 
cautious modus operandi. The Government simply wished to avoid hassle and were therefore, 
naturally upset when they learned that their Foreign Minister did not hold back a bit, but 
instead had strongly intervened in the most intricate matters of Poland and Saxony.278 As 
Liverpool admitted to Wellington, “Lord Castlereagh has been substantially right in all his 
points; but I wish we had not been made so much principals in the Polish question.”279 
Repeatedly, the Prime Minister urged Castlereagh to change his conduct to a more reticent 
one, for he as well as most other ministers believed that  
“we have done enough on this question of Poland, and that if our efforts should not 
have been successful, the time is now come when […] it would be far better that we 
should withdraw ourselves from the question altogether, and reserve ourselves for 
points on which we have a more immediate and direct interest. I am the more strongly 
inclined to this opinion because I am fully persuaded, as I have already said, that no 
arrangement respecting Poland can now be either creditable or satisfactory. I think it 
very material that we should likewise consider that our war with America will 
probably now be of some duration. We owe it, therefore, to ourselves not to make 
enemies in other quarters if we can avoid it […].”280 
 
In this letter Liverpool had also enclosed a memorandum which Vansittart, the Minister of the 
Exchequer, had drawn up and which represented the opinion of most of the ministers. 
Vansittart opined that Poland would cause Alexander more trouble than good, also, as Minster 
                                                 
276 WEBSTER: The Pacification of Europe, p. 473. 
277 Quoted in NICOLSON: The Congress of Vienna, A Study in Allied Unity, p. 184. 
278 MUIR: Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon, p. 338; WEBSTER: The Pacification of Europe, p. 464, 473. 
279 Liverpool to Wellington, 26 November 1814, B.D., p. 246. 
280 Liverpool to Castlereagh, 28 October 1814, B.D., p. 219f. 
 78 
of the Exchequer, considered the economical advantage of an independent Poland, and 
concluded that Britain’s representatives should stop antagonising the Tsar: 
“I begin to apprehend that we are making ourselves too much principals in the disputes 
respecting Poland. The pretensions of Russia evidently endanger the security and 
independence of Austria and Prussia; but those Powers are at least wavering in their 
resistance, if not disposed to acquiesce, for the sake of securing objects still more 
interesting to them. We run the risk, therefore, of being disavowed, and represented 
abroad as actuated by a jealousy of the greatness of Russia, and at home as the 
advocates and instigators of a system of partition. […] The Emperor, in accepting the 
crown of Poland, becomes bound to give the kingdom a constitution; and […] he will 
infallibly cripple the powers of his government, and render the Poles much less 
manageable than when directly subjects of Russia. There is, besides, the greatest 
probability that in the course of one or two generations, at the utmost, the nominal 
independence of Poland would become real. A minority, or a weak reign, in Russia 
would bring about a separation which all the other Powers of Europe would be 
inclined to countenance. In the meantime, as far as British interests are concerned, I 
think the decision of the question of no great political importance to us either way; and 
that in a commercial point of view we should reap considerable advantage even from a 
nominal independence of Poland. Russia, from whatever cause, shows the strongest 
spirit or hostility against our trade; and nothing could so effectually defeat her 
restrictive regulations as the opening the ports of an adjoining kingdom, in which, 
even if similar prohibitions were nominally imposed, they would be constantly evaded. 
It is, indeed, well known that […] large quantities of British goods, prohibited in 
Russia, always found their way there through the Polish ports […]. These ideas […] 
lead me to this practical conclusion, that though we were bound to support to a certain 
extent the endeavours of Austria and Prussia to prevent the extension of a dominion 
dangerous to their independence, yet that we have now fully performed all that could 
be expected from us, and that we ought to avoid irritating Russia by a pertinacious 
opposition which is so unlikely to be successful.”281 
 
Castlereagh was, therefore, well aware that his policy on the Polish-Saxon question had been 
all but popular in Britain, but he had already expected that a conflict of the German Powers 
would ensue in the event of Alexander’s plan not being averted and he vindicated his conduct 
by opining that Poland, no matter how distant it might be, would still influence British interest, 
for all security would derive from a general peaceful reconstruction.282 
 
“I deemed it of great importance to contribute as far as depended upon me, to this 
concert: considering the establishment of Russia in the heart of Germany not only as 
constituting a great danger in itself, but as calculated to establish a most pernicious 
influence both in the Austrian and Prussian Cabinets; and I also foresaw, that if these 
two Powers, from distrust of each other, gave up the Polish point as desperate, the 
contest in negotiation would then turn upon Saxony, Mayence and other German 
points, and through the contentions of Austria and Prussia, the supremacy of Russia 
would be established in all directions, and upon every question; whereas an 
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understanding previously established on German affairs, gave some chance of 
ameliorating the Polish arrangement, and, in case of its failure, afforded the best, if not 
the only means of counteracting the Russian influence in the other European 
arrangements, […] Your Lordship may rest assured that no effort on my part shall be 
omitted to prevent disunion, and still more, war; but I am confident I speak the 
universal sentiment, when I declare my perfect conviction, that unless the Emperor of 
Russia can be brought to a more moderate and sound course of public conduct, the 
peace, which we have so dearly purchased, will be but of short duration.”283 
 
The war threats left the Government gravely distressed; Liverpool pointed out that Britain 
was still engaged in a war with the United States and had to bear the burden of having an 
immense debt. And intelligence from France was received according to which the Bourbons 
as well as Wellington were subjected to endangerment.284What scared Liverpool the most was 
the thought that a new war now might be of revolutionary nature: 
“It may be quite true that if the Emperor of Russia does not relax in his present 
demands, the peace of Europe may not be of long continuance; but for however short a 
time that peace may last, I should consider it of great advantage. In the course of two 
or three years it may reasonably be expected that the power of Louis XVIII. in France 
will be consolidated, and that the revolutionary spirit which still exists to such an 
alarming degree in that country will in a great measure have evaporated. The people 
will have returned to peaceful habits, and the landed and moneyed interests will feel 
their fate connected with that of the restored government. In two, or three years 
likewise the Prince of Orange will, I trust, have been enabled firmly to establish his 
authority in the Low Countries, will have raised an army for the defence of his 
dominions, and have made some progress in erecting a barrier against his neighbours. 
But if war should be renewed at present, I fear that we should lose all we have gained, 
that the revolutionary spirit would break forth again in full force, and that the 
Continent would be plunged in all the evils under which it has groaned for the last 
twenty years. A war now, therefore, may be a revolutionary war. A war some time 
hence, though an evil, need not be different in its character and its effects from any of 
those wars which occurred in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, before the 
commencement of the French Revolution.”285 
 
Castlereagh actually entertained similar anxieties, but his strategy of how to obviate a war and 
therewith the potential resurrection of revolutionary forces was different.286 In a letter he 
warned Liverpool that 
“[…] you must make up your mind to watch him, and to resist him if necessary as 
another Buonaparte [sic!] […] acquiescence will not keep him back, nor will 
opposition accelerate his march. His Imperial Majesty is never more condescending 
than to those who speak plainly but respectfully to him; and if I were to speculate on 
the course most likely to save your money, and to give you the longest interval of 
peace with such a character, I should say that it would lie in never suffering him for a 
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moment to doubt your readiness to support the continental Powers against his 
ambitious encroachments. […] With such a personage at the head of between forty and 
fifty millions of people prone to, and adapted to war, you cannot afford to dissolve 
your continental relations, unless you are prepared to acquiesce in a domination that 
would very soon assume the character of that from which we have escaped, and would 
certainly not degenerate from it in a disposition to circumscribe the power of Great 
Britain.”287 
 
As the reports from Vienna grew more and more alarming, Bathurst, the Minister of War and 
Colonies, explicitly ordered Castlereagh on 27 November that under no circumstances should 
Britain be implicated in a new war “for any of the objects which have been hitherto under 
discussion at Vienna.” 288  These instructions, the only significant ones that Castlereagh 
received during his stay in Vienna, however, did not yield the sought after result, as the 
addressee turned out to disregard the letter. Instead, Castlereagh set the warnings at nought 
and perpetuated his interference, believing only by taking a holding he could try to prevent 
disruption. Still, as it was learned at the Congress that the British Cabinet did not really 
sanction Castlereagh’s policy, his position was considerably weakened at this critical time. 
For, as Castlereagh received these instructions, the statesmen were fiercely disputing the 
Saxon question.289 
 
Since November 1814, Prussia was already in possession, because the Russians, seeing in it a 
possibility to further increase the dissensions dividing Austria and Prussia, consigned to the 
latter the administration of the Saxon Kingdom. However, as Metternich had only agreed to 
Prussia’s annexation provided that Alexander could be restrained, he now retracted his assent. 
In December he announced to the Prussians that he would only give his consent to an 
annexation of a territory, which was home to merely one-fifth out of Saxony’s 2.2 million 
inhabitants, leaving Hardenberg fuming. Completely distressed, the Prussian Chancellor 
turned to Alexander and showed him some of Metternich’s correspondence, composed right 
in the middle of the Polish crisis, which led to brutal disputes, but in the end did more damage 
to Hardenberg than to Metternich, for it prompted the latter to do the same.290  
 
At any rate, in answer to Metternich’s proposal Hardenberg suggested on 20 December to 
compensate the Saxon King with territory on the left bank of the Rhine, while Prussia would 
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annex his old kingdom. This suggestion was, however, flatly refused by both Metternich and 
Castlereagh, by the latter out of fear of the predictable influence France would have on this 
new kingdom, and by the former because he did not want Leipzig and Dresden to fall to 
Prussia. The positions had become so entrenched that negotiations led nowhere and thus 
disembogued into a standstill. Meanwhile, however, the relations of the Powers had 
undergone an immense change. Prussia had moved towards Russia, whereas Austria’s stance 
was endorsed by nearly all smaller states in Germany - as well as France. The state of affairs 
exacerbated until the disputants were not only speaking of war, but also made arrangements 
for the impending hostilities.291 Castlereagh pointed out to Liverpool that, if a war would 
ensue, it would be sooner rather than later in view of the large armies all across Europe: 
“[…]if we cannot agree upon some general system, the most likely case to occur is 
that of hostilities; and where all are armed, and none can long support the burthen of 
their existing establishments, the chances are that the warfare will be early and general. 
Take the case of Russia and Prussia: if they are determined to make common cause on 
their respective objects, and cannot succeed in prevailing upon the other Powers to 
acquiesce in their demands, it will not suit the exhausted finances of Prussia to remain 
long armed and inactive; nor can Russia expose herself indefinitely to the incumbrance 
of large armies remaining unemployed beyond or on the verge of her own frontier. I 
think the probability therefore is, that one or both of these Powers, if they do not relax 
in their pretensions, will provoke rather than procrastinate the war.”292 
 
Truly, there was hardly anyone who questioned the possibility of an immediate outbreak of 
war in this climate bursting with tension. Talleyrand, on 23 December, seized this critical 
moment to suggest an alliance between France, Great Britain, and Austria.293 
 
 
19. THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 
 
All along, Talleyrand had tried to interfere in the negotiations, to disrupt the alliance of the 
Four Powers and had laughed up his sleeve in view of their quarrel, on which he naturally had 
attempted to capitalise. Still, he had up to now been mostly unsuccessful, but as the Four 
Powers now turned out to be unable to reach an agreement, Talleyrand’s chance had come: 
for France was needed again.294 
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Talleyrand advocated the case of the King of Saxony on grounds of legitimacy, and by 
promoting legitimate sovereigns he also aimed at revitalising and strengthening the restored 
French dynasty. Additionally, he intended to utilise this reasoning to pave the way for 
deposing Murat from the Neapolitan throne. Therefore, his argument was obviously a mere 
means to achieve his own objects. Still, the diplomats at the Congress could not disregard the 
principle of legitimacy – after all, Europe had been at war more or less for the past two 
decades to fight a usurper who had reigned by employing anguish and power. Talleyrand also 
aspired to reintegrate France into the ranks of the Great Powers, and, by making use of the 
discord between the two German powers, to regain sway over the German and Italian states. 
By aligning France with Great Britain and Austria, Talleyrand had found an ideal way to 
further fuel the conflict of the Central Powers, which, in all likelihood, would restore France’s 
influence in Italy as well as Germany, and which, moreover, as one possible consequence, 
could effectuate that Britain had to stay engaged in the Continent and, therefore, be unable to 
properly attend to her colonies. The different attitude towards the question of Saxony had, up 
till now, prevented a closer connection between Castlereagh and Talleyrand. For a while the 
French Foreign Minister had been completely against Prussia’s claim to Saxony, and 
Castlereagh had supported it. As the latter’s strategy on the Polish question had proved 
unfruitful, and his Austrian colleague had retracted his assent to the incorporation of the 
Saxon Kingdom into Prussia, Castlereagh had, however, to take up a stance on the new 
situation. In the beginning of December he told Hardenberg that he was on Austria’s side and 
that his position was supported by his Cabinet, for, as we have seen, public opinion in Great 
Britain was such as to oppose the entire erasure of the Saxon kingdom. Though Castlereagh 
still tried to refrain from officially allying with France, the shift in his policy rendered it 
possible for Great Britain and France to draw closer.295 Another reason for the Powers to 
draw closer might be found in Liverpool’s less than flattering perception of the other Great 
Powers, which he exposed in a letter to Wellington: 
“The more I hear and see of the different Courts of Europe, the more convinced I am 
that the King of France is (amongst the great Powers) the only Sovereign in whom we 
can have any real confidence. The Emperor of Russia is profligate from vanity and 
self-sufficiency, if not from principle. The King of Prussia may be a well-meaning 
man, but he is the dupe of the Emperor of Russia. The Emperor of Austria I believe to 
be an honest man, but he has a Minister in whom no one can trust; who considers all 
policy as consisting in finesse and trick; and who has got his government and himself 
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into more difficulties by his devices than could have occurred from a plain course of 
dealing.”296  
 
Indeed, ever since the reinstatement of the Bourbons and the Treaty of Paris France had 
appeared as a possible ally, but only as the threat from the East was becoming more menacing 
than that of France, Talleyrand was to get his chance to partake in the discussions. Metternich 
in fact had already drawn nearer to Talleyrand ever since the relations between Austria and 
Prussia had begun to deteriorate and had meanwhile established quite intimate relations; 
Castlereagh also now moved closer to his French colleague. Through their support Talleyrand 
was finally to be admitted to the inner council.297 
 
As the protest against Alexander’s aspirations had ebbed away, he desired to acquire a formal 
agreement about Poland. In the ensuing conference end of December the interlinked issue of 
Saxony’s fate naturally also had to be subject to the negotiations. The Russians had to sustain 
Prussia’s claims, but Alexander’s succour was quite unsteady - his own objects in Poland 
seemed to be achieved, hence he was naturally disinclined to be drawn into hostilities because 
of the Saxon Kingdom. At the meeting Castlereagh and Metternich now rejected discussions 
unless the French delegate would also be admitted access to the inner council. Given 
Talleyrand’s stance on the Saxon question, Hardenberg refused and inconsiderately dared to 
announce that Prussia would view a rejection of her claim to Saxony as a declaration of war, 
which gave Castlereagh the necessary excuse to act – he drew up a secret treaty of alliance 
between Britain, France and Austria, which was signed on 3 January, 1815. 298 
 
The character of the Triple Alliance was defensive, the conditions being quite similar to those 
of the Treaty of Chaumont. Each of the three Powers engaged herself to furnish 150,000 
troops. An article committed France to accept the Treaty of Paris and another one provided 
that an assault upon the Netherlands or Hanover should be treated as tantamount to an assault 
upon Britain. Furthermore, these two northern powers as well as Bavaria also joined the 
alliance. Talleyrand was obviously keen on concluding the treaty. Only months ago an 
alliance with France would have produced an outburst; now, however, it was welcomed as a 
means to protect the balance of power. The conclusion of the Treaty meant nothing less than 
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that France had managed to break open her chains of isolation.299 Exultingly, Talleyrand 
reported to his King that “the Coalition is dissolved, France is no longer isolated in 
Europe.”300  
 
Seeing as the Cabinet had instructed Castlereagh not to engage Britain in hostilities and 
instead put all efforts into the maintenance of peace, Castlereagh’s decision to align Great 
Britain with Austria and France was a daring deed. For, in case Prussia insisted on acquiring 
all of Saxony and war ensued, Britain would inevitably have to participate. The Foreign 
Secretary was convinced that, in the event of hostilities, Great Britain would anyway be 
drawn in sooner or later. By concluding the Treaty, he was at least able to make sure that 
France accepted her borders, and therewith guarded the damageable western frontier of the 
Netherlands. One factor that probably eased his decision to conclude the Triple Alliance was 
the intelligence he had providentially received on 1 January: The war between Great Britain 
and the United States of America had come to an end, which meant that Great Britain could 
again draw on all her resources and rendered it possible301, as Castlereagh put it, that “[…] by 
the Spring we can have a very nice army on the Continent.”302 No wonder, therefore, that the 
news made a great impression at the Congress and obviously also at London. This good news 
as well as that, according to the treaty, France had to adhere to the conditions enacted at Paris 
helped to gain the Cabinet’s acceptance for Castlereagh’s rash action. By reason of 
Castlereagh having confronted the Government with a fait accompli there was not much the 
ministers could do anyway. Disavowing the alliance would not only harm the reputation of 
the Foreign Minister but also leave a blot on Great Britain’s trustworthiness. As it turned out, 
the completion of the Triple Alliance did not cause too much reluctance, only that, after 
Talleyrand and Metternich had done most preliminary planning, Castlereagh had in the end 
taken the lead in forging the alliance was a matter of lament. Liverpool, however, 
acknowledged that Britain would eventually be drawn into hostilities if such broke out on the 
Continent and was, indeed, satisfied to be aligned with France, still considering her to pose a 
more severe danger than Russia.303 
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However pleased Liverpool might have been about the connection with France, one point of 
the treaty of alliance, namely that it engaged every one of the three Powers – including France 
- to furnish an army of 150,000 men is more than astonishing. Were the French troops 
seriously prepared to align themselves with the Austrians and the British in a common battle? 
Even given that they were, would they not have posed a danger to the re-established 
monarch? And would Austria and Great Britain have truly been bold enough to allow the 
presence of French forces all over Europe yet again? Besides, how would France have raised 
the necessary financial means? They could hardly have counted on Great Britain – the Prime 
Minister was not even prepared to fund Austria – it is hardly imaginable that Parliament 
would have voted in favour of financial support of the former enemy. France, however, was 
not the only one to meet difficulties in the event of renewed warfare. While Britain was 
longing for peace, Austria was engaged in Italian questions and could have hardly wished for 
a war, which would have left her, at least initially, pretty much on her own struggling against 
both Russia and Prussia, whose armies were stationed quite close. Thus, the conclusion of the 
Triple Alliance can indeed be seen as being a mere bluff - but a well targeted one, which 
rendered it possible to expose the war threats as being not much more than a deception. The 
Tsar knew full well that his army was eager to go back to Russia and was far from inclined to 
start a war for the purpose of Saxony, and Prussia, as the most infirm of the Great Powers, 
could not have taken up arms on her own. 304 
 
Although the treaty was secret, it became known that Britain, Austria and France had forged 
an alliance and before long the threat of renewed hostilities ebbed away305, which rendered it 
possible for Castlereagh to set his Cabinet at ease, stating on 5 January that “the alarm of war 
is over.”306 Hardenberg gave in and agreed to Prussia only acquiring a part of Saxony, and 
Talleyrand was now being admitted to the negotiations. It was in the Committee of Five that 
in the next few weeks the fate of Europe was decided. Even when Napoleon returned, 
Talleyrand stayed a member of the Committee, though his authority was naturally 
diminished.307  
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Although the threat of war had passed, the undertaking of producing a settlement, which both 
Hardenberg as well as Metternich could agree to, still remained and was to take five more 
weeks. Since the latter as well as Talleyrand aimed to capitalise their success and leave 
Prussia only a fiddling part of Saxony, Castlereagh was again needed as an intermediary. 
What the British Foreign Minister strived for was not to conserve all of Saxony, but to reach 
an understanding between Austria and Prussia, which would render it possible to get the latter 
out of Russian control and allow the two German powers to draw near again. Castlereagh was 
under considerable strain, since the Prime Minister urged him to return to London as soon as 
possible, where he was supposed to defend the Government’s policy in the House of 
Commons. After all, he was the Leader of the House of Commons, and as the condition in the 
House grew ever more alarming, the Cabinet could not do without Castlereagh anymore. 
Parliament apparently addressed more importance to the question of decreasing the amount of 
spending than to the discussions at Vienna,308 as Liverpool told Castlereagh: 
“I can assure you that I feel, in common with my colleagues, the greatest reluctance in 
proposing to you to withdraw at this moment from Vienna. Last year we could spare 
you: every thing was quiet in Parliament-every body waiting for the result-and no 
symptom of party-spirit appeared. Now, very few persons give themselves any anxiety 
about what is passing at Vienna, except in as far as it is connected with expense 
[…].”309 
 
As Wellington had agreed to take over at Vienna, Liverpool, underestimating the significance 
of Castlereagh’s presence at the Congress, did not see any reason why the latter should not 
return immediately. Castlereagh, however, preferred to apply himself to the European 
settlement and rejected coming back.310 Already in the beginning of January he had written to 
Liverpool:  
“In the present state of the negotiation, I feel myself bound to urge that I should not be 
withdrawn from hence at least till the important discussions now pending are closed. 
With every deference to the Duke of Wellington’s ability and great personal authority, 
he cannot at once replace me in the habits of confidential intercourse which a long 
residence with the principal actors has established, and which gives facilities to my 
intervention to bring them together, which could not attach to another for a length of 
time, whereas the fate of Europe may depend on the conclusions of the ensuing 
month.”311 
 
End of January Castlereagh also appealed to Bathurst: 
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“You may rely upon my joining you as soon as I can, without essentially endangering 
the point immediately at issue; but you might as well expect me to have run away from 
Leipsick [sic!] (if I had been there) last year […] and I think you do both injustice to 
your own supporters, and too much honour to me, in supposing my presence so 
necessary.”312 
 
There were still some diplomatic battles - one point of dispute was, for instance, the number 
of souls living in the areas in question. Upon Castlereagh’s suggestion, a Commission dealing 
with these statistical issues was established. The fortresses of Torgau and Erfurt and even 
more, Leipzig were still subject to quarrels. While Castlereagh, who after all aspired to create 
a strong Prussia, supported Hardenberg’s claim to Torgau and Erfurt, Alexander also 
endeavoured to render an agreement possible. As his aspirations did not meet any objections 
anymore, the Tsar now behaved increasingly placatory. He had already, in an interview with 
Emperor Francis, agreed to cede the Tarnopol district – an Austrian possession until 1809 – to 
Austria, and now he ceded Thorn to Prussia, therewith rendering it possible for Hardenberg to 
abandon Prussia’s claims to Leipzig. Castlereagh, who might have been anxious that the 
Netherlands would be too extended and consequently would not depend so much on Great 
Britain anymore, also arranged for the Low Countries and Hanover to cede areas with a 
population of 50,000 each to Prussia, so as to make it a bit easier for the latter to come to 
terms with not acquiring all of Saxony.313  
 
Finally, on 11 February the Polish-Saxon question was settled. The Tsar had won the 
diplomatic battle and acquired the bulk of the Duchy of Warsaw, but at least Cracow was 
made an autonomous town, while the district of Galicia was left to Austria and the district of 
Posen to Prussia. The remainder was proclaimed Kingdom of Poland under Alexander’s 
sovereignty – Alexander therewith acquired the title of ‘King of Poland’ in addition to his 
Imperial one. Furthermore, it was agreed that Prussia would acquire half of Saxony (including 
Torgau and Erfurt) with two-fifths of its total population as well as land on the left bank of the 
Rhine with over one million souls. The Prince of Orange, who had just been made King 
William of the Netherlands, also acquired Luxemburg (as indemnity for his hereditary lands, 
which he had ceded to Prussia). More significant than the concrete particulars of the 
settlement was, however, that it enabled the German powers to draw near again. Castlereagh 
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had every reason to be quite content, for, as Pitt already had wished, Prussia had now become 
a Power that bordered France and was able to guard the Low Countries.314  
 
 
20. CASTLEREAGH’S RETURN AND EVALUATION 
 
As the powers had finally come to an agreement regarding the tricky questions, and 
Wellington had reached Vienna to take his place, Castlereagh in mid-February was ready to 
go back to London. As we have seen, he was badly needed to resume his position in the 
House of Commons for the Opposition, though on many occasions discordant themselves, 
endeavoured to decry the Cabinet’s accomplishments and to criticise the current course of 
actions.315 As Liverpool expressed in a letter to Wellington in January: 
“I can assure you that I have not known for some years such party spirit and rancour as 
exist at present. The restoration of general peace, though it may relieve the country of 
great difficulties, does not make the government more easy to be conducted in the 
House of Commons. During a war so eventful as the last, all minor questions, however 
subordinate, will create a conflict, and if the Government in the House of Commons 
should lose credit, and be considered as beat in debate before Castlereagh returns, it 
will be no easy matter for him or for any man to recover the ground which has been 
lost.”316 
 
Castlereagh’s accomplishments at the Congress were subject to little appreciation, even 
among the Ministry. True, Castlereagh had completely misjudged the Polish issue,317 and 
Muir opines that “Liverpool’s judgement on the great questions of policy may have been 
equal or superior to Castlereagh’s, and he certainly appreciated the domestic constraints on 
British action far better; but neither he, nor any of the other ministers, nor even Wellington, 
could have represented Britain as forcefully and skilfully in the negotiations.” 318 Indeed, 
credit must be given to Castlereagh’s audacity for being willing to operate devoid of first 
awaiting instructions from home and the fact that, while Britain two years previously was 
hardly admitted a voice in the negotiations, she now was a part and parcel of conferences. 
That Castlereagh had managed to bring into being so many of the points Pitt had drawn up 
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rendered it possible for him to table Pitt’s paper in Parliament as vindication of his conduct of 
the past three years. The actual outcome of the Congress concerning the Polish-Saxon 
question was advantageous for Castlereagh’s standing, but he was criticised for Genoa and, as 
will be seen later, for Naples.319 Buckingham called the arrangement of incorporating Genoa 
into Sardinia-Piedmont “foul and disgraceful,” Grey condemned it as a matter of “treachery 
and fraud,” 320  but Castlereagh pointed out that Bentinck had acted without the slightest 
authorisation when he, in April 1814, had pledged the Genoese their independence321 and he 
further opined that “the Congress of Vienna was not assembled for the discussion of moral 
principles, but for great practical purposes, to establish effectual provisions for the general 
security” and for this great purpose the incorporation of the old Republic into Sardinia-
Piedmont had simply been inevitable. 322  This is just another aspect that shows that 
Castlereagh’s policy had always been to “make the establishment of a just equilibrium in 
Europe the first object of my attention, and to consider the assertion of minor points of 
interest as subordinate to this great end.”323  
 
When Wellington took over at Vienna, the most crucial matters had already been decided, but 
there were still other tasks, like the settlement of Italy or the establishment of the German 
Federation. However, Britain’s representative did not play a decisive part in any of these 
discussions, for his attention was soon centred on one thing and one thing only: Napoleon had 
escaped from Elba.324 
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VI. THE HUNDRED DAYS 
 
 
21. NAPOLEON’S RENEWED SEIZURE OF POWER 
 
It was in the morning hours of 7 March that intelligence of Napoleon’s escape found its way 
to Vienna. Metternich, who was the first to learn of the dreadful incident, recalled in his 
memoires: 
“A conference between the Plenipotentiaries of the five Powers took place in my 
house on the night of March 6, and lasted till three o’clock in the morning. Since the 
Cabinets had met in Vienna, I had given my servant orders that if a courier arrived at 
night he was not to awake me. In spite of this order, the servant brought me at six 
o’clock in the morning a despatch, sent by courier, and marked urgent. When I saw on 
the envelope the words “from the Consul general in Genoa,” having been only two 
hours in bed, I laid the despatch unopened on the nearest table, and turned round again 
to sleep. Once disturbed, however, sleep would not come again. About half past seven 
I resolved to open the despatch. It contained the information in six lines: “The English 
Commissary, Campbell, has just appeared in the harbour, to inquire whether Napoleon 
had been seen in Genoa, as he has disappeared from the island of Elba; this question 
being answered in the negative, the English ship has again put out to sea.” I was 
dressed in a few minutes, and before eight o’clock I was with the Emperor. He read 
the despatch, and said to me quietly and calmly, as he always did on great occasions: 
“Napoleon seems to wish to play adventurer: that is his concern; ours is to secure to 
the world that peace which he has disturbed for years. Go without delay to the 
Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia, and tell them that I am ready to order my 
army to march back to France. I do not doubt but that both monarchs will agree with 
me.” At quarter-past eight I was with the Emperor Alexander, who dismissed me with 
the same words as the Emperor Francis had used. At half-past eight I received a 
similar declaration from the mouth of King Frederic William III. At nine o’clock I was 
at my house again, where I had directed Field-Marshal Prince Schwarzenberg to meet 
me. At ten o’clock the ministers of the four Powers came at my request. At the same 
time adjutants were already on their way, in all directions, to order the armies to halt 
who were returning home. Thus war was decided on in less than an hour.”325  
 
Yet it was still subject to speculation where Napoleon was going. Only four days later it 
became known that the fallen Emperor was back in France.326 
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Napoleon, in spite of allied remonstrations addressed to Talleyrand, had never received the 
pension from France he was entitled to according to the Treaty of Fontainebleau. Moreover, 
he had also heard rumours that he might be deported to a more distant location than Elba. 
True, relocating Napoleon had been mentioned at Vienna, but not earnestly, as the Tsar 
unlikely would have allowed a breach of the Treaty of Fontainebleau, which he had arranged. 
More than these rumours or the fact that he did not receive his pension, the major cause for 
Napoleon’s comeback was his unquenched ambition. The whole Continent had trembled 
before him, and he could simply not resign himself to the fact that his sovereignty was now 
confined to a small island of merely 12,000 inhabitants and a force of 1,200. Being informed 
of the conflicts of the Allies at the Congress as well as of the state of dissatisfaction that 
prevailed in France - Louis XVIII showed himself incompetent, was therefore not exactly 
popular, and especially the French forces were strongly restive – Napoleon intended to seize 
the opportunity to ruthlessly capitalise France’s unhappiness to get his position back and 
departed from Elba on 26 February, 1815. He anticipated to soon gain followers, and in this 
he was not to be disappointed: when he disembarked on 1 March near Cannes he was received 
warmly.327  
 
The threat of rupture at Vienna had, however, by now blown over and there was never the 
slightest hesitancy over the question of whether to fight Napoleon or not. United in their wish 
to oust Napoleon, the Allies again moved closer to each other and on 13 March the Eight 
(Great Britain, Russia, Prussia, Austria, France, Spain, Portugal, and Sweden) announced that 
Napoleon was considered a subversive. At the same time they assured the Bourbons of their 
aid in dealing with Napoleon. 328  Wellington showed himself quite pleased, telling 
Castlereagh: 
“I do not entertain the smallest doubt that, even if Buonaparte [sic!] should be able to 
form a party for himself in France, capable of making head against the legitimate 
Government of that country, such a force will be assembled by the Powers of Europe, 
directed by such a spirit in their councils, as must get the better of him. […] Upon the 
whole, I assure your Lordship that I am perfectly satisfied with the spirit which 
prevails here upon this occasion; and I do not entertain the smallest doubt that, if 
unfortunately it should be possible for Buonaparte [sic!] to hold at all against the King 
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of France, he must fall under the cordially united efforts of the Sovereigns of 
Europe.”329 
Louis, coping on his own, was nevertheless much more desirable.330 Wellington thought this 
actually quite likely, stating that, “it is my opinion that Buonaparte [sic!] has acted upon false 
or no information, and that the King will destroy him without difficulty, and in a short time.” 
More guardedly, however, the Duke went on that, “if he does not, the affair will be a serious 
one, and a great and immediate effort must be made, which will doubtless be successful.”331 
By mid-March, however, it was perceivable that Louis XVIII would not be able to manage. 
Upon the receipt of the despatch carrying the report of Napoleon’s return, Louis XIII, despite 
being aware that the reliability of the French army was quite dubious, could do naught but 
send out a force and hope for the best. But these hopes were shattered as Ney, who had been 
sent out against Napoleon, instead of fulfilling his mission, went over to the latter’s side.332 
This prompted Napoleon to mischievously inform Louis XVIII: “My good brother, there is no 
need to send any more troops – I have enough.”333 Indeed, within the French forces, there 
were many who vigorously supported Bonaparte. Nonetheless, this could not be said about all 
of the French. The problem was, however, that the French were not that keen on King Louis 
XVIII either, to be induced to take any actions against Napoleon.334 This was also observed 
by Castlereagh, who in a letter to Wellington opined: 
The great question is, can the Bourbons get Frenchmen to fight for them against 
Frenchmen? If they can, Europe may soon turn the tide in their favour; and, the 
process of fermentation once begun, they may create real partisans, instead of criers of 
Vive le Roi! and doers of nothing.”335 
 
Anyway, as it was, Louis felt impelled to leave Paris, while Napoleon, only hours later, 
arrived at the city on 20 March. There was hardly any resistance in France towards 
Bonaparte’s resumption of power; his sovereignty was, however, even in France anything but 
stable. Over and above, his sovereignty could only last if the Continent tolerated his rule. 
Therefore, Napoleon endeavoured to be on his best behaviour and purported, in letters 
despatched to Vienna as well as London, to desire peace, even assuring the Allies that he 
acknowledged the Treaty of Paris. Moreover, he attempted to disunite the Allies by every 
means. He appealed to the Austrian Emperor, his father-in-law, and was infuriated when 
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Murat’s conduct, as will be seen, rendered this futile. By immediately abandoning the slave 
trade he meant to appease British public opinion. And being aware that he could not hope to 
impress the Prussians, he sent an assuaging despatch to Alexander – together with proof of the 
secret Triple Alliance, which he had detected in an archive.336 Castlereagh had foreseen this 
and, although he had been quite optimistic that it would not produce poor effects, he had 
warned Wellington: 
“It is to be presumed, in the hurry of their departure, the Foreign Office at Paris has 
not been stripped by the King’s Ministers of any of its contents, and consequently that 
our Secret Treaty with France and Austria, as well as all Prince Talleyrand’s 
correspondence will fall into Buonaparte’s [sic!] hands. He will of course try to turn 
this to account […]. I flatter myself, after all he [Alexander] knew long since, it cannot 
produce any unfavourable impression upon the Emperor of Russia’s mind. He must 
feel assured that the whole grew out of differences now settled, and a most indiscreet 
declaration of Prince Hardenberg’s. The treaty is, upon the face of it, purely defensive; 
and all our proceedings since have proved this beyond a doubt.”337 
 
Castlereagh’s assessment turned out to be right, for, although Alexander was for a moment 
quite angry, he did not change his course. He even wanted to be commander-in-chief of the 
revived alliance. Wellington was anything but impressed at this idea and had do dissuade him 
from doing so.338  
 
Despite Napoleon’s assertions of only having peace in mind, he made arrangements for 
renewed hostilities, rallying his troops by announcing revenge on the countries, which had 
invaded France the previous year. From the outset, he made an effort to persuade Murat to 
connive and endeavoured to win over some countries, such as the smaller German and Italian 
states or Switzerland, and additionally tried to induce other countries’ servicemen to fight in 
the French army. All this proved that it was more than likely that Napoleon would fall back 
into his old pattern as soon as he had managed to cement his power. Therefore, it was clearly 
evident that his sovereignty would eventually lead to war. Yet his chances to again overturn 
Europe were as good as nil unless the Coalition would be dissolved or Britain would not pay 
subsidies to her Allies, who would consequently hardly be able to fight. Neither, however, 
occurred. On 25 March, the Treaty of Chaumont was revived and Wellington engaged Great 
Britain to again subsidise her Allies. Not believing that peace with Napoleon was possible and 
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regarding the latter’s protestations of peaceful intentions as a mere means to gain him time to 
strengthen his position, the Allies were firm in their determination to fight him. Already on  
12 March the Allies had decided, if only for preventive purposes, on some military measures. 
As Murat was already eyed with mistrust, a force of 150,000 Austrians should be present in 
Italy, while on the Upper Rhine Austrians and Germans should form an army of 200,000 men. 
Nearly the same number of troops should assemble on the Lower Rhine, which was to be 
composed of a Prussian force under Blücher, and Wellington’s army, consisting mostly of 
British, Hanoverian, Dutch, and Belgians. Furthermore, 200,000 Russians should congregate 
at Würzburg as reserves. Together with the other leading military personalities present at 
Vienna, Wellington established a scheme of action before he, in early April, put himself at the 
head of the troops in the Netherlands. Advantageous for Napoleon was, however, the fact that 
most of the soldiers who had fought on the Peninsular had not yet returned from America. Yet 
German and British troops were the only ones obtainable to enforce the small army in the 
Netherlands, as the Russians were still in Poland and the Austrians engaged in Italy. As it was, 
Europe had not even been completely reconstructed when it was thrown in hostilities yet 
again.339 Wellington, in a letter to Castlereagh, opined: 
“It is the desire for war, particularly in the army, which has brought Buonaparte [sic!] 
back, and has formed for him any party, and has given him any success; and all my 
observations when at Paris convinced me that it was the King alone who kept Europe 
at peace, and that the danger which most immediately threatened His Majesty was to 
be attributed to his desire to maintain the peace, contrary to the wishes, not only of the 
army, but of the majority of his subjects, of some of his Ministers, and even of some of 
his family. Your Lordship will then judge what chance there is of maintaining the 
peace if Buonaparte [sic!] should be entirely successful, considering his disposition for 
war, adverting to the opinions he has delivered and entertains upon the peace, and to 
the necessity under which he labours to cultivate his popularity with the army, and to 
endeavour, at least, to flatter the vanity of the nation by military success. Depend upon 
it, my Lord, that if he succeeds in establishing himself we have no chance of peace, 
excepting by resigning all our conquests to the Rhine at least; and our chance then 
depends upon his moderation.”340 
 
The Allies, at one with each other in their resolution to fight Napoleon, were, however, not so 
united where Louis XVIII was concerned. The Tsar again pointed to his aversion towards the 
Bourbons, yet he would not oppose the King’s restoration if this was what the French desired. 
While he did not mind a regency under the Duc d’ Orléans, no marshal - whether Soult, 
Eugène, or anyone else - should be able to succeed Napoleon. Alexander was also quite 
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anxious that the Austrians would demand a regency of Marie Louise, but Metternich was not 
keen on this option anyway. Despite the fact that Louis’ sovereignty was clearly weak, he was 
still regarded by the British Ministry, as well as by Wellington, as being the best option. 
Indeed, in comparison with her Allies, Great Britain was doubtless most avid for the 
restoration of Louis XVIII. Yet, due to the commonly acknowledged attitude of not 
intervening in other countries’ inner matters, the British government could not dare to declare 
the casus belli being a restoration of the Bourbons.341 Thus, Castlereagh in Parliament even 
had to purport that his attitude was entirely neutral regarding France’s inner affairs. As 
Castlereagh pointed out to Wellington: 
“In inviting the King of France, more especially when out of France, to accede to the 
treaty, we deem it material to mark that the object of the alliance and concert is to 
destroy Buonaparte’s [sic!] authority, and not to impose on France any particular 
Sovereign or form of government. We deem this declaration not less advantageous to 
the King’s interests in France than to the maintenance of the contest in Parliament 
against Buonaparte [sic!].”342  
 
Nevertheless, the Cabinet hurried to promise Louis that every endeavour would be made to 
support him. In a letter to Clancarty, Wellington’s successor in Vienna, Castlereagh defined 
the Government’s position regarding Louis XVIII:343 
“His Majesty cannot wish us to feel more decisively the importance of his restoration 
than we do; and most assuredly every effort will be made so to conduct the war so as 
to lead to this result, but we cannot make it a sine quá non. Foreign Powers may justly 
covenant for the destruction of Buonaparte’s [sic!] authority as inconsistent with their 
own safety, but it is another question avowedly to stipulate as to his successor. This is 
a Parliamentary delicacy.”344 
 
Indeed, the ministers shared the conviction that Napoleon had to be overthrown and that 
Louis XVIII would be the best option as to the question of who was to rule France. Within the 
Opposition, however, opinions varied extremely. Grenville, who thought that a sovereignty of 
Napoleon would inevitably lead to hostilities, sided with the Cabinet, whereas Grey was of 
the opinion that, while Napoleon was displaying an irenic attitude, the Allies had no right to 
oust him; astonishingly this opinion was also shared by one of Wellington’s brothers. At any 
rate, Grey endeavoured to not get too involved, for he did not want to cause a rupture with 
Grenville.345 Not so Whitbread, who was said to be “all for Boney,” because he insisted that 
                                                 
341 KISSINGER: A World Restored, p. 178; MUIR: Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon, p. 348-350. 
342 Castlereagh to Wellington, 8 April 1815, C.C. X, p. 302. 
343 MUIR: Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon, p. 345; WEBSTER: The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, p. 448. 
344 Castlereagh to Clancarty, 8 April 1815, C.C. X, p. 301. 
345 MUIR: Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon, p. 350; NICOLSON: The Congress of Vienna, A Study in Allied 
Unity, p. 232f. 
 96 
the French were entitled to choose their own ruler. While some Whigs took up Whitbread’s 
stance on that matter, most of them actually sided with the Cabinet. Wilberforce showed 
himself to be quite torn, recording subsequent to a parliamentary session in his diary: “I spoke 
ill, because indecisively, as indeed I felt in one sense; for my own judgement would be for 
treating with Buonaparte [sic!] if we were free: but we are so committed with the Allies, that 
we could not honestly separate from them, as agreeing to Whitbread’s motion would 
substantially have been.” 346  At any rate, the Cabinet’s decision to fight Napoleon was 
supported by most members of Parliament. Castlereagh, however, refrained from making the 
castigation of France, clamoured for by public opinion, an aim of the war. Instead, he 
proclaimed that Britain engaged herself in hostilities to fight the menace evoked by 
Napoleon’s rule and aspired not to penalise France, but to reintroduce her into Europe. In 
other words, war was not made against France, but against Bonaparte. This corresponded with 
British public opinion insofar as the average Briton was not entirely disposed to make an 
effort for the re-establishment of Louis XVIII; he was, however, ready to incur a renewed 
struggle induced by the very odium that tainted Napoleon. In a way, Napoleon’s return even 
facilitated Castlereagh’s position in Parliament, for it overshadowed the arrangements agreed 
upon at the Congress. Therefore, various arrangements were only half-heartedly discussed in 
the Houses. Especially where Murat was concerned, Napoleon’s renewed seizure of power 
eased Castlereagh’s position.347  
 
 
22. MURAT’S FALL FROM GRACE 
 
As the Congress of Vienna had commenced in the fall, Metternich had succeeded in deferring 
the negotiation of Italian issues, arguing that the Polish-Saxon question ought to be settled 
primarily. The British Cabinet as well as the Prince Regent disfavoured Murat, but averred 
that it was not up to Britain to take any steps. Considering that it was Metternich who would 
have to deal with the question of Murat, Castlereagh did not want to tie himself down. From 
the outset, Castlereagh had tended to view Italy as an area of Austrian influence and therefore 
had adjusted his stance on Italian questions to that of Metternich. The treaty with Austria was 
Murat’s only guarantee for his sovereignty over Naples, other than that he could not count on 
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one single power to support him. Still, as Metternich supported Murat – whether this, as 
Nicolson seems to believe, had something to do with Metternich’s brief affair with Queen 
Caroline (Murat’s wife and Napoleon’s sister) in 1806 or not – Castlereagh was far from 
inclined to take any steps to depose him. When Metternich changed his policy regarding 
Murat, so did Castlereagh.348 
 
As the months passed by, Metternich had altered his stance on Murat’s sovereignty over 
Naples, first on grounds of fearing that Murat would add fuel to national movements and thus 
make it more difficult for Austria to govern her northern Italian lands, and secondly because 
he had been eager for French support on the Polish-Saxon question, which he sought to 
achieve by a change of policy on the Neapolitan question, for Louis XVIII was known to 
aspire the reinstitution of the Sicilian Bourbons on the throne of Naples. In January 1815, it 
was secretly agreed that Murat should be deposed, while Louis promised Austria concessions 
in Italy. It was Castlereagh, who, stopping over at Paris in late February on his journey back 
to London, deputised for Metternich and attested the minutiae of the agreement. Therewith 
Murat’s dethronement was arranged. The delicate issue, however, was of how to proceed 
without causing an open abuse of confidence. After all, though Murat’s conduct in 1814 had 
not exactly enhanced his trustworthiness, it was not enough to justify a breach of the treaty. 
Moreover, Castlereagh had to pay attention to Parliament, where the Opposition endeavoured 
to utilise the question of Murat to decry the Cabinet. As the Opposition got hold of some 
letters between the British Foreign Minister and Bentinck, they accused Castlereagh of 
betrayal of confidence. But not all was known, and Castlereagh was naturally wary of 
revealing the collusion between France, Austria, and Great Britain. Instead, he circumspectly 
selected the evidence he laid before Parliament. While Murat could not be proved guilty of an 
abuse of confidence, it was at least attested that he had not fulfilled the terms stipulated in the 
peace treaty with Austria and under which Great Britain had been prompted to conclude a 
truce.349 
 
It was Murat himself who, by his treachery upon Napoleon’s return, not only supplied the 
long sought-after pretext and the sufficient excuse for his own dethronement, but also enabled 
Castlereagh and Metternich to veil their insidious deceit. Although Murat’s representatives at 
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Vienna and London proffered to engage Naples in the pending struggle with Napoleon on the 
side of the Allies, Murat, who was all too conscious that his position was in severe danger, 
decided to seize the opportunity to launch an offensive while the Allies were distracted by 
Bonaparte. Despite the fact that Napoleon had told him to wait, Murat, on 15 March, made a 
declaration of war, expecting to be able to attack flatfooted Austrians.350 Wellington was sure 
that “if we do not destroy Murat, and that immediately, he will save Buonaparte [sic!].”351 
However, Murat’s force of 40,000 men was of poor quality and his appeals to feelings of 
nationalism, telling Italians to rise, were unfruitful because, although they found some 
approval, they did not lead to reinforcements. The battle of Tolentino in early May ended in 
an overwhelming Austrian victory and Murat had to flee. Although Austria had proffered 
Murat habitation he declined, and instead, in early October, made a despairing and admittedly 
foolish effort to resume power in Naples. The Neapolitans welcomed him by throwing objects 
at him, and before long he was imprisoned and sentenced to death. After Murat’s defeat, the 
sovereignty of the Bourbons was re-established in Naples by Austrian troops, thus the Sicilian 
branch of the dynasty again ruled over the Two Sicilies. By a secret agreement with Austria, 
the restored monarch pledged that he would not grant the Constitution, which he had been 
pushed by the British to bestow on Sicily, to Naples.352  
 
 
23. THE COMPLETION OF THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA 
 
As for the Italian settlement decided upon at the Congress, Metternich without difficulty 
carried his point as Talleyrand’s authority was diminished due to Napoleon’s return. As we 
have seen, a secret article in the Treaty of Paris provided for the incorporation of Venetia and 
Lombardy into Austria. However, Metternich aspired to stretch Austria’s sway out over all of 
Italy. And he was successful - in the end only Sardinia-Piedmont, which, as already 
mentioned, gained Genoa, was not completely dominated by Austria. The Pope was restored 
to most of his territories, but did not regain enclaves such as Avignon. Parma had, according 
to the Treaty of Fontainebleau, been promised to Marie-Louise and her son, but Labrador, the 
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Spanish representative, backed up by Talleyrand, demanded the Duchy to devolve to the 
Infante Don Louis or his mother, the Queen of Etruria. An understanding was reached, 
according to which Marie Louise would rule over Parma, but her son would not inherit the 
Duchy. Tuscany went to an Austrian Arch-Duke and the rest was given to a loyal Austrian 
ally. Thus, Metternich had every reason to be pleased with these arrangements that provided 
for Austria to dominate Italy.353  
 
In contrast to her strong position in the south, Austria, however, lost ground in the north as 
Prussia was now the dominating power in the northern part of the erstwhile Holy Roman 
Empire. Naturally the relinquishing of Austria’s leading position within Germany caused 
disapproval. The strengthening of Prussia naturally provoked some solicitude on the part of 
Metternich, but unlike Talleyrand, he did not believe that it would eventually lead to Prussian 
control over all of Germany. The acquisitions Prussia made, indeed, largely exceeded the 
significance of the Polish lands she relinquished. This settlement mostly arose out of 
Castlereagh’s persistency; if not for him, Metternich and Talleyrand surely would not have 
allowed Prussia such a large extension. Various proposals aiming at the instauration of 
Francis as Emperor of Germany existed; this, however, would not have been much more than 
a courtesy title, for it would not have brought back control over Germany to the House of 
Habsburg. Nor would an acquisition of south-western German territories, such as 
Schwarzenberg and Stadion aspired to, have changed much. Apart from the inner-German 
obstacle that the individual states had become too powerful and that it most probably would 
have caused another conflict with Prussia, a revival of the Reich would have hardly been 
compatible with Austria’s other points of interest, particularly in Italy and Hungary. That 
Austria and Prussia had finally come to an agreement about the fate of Saxony rendered it 
possible to work on German issues, but progress was made only very slowly, mostly because 
the two leading German Powers apparently found it still difficult to negotiate harmoniously 
with each other. In March, circumstances were altered by Napoleon’s escape from Elba, 
which rendered it essential to solve all remaining issues as soon as possible, lest the Congress 
would be called off and some of the negotiators would leave Vienna. Austrians and Prussians 
reached an understanding in May, but it still took some time to come to an agreement with 
Bavaria. Austria resumed the Tyrol and also acquired part of Salzburg from Bavaria; several 
barter transactions were, however, only entirely completed after 1815. It took quite a while to 
overcome Bavarian objections to the project – at one time it even looked like Bavaria would 
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not become part of the Confederation, but then quite a few states made it a condition of their 
joining the Federation that all German territories would be part of it. As a result of this 
pressure, last minute alterations were made to the project, and finally Bavaria was won over. 
According to the Final Act of the Congress, Germany was combined into a federation, 
autonomous dominions and towns bound together in a defensive alliance. Every member was 
also at liberty to conclude an alliance, unless it was directed against other members of the 
Confederation. What remained an issue of controversy was the nature of relations between the 
Confederation and the non-Confederation territories such as Austria’s or Prussia’s, and the 
role the Confederation would play in the event that the two great German powers would get 
involved in European wars. In the end, this point was simply omitted. Thus, though a lot of its 
structure was shaped afterwards; the basic character had therewith been brought into being. 
The territorially most disputed point, Mainz, demanded by Prussia as well as Bavaria, was in 
the end given to Hesse-Darmstadt while the Prussians were entitled to be in charge of a 
composite garrison within the stronghold. All in all, the agreement settled upon was almost 
certainly the most viable one with a view to repose and safety. The idea of a unified Germany 
did of course exist, but it would not have been applicable for various reasons. There were too 
few proponents of nationalism, the individual sovereigns were too powerful, and since Austria 
and Prussia were still competing for the domination of Germany, nothing but a loose 
confederation was feasible. Even more, a unified Germany would have posed a threat to 
European peace, as it would have endangered smaller states and unsettled bigger ones. 
Nevertheless, some bond between Austria, Prussia, and the smaller German States was 
essential to render amicable relations possible. Given these circumstances, the result was the 
best possible. The details of the Federation were hardly relevant to Great Britain, except 
insofar as Hanover (which was naturally part of the Confederacy) was concerned, and thus 
only Münster, the Hanoverian minister, but none of the British representatives contributed to 
the creation of the Federation.354  
 
Also, in other issues, such as Jewish rights and river navigation, Britain’s representatives 
played a secondary role. Another issue was that of diplomatic ranking and was regarded by 
Castlereagh as being rather insignificant. Derived from a long list drawn up by the Pope in 
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1504, the hierarchy of the European sovereigns had been defined355, and therewith the ranking 
of the ambassadors. Throughout all these years the distribution of power had obviously 
undergone constant shifts, and as a result seemingly simple questions such as seating 
arrangements or the order of coaches in the event of corteges had provoked duels and even 
hostilities. Therefore, the cessation of the old hierarchical order was enacted. Instead, the 
length of any ambassador’s service at the place he was appointed was decisive for the ranking, 
and three years later it was resolved upon the sequence of signatures on contracts to be carried 
out according to alphabetic sequence.356 
 
As for Spain and Portugal Castlereagh opined: 
“It is somewhat singular in itself that the only two Courts with which we find it 
difficult to do business are those of the Peninsula. There is a temper in both which 
makes it more arduous to settle a trifling matter with them than to arrange a great 
measure of European policy with other Powers. It seems as if the recollection of our 
services made it impossible for them to do anything without endeavouring most 
unnecessarily and ungratefully to display their own independence.”357 
 
In comparison to Spain, Portugal had shown herself more compliant, but her rejection to 
furnish any forces to fight Napoleon during the Hundred Days did not gain her any 
sympathy358, as a letter of Castlereagh demonstrates:  
“The Portuguese Regency ought to feel humiliated by the situation in which they are 
placed, or have chosen, from a timid policy, to place themselves. By the decision they 
have come to, they have, in fact, turned their back upon the cause of Great Britain and 
the Allies, for the entire of one campaign. In this, as in other instances, they make but 
an ungracious return for the assistance afforded to them in their late difficulties.”359 
 
Spain still averred to be a great power and was strongly dismayed as Labrador, her 
representative, was not admitted to the inner council. The latter contested for ridiculously 
high and unrealisable demands, such as the return of Louisiana360 in return for Spain making 
advances to the British with regard to the slave trade. Labrador also made rather far-fetched 
demands concerning Italian territories, but again did not succeed. Another problem was King 
Ferdinand’s haphazard behaviour and his dislike for the newly granted constitution, which 
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continually was subject to disputes between Great Britain and Spain. Displeased with the 
settlement, Labrador in the end did not affix his signature to the Final Act.361  
 
The Final Act, signed on 10 June, 1815 (although backdated 8 June), was the ratification of 
all decisions agreed upon at the Congress of Vienna. The arrangements had their flaws and 
imperfections: Russia still bore a danger to the centre of the Continent, and Prussia’s 
aspirations in Germany did not end with the Congress, but were merely protracted. Yet all 
powers were content enough, rendering it possible to avert crucial hostilities for about a 
century.362 
 
 
24. THE FINAL CLASH OF ARMS 
 
Meanwhile, at the same time as the negotiations at Vienna were taking place, prearrangements 
were being taken for the renewed hostilities. The troops in the Netherlands were greatly 
reinforced so Wellington in June had an army of approximately 90,000 for the field and  
20,000 for garrisons, thus about 110,000 men altogether, consisting of Britons, Dutch, 
Belgians, Hanoverians, and other Germans. Wellington, however, lamented their rather 
inferior quality as well as the insufficient supply of artillery. While the British fraction was 
still the best in his army, the Belgian parts of his forces were especially eyed with suspicion, 
as rumours accused some of them of welcoming Napoleon’s return. After all, Belgium had 
been a part of France for over two decades and their integration with Holland was much 
loathed. 363  In a letter to Stewart, Wellington expressed his displeasure: “I have got an 
infamous army, very weak and ill equipped, and a very inexperienced Staff. In my opinion 
they are doing nothing in England.” 364 Similarly, he bluntly told Bathurst: “[…] I really 
believe that, with the exception of my old Spanish infantry, I have got not only the worst 
troops, but the worst equipped army, with the worst staff, that was ever brought together.”365 
Blücher’s army also had its weaknesses. Composed of Prussians and other German 
contingents it was not so diverse, but enfeebled because so many of its troops were 
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inexperienced recruits and many Germans disliked having to fight under a Prussian general. 
Bonaparte’s force in June amounted to 300,000 men. However, a lot of them were poorly 
armed and some were required for garrisons and to guard France. With these deductions, 
Napoleon’s actual force constituted of 124,000 soldiers only – merely sixty percent of the 
allied troops in the Low Countries. Still, compared to the coalesced forces, the French in all 
likelihood were of superior quality, a fact that relativised the numerical advantage of the 
Allies. Nevertheless, Napoleon undeniably was in the weaker position. His only option was to 
assault the allied armies individually, thus he had to gain an early victory over the Prussian 
and British forces in the Netherlands, lest the Russian and Austrian ones would rush to their 
aid. By an early attack, Napoleon also hoped to prevent the Coalition from mobilising all their 
resources, and not having to face another invasion of France, which would naturally badly 
affect French public opinion and might lead to conspiracies. Given Napoleon’s rather 
vulnerable position, he knew he could not afford anything like that to happen. Thus, he sought 
to disperse the British and the Prussians and strike at them prior to their amalgamation. In the 
event of success, he would therewith have bought some time to build a huge army. Surely, his 
prospects were none too good, but this nevertheless provided his biggest opportunity.366 
 
On 16 June, the very day Ney fought against Wellington at Quatre Bras, Napoleon made an 
assault upon the Prussians at Ligny. While Ney was defeated, Napoleon bore the palm over 
Blücher’s army. The 72-year-old Prussian general was wounded as his charger was fired and 
he consequently found himself being overrun by both the French as well as the Prussian 
cavalry. Neither battle had been decisive, but Napoleon had at least enhanced his position. On 
the following day no major combating occurred. The Prussians withdrew, but in a direction 
that still allowed them to unite their troops with the British. And as Blücher promised 
Wellington to join him, the British field marshal decided to fight on the next day, 18 June, 
what was to be the ultimate clash of arms – the ever so famous Battle of Waterloo. Napoleon 
was astonished, but nevertheless delighted about his opponent’s decision, as he believed he 
would only fight the British and that the Prussians would not come to their support. After all, 
he had detached part of his troops to deter Blücher from uniting his forces with Wellington’s. 
As it was, Blücher’s undertaking was a daring deed. In the event of a French victory the 
Prussians would have been locked by the French and lacked a safe route for withdrawing. 
However, the Prussians made it in time to participate in the battle and in the end the allied 
forces bore the palm. The losses on both sides were incredible. About 50,000 men, of which 
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30,000 were French, were dead or injured.367 Notifying Aberdeen of the death of his brother, 
Wellington wrote: “I cannot express to you the regret and sorrow with which I look round me, 
and contemplate the loss which I have sustained […]. The glory resulting from such actions, 
so dearly bought, is no consolation to me, and I cannot suggest it as any to you and his friends 
[…].”368 In another letter he exposed: “Indeed, the losses I have sustained, have quite broken 
me down; and I have no feeling for the advantages we have acquired.”369 
 
Even in case the French had been victorious in Belgium, Napoleon still would have had 
hardly any chance of success. After all, he had only fought a fraction of the allied troops, and 
the Allies would have made every effort to secure his overthrow in the end. Napoleon was 
clearly just too big a threat to peace to be allowed to retain his position. This threat, however, 
was not only confined to his military undertaking. Indeed, the European settlement, so 
recently concluded, was in jeopardy of being overturned. The issue of Napoleon’s successor 
was very likely to become once more the subject of disputes and moreover there was the 
problem of the nature of peace – a punitive peace would topple all arrangements the Allies 
had worked and agreed upon. The speedy and successful campaign rendered it at least partly 
possible for Wellington to prevent such issues to become too much subjects of disputes as he 
not only acquired an outstanding reputation and consequently authority, but also gained the 
benefit of time, as his army, together with the Prussian one, was the first to invade France. 
Throughout the invasion, little fighting occurred, as Napoleon had evidently been defeated. 
His army was broken and he had returned to Paris where he, lacking any other realistic 
options, on 22 June again signed his abdication and relinquished his throne to the King of 
Rome.370  
 
A temporarily formed government, of which both Fouché (the erstwhile regicide Napoleon 
had made Minister of Police, who had behind Napoleon’s back been in touch with the 
Austrian Foreign Minister as well as with Wellington) and Caulaincourt were part of, 
requested a truce with the allied armies, but Wellington, as well as Blücher, rejected.371 In a 
letter to Bathurst, Wellington explained the decision:  
“I could not consider his [Napoleon’s] abdication of an usurped power in favor of his 
son, and his handing over the government provisionally to five persons named by 
                                                 
367 GATES: The Napoleonic Wars, p. 267; MUIR: Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon, p. 359-361, 363. 
368 Wellington to Aberdeen, 19 June 1815, W.D. XII, p. 488. 
369 Wellington to Beaufort, 19 June 1815, W.D. XII, p. 489. 
370 GATES: The Napoleonic Wars, p. 268f; MUIR: Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon, p. 365f; SCHROEDER: The 
Transformation of European Politics, p. 550-553. 
371 MUIR: Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon, p. 347, 366; WEBSTER: The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, p. 449. 
 105 
himself, to be that description of security which the Allies had in view, which should 
induce them to lay down their arms, and therefore I continue my operations.“372 
 
The British field-marshal also informed Bathurst that he had bluntly pointed out to the French 
that, “before I could stop my operations, I must see some steps taken to re-establish a 
government in France which should afford the Allies some chance of peace.”373 As to the 
question of what kind of government would please the Allies, Wellington explained that he 
lacked the authority to determine that; however, he stated his private view on that matter: 
“[…] I conceived the best security for Europe was the restoration of the King, and that 
the establishment of any other government than the King's in France must inevitably 
lead to new and endless wars; that Buonaparte [sic!] and the army having overturned 
the King's Government, the natural and simple measure, after Buonaparte [sic!] was 
prisoner or out of the way, and the army defeated, was to recall the King to his 
authority, and that it was a much more dignified proceeding to recall him without 
conditions, and to trust to the energy of their constitution for any reforms they wished 
to make either in the government or the constitution, than now to make conditions 
with their sovereign; and that, above all, it was important that they should recall the 
King without loss of time, as it would not then appear that the measure had been 
forced upon them by the Allies.”374 
 
With his forthrightness Wellington was able to avert a contest regarding the question of 
Napoleon’s successor. In this manner the British field-marshal’s overwhelming victory had 
enabled him to take the decisive steps for the restoration of the Bourbons. If all allied armies 
had been on the spot and invaded France at the same time as Wellington’s army did, the 
question of Napoleon’s successor would in all likelihood at least have been more uncertain 
and controversial. However, on 3 July Paris officially surrendered, and on 7 July Wellington 
and Blücher reached the capital. On the following day, Louis XVIII thus returned to a France 
that was momentarily occupied by British and Prussian forces. Sure, the Prussian field-
marshal would also have been able to have his say on the matter of Louis’ restoration, but did 
not care too much about it and was busy taking revenge on France anyway. Emperor Francis, 
Tsar Alexander, and King Frederick William III reached Paris soon afterwards, but it was 
already too late. Louis XVIII had been restored and they were presented with this fait 
accompli.375  
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Right after Napoleon’s second abdication, he had absconded. If the Prussians had detected 
him, he would have been shot. Blücher undoubtedly wished to put Napoleon to death.376 
Wellington was adamantly against such a measure:  
“[…] I have told him [Blücher] that I shall remonstrate, and shall insist upon his 
[Napoleon’s] being disposed of by common accord. I have likewise said that, as a 
private friend, I advised him to have nothing to do with so foul a transaction; that he 
and I had acted too distinguished parts in these transactions to become executioners; 
and that I was determined that if the Sovereigns wished to put him to death they 
should appoint an executioner, which should not be me.”377 
 
Nevertheless, Wellington was far from inclined to let Napoleon escape. As the fallen Emperor 
was not granted a passport with which he could head off to the United States, he realised that 
there was no way out and on 16 July capitulated to the British.378 Responsively, Castlereagh 
claimed that “[…] after fighting him for twenty years, as a trophy, he seems to belong to 
us.”379 At any rate, Napoleon was then taken to Great Britain, but was not permitted to stay 
there or even to disembark380, because, as Liverpool explained, “[…] he would become an 
object of curiosity immediately, and possibly of compassion, in the course of a few months: 
and the circumstance of his being here, or indeed anywhere in Europe, would contribute to 
keep up a certain degree of ferment in France.”381 Liverpool was right; Napoleon did attract 
the attention of countless curious onlookers, who sailed out so as to sneak a peek of Britain’s 
arch nemesis. To avoid renewed threats to Europe it was essential to take him to a remote 
location, and thus the Cabinet opted for St. Helena to be the place of his exile. On this island 
in the Atlantic, Napoleon was to pass away in 1821.382 
 
 
25. THE SECOND PEACE OF PARIS 
 
British public opinion was ferociously clamouring for the punishment of France. The Ministry, 
which was naturally affected by these violent urgings, also worried whether Louis XVIII 
could really consolidate his power.383 Liverpool reckoned that “It will be an [sic!] Herculean 
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task, I think, to give any real strength to this Government. For, what is a King, unsupported by 
opinion, by an army, or by a strong national party?”384 Therefore, the Cabinet badly wanted 
the restored French King to take rigorous steps regarding Napoleon’s adherents. Liverpool 
thought it “a curious circumstance, that after the sanguinary scenes which we recollect at the 
beginning of the French Revolution, all parties appear now to have an insuperable repugnance 
to executions.” 385  Only owing to royalist and allied demands, fifty-seven persons were 
subjected to prosecution. Fouché, however, in his capacity as Minister of Police, informed 
them and made certain that they had plenty of chances to flee. Merely three of them, including 
Ney, were caught and condemned to death, which caused heavy protests on the part of the 
Whigs. However, according to the prevailing British public opinion not only particular 
persons had to be penalised, but France as a whole. Castlereagh, who meanwhile was back in 
Paris, was informed by the Prime Minister386: 
“The more I consider the internal state of France, and the little chance there is for the 
security of Europe from the character and strength there is of the French Government, 
the more I am satisfied that we must look for security in frontier, and in really 
weakening the power of France. This opinion is rapidly gaining ground in this country; 
and I think, even if Buonaparte [sic!] was dead, there would now be considerable 
disappointment at any peace which left France as she was by the Treaty of Paris, or 
even as she was before the Revolution.”387 
 
Only a few days later, Liverpool again made clear that: 
“In this state of things we must look to other measures for our security, and we shall 
never be forgiven if we leave France without securing a sufficient frontier for the 
protection of the adjoining countries. The prevailing idea in this country is, that we are 
fairly entitled to avail ourselves of the present moment to take back from France the 
principal conquests of Louis XIV. It is argued with much force that France will never 
forgive the humiliation which she has already received-that she will take the first 
convenient opportunity of endeavouring to redeem her military glory-and that it is our 
duty, therefore, to take advantage of the present moment to prevent the evil 
consequences which may even flow from the greatness of our own success. It might 
have been not unwise last year to try the effect of a more magnanimous policy; but in 
the result of that we have been completely disappointed; and we owe it to ourselves 
now to provide, in the best manner we can, for our own security.”388 
 
Yet, despite the overwhelming cries for revenge in Great Britain, both Castlereagh and 
Wellington were adamantly against any such measures.389 Wellington complained that “our 
own Government also are taking up a little too much the tone of their rascally newspapers. 
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They are shifting their objects; and, having got their cake, they want both to eat it and keep 
it.”390 And Castlereagh, having almost made a habit out of it, also once more refrained from 
obliging public pressure; for he believed that a territorial reduction would only humiliate 
France and thus might cause renewed aggression. By three measures – first by stationing 
troops for a limited period of time in France, second by razing strongholds along the borders, 
and third by perpetuating the alliance - he thought to avoid a punitive peace. However, being 
aware that this proposal would be unpopular with his Cabinet, he persuaded the Tsar to draft 
such a scheme and table it as being his.391  
 
Alexander, who apparently had at first been of the opinion that “having shown the French 
what it was to be merciful, we must now make them feel what it is to be just”392 had altered 
his stance on the question before he arrived at Paris. More intensely than ever, he was 
idealistically upholding principles of religion and moral values, which caused his attitude to 
be placated. Indeed, he did not oppose Louis’ instauration to the throne of France and 
supported Castlereagh in his struggle to get an affirmation of the abandoning of the slave 
trade, which as we have seen Napoleon had decreed. 393  Castlereagh was really pleased, 
claiming that “I have never observed the Emperor of Russia to be in a more cordial, contented, 
and at the same time reasonable disposition.”394 The Austrian Minister, whether on purpose or 
due to fatigue resulting from the gruelling conferences at Vienna, did not get involved much 
in the discussions, but in general rather concurred with Castlereagh’s attitude. In sharp 
contrast, the Prussians were completely against any leniency. The feeling in Prussia was one 
of great odium, especially within the armed forces. This, perhaps useful in the battles, caused 
unnecessary brutality during the invasion and the occupation of France. Although none of the 
allied forces was entirely free of guilt, the Prussians were undoubtedly the worst. 395 
Castlereagh informed Liverpool that “the immediate difficulty is now to keep Blücher and the 
Prussians within any bounds towards this town. […] they are at this moment mining the 
bridge of Jena, with a view of blowing it up.”396 Fortunately, Wellington managed to avert 
this annihilation. He was, however, worried that such behaviour might lead to an upheaval of 
the French, and at one stage the British field-marshal even considered that the occupation 
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army, which he was to be in charge of, should not consist of any Prussians.397 Confiding in 
one of his brothers, Wellington wrote, “I confess that I am a little afraid of them [the Allies]. 
They are all behaving exceedingly ill.”398 Hardenberg himself disapproved of the conduct of 
the Prussian army and their notion to interfere in political matters. Still, he shared their thirst 
for stripping France of some of her territory, which would be acquired by her smaller 
bordering states that would then be supposed to relinquish land to Prussia. The Prussians had 
already objected to the terms of the first peace treaty with France and reasoned that the French 
had not resisted Napoleon, and Europe had a right to be indemnified for her renewed struggle. 
And if France was not punished and was allowed to retain all her territory – would the 
Continent be really safe or simply fall victim to French aggression all over again? Many of 
the smaller powers agreed to Prussia’s reasoning and her proposition to reduce the French 
territory partly out of loathing and anguish of France, partly simply out of avidity. Also, 
Münster, who had significant sway over the Prince Regent and therewith also on the British 
government, joined in the clamouring. Eventually, however, being fully aware of the abyss 
that divided him from Castlereagh on this issue, he departed from Paris.399 Castlereagh was 
incensed by the conduct of the Allies, especially that the German powers were apparently all 
keen on letting their forces march into French territory, therewith saving their money and 
letting France pay for them while receiving British subsidies. Not surprisingly, he, therefore, 
ascribed the slow progress of the negotiations to this fact:  
“[…] neither Austria nor Prussia may, and certainly none of the smaller Powers have 
any sincere desire to bring the present state of things to a speedy termination, so long 
as they can feed, clothe, and pay their armies at the expense of France, and put their 
English subsidies into their pockets […].”400 
 
The demeanour and pretensions of the smaller states also infuriated Castlereagh, given that 
they would not even be capable of guarding such new annexations without the support of the 
Allies if France chose to take military action in order to recapture these territories: 
“The prevailing sentiment in Germany is favourable to the territorial reduction of 
France. After what the people have suffered, this is not wonderful [sic!]; but it is one 
thing to wish a thing done, and another to maintain it when done. None of these 
Powers can for any time keep up war establishments, or, having laid them down, 
easily resume them. If, then, this course increases the chance of early war, the 
acquisitions may be of short duration; and whilst the chances of peace diminished, we 
may be obliged, in order to keep France within due bounds, to take the weight of the 
war on ourselves.”401 
                                                 
397 MUIR: Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon, p. 371; WEBSTER: The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, p. 463. 
398 Wellington to H. Wellesley, 19 July 1815, W.D. XII, p. 566 
399 MUIR: Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon, p. 371; WEBSTER: The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, p. 466, 468. 
400 Castlereagh to Liverpool, 17 August 1815, C.C. X, p. 485, same also: B.D., p. 363. 
401 Castlereagh to Liverpool, 17 August 1815, C.C. X, p. 488, same also: B.D., p. 365. 
 110 
The clamour for territories, however, could not be stopped that quickly, and in September 
Castlereagh complained again: 
“The fact is that we have now before us demands from every State, however feeble, 
that either borders or approaches, France desiring to have some portion either directly 
or indirectly of permanent accession at her expense, and for the conservation of which 
it is taken for granted that we are to be guarantees: the more I reflect upon it, the more 
I deprecate this system of scratching such a Power. We may hold her down and pare 
her nails, so that many years shall pass away before they can again wound us. […] this 
system of being pledged to a continental war for objects that France may any day 
reclaim from the particular States that hold them, without pushing her demands 
beyond what she would contend was due to her own honour, is I am sure a bad British 
policy, and that if the States who ambition [sic!] these objects choose to fly at such 
small game, it ought to be at their own risk, and with their own means and not with 
ours, but unfortunately if they once get into a scrape with such an enemy, Great 
Britain may, and probably will, sooner or later be involved, and hence it becomes 
necessary for us not only to refuse them our guarantee for such purposes, but to 
dissuade them from pursuing them.”402 
 
In the end, the claims of the smaller states were defeated without too much difficulty, but 
things were different where Prussia was concerned, whose troops on French territory 
amounted up to 280,000 men 403  The British delegates, however, strongly promoted 
moderation. Although Wellington admitted that France had retained a powerful position in 
comparison to the other continental powers, he still stood out for moderation. He reasoned 
that, as Louis XVIII had acceded to the treaty of 25 March, the Allies were not entitled to 
claim any considerable concessions from France. More to the point, he highlighted that the 
French, although they had not resisted Napoleon, had neither made a stand against the Allies 
– a fact that doubtless facilitated the invasion of France. Arguing that the Coalition’s aim was 
to attain peace, he considered too extensive demands as simply being counterproductive as 
they would only enfeeble King Louis XIII and the French government. And in this event he 
thought it likely that a similar situation, as the one Europe had just witnessed, might occur: 
another upheaval in France, another struggle to get back territories taken from her. Thus, for 
the security of Europe, he regarded any extensive cessions to be nonsensical and instead 
pointed to the possibility of a temporary occupation, which he thought much more effective. 
This measure would give strength to the King and his Government and would ensure at least 
some repose to the Allies. All these points he explained in a long letter: 
“My opinion is, that the French Revolution and the treaty of Paris have left France in 
too great strength for the rest of Europe, weakened as all the powers of Europe have 
been by the wars in which they have been engaged with France, by the destruction of 
all the fortresses and strongholds in the Low Countries and Germany, principally by 
                                                 
402 Castlereagh to Liverpool, 4 September 1815, B.D., p. 376. 
403 WEBSTER: The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, p. 471. 
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the French, and by the ruin of the finances of all the Continental Powers. […] First; I 
conceive that our declarations, and our treaties, and the accession, although irregular 
in form, which we allowed Louis XVIII. to make to that of the 25th of March, must 
prevent us from making any very material inroad upon the state of possession of the 
treaty of Paris. […] The French people submitted to Buonaparte [sic!]; but it would be 
ridiculous to suppose that the Allies would have been in possession of Paris in a 
fortnight after one battle fought if the French people in general had not been 
favourably disposed to the cause which the Allies were supposed to favour. […] The 
assistance which the King and his party in France gave to the cause was undoubtedly 
of a passive description; but the result of the operations of the Allies has been very 
different from what it would have been if the disposition of the inhabitants of the 
country had led them to oppose the Allies. […] But my objection to the demand of a 
great cession from France upon this occasion is, that it will defeat the object which the 
Allies have held out to themselves in the present and the preceding wars. That which 
has been their object has been to put an end to the French Revolution, to obtain peace 
for themselves and their people, to have the power of reducing their overgrown 
military establishments, and the leisure to attend to the internal concerns of their 
several nations, and to improve the situation of their people. […] If the King were to 
refuse to agree to the cession, and were to throw himself upon his people, there can be 
no doubt that those divisions would cease which have hitherto occasioned the 
weakness of France. The Allies might take the fortresses and provinces which might 
suit them, but there would be no genuine peace for the world, no nation could disarm, 
no Sovereign could turn his attention from the affairs of this country. If the King were 
to agree to make the cession, which, from all that one hears, is an event by no means 
probable, the Allies must be satisfied, and must retire; but I would appeal to the 
experience of the transactions of last year for a statement of the situation in which we 
should find ourselves. Last year, after France had been reduced to her limits of 1792 
[…] the unpopularity of the Government in the army was to be attributed to their 
supposed disinclination to war to recover these possessions. […] We must, on the 
contrary, if we take this large cession, consider the operations of the war as deferred 
till France shall find a suitable opportunity of endeavouring to regain what she has 
lost; and, after having wasted our resources in the maintenance of overgrown military 
establishments in time of peace, we shall find how little useful the cessions we shall 
have acquired will be against a national effort to regain them. In my opinion, then, we 
ought to continue to keep our great object, the genuine peace and tranquillity of the 
world, in our view, and shape our arrangement so as to provide for it. Revolutionary 
France is more likely to distress the world than France, however strong in her frontier, 
under a regular Government; and that is the situation in which we ought to endeavour 
to place her. With this view I prefer the temporary occupation of some of the strong 
places, and to maintain for a time a strong force in France, both at the expense of the 
French Government, and under strict regulation, to the permanent cession of even all 
the places which in my opinion ought to be occupied for a time. […] There is no doubt 
that the troops of the Allies stationed in France will give strength and security to the 
Government of the King, and that their presence will give the King leisure to form his 
army in such manner as he may think proper. The expectation also of the arrival of the 
period at which the several points occupied should be evacuated would tend to the 
preservation of peace, while the engagement to restore them to the King, or his 
legitimate heirs or successors, would have the effect of giving additional stability to 
his throne. […] This term of years, besides the advantage of introducing into France a 
system and habits of peace, after twenty five years of war, will enable the powers of 
Europe to restore their finances; it will give them time and means to reconstruct the 
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great artificial bulwarks of their several countries, to settle their Governments, and to 
consolidate their means of defence. France, it is true, will still be powerful, probably 
more powerful than she ought to be in relation to her neighbours; but, if the Allies do 
not waste their time and their means, the state of security of each and of the whole, in 
relation to France, will, at the end of the period, be materially improved, and will 
probably leave but little to desire.404 
 
Castlereagh argued similarly as his fellow countryman. Faced with extensive demands, Louis 
XIII would have to make his choice. He could either give in to allied demands, but this would 
enfeeble his position in France, or he could consolidate his power, but then he would have to 
oppose the Allies. Therefore, Castlereagh believed that an imposition of any significant 
cessions would not lead to security, but on the contrary, to another war. Besides, France might 
someday be needed to counterbalance other continental powers. In a letter he explained his 
reasoning to Liverpool: 
“If […] we push things now to an extremity, we leave the King no resource in the eyes 
of his own people but to disavow us; and, once committed against us in sentiment, he 
will be obliged soon either to lead the nation into war himself, or possibly be set aside 
to make way for some more bold and enterprising competitor. […] if you should deem 
it necessary to demand securities against which all Frenchmen must protest, which I 
do not consider to be by any means the case, with respect to those recommended by 
the Duke of Wellington, my advice then will be to you and to the Allies to have no 
reserve towards France. You cannot you must not. In that case, calculate upon the 
submission of France but for the shortest interval; and the only objection I should then 
to have to state against General Knesebeck's405 plan is that it does not go far enough. It 
leaves France nearly entire, both in population and resources, whilst it deprives her 
precisely of those objects which will revive in every Frenchman, whatever may be his 
principles, a desire of war at the first favourable moment. […] But it is not our 
business to collect trophies, but to try if we can bring back the world to peaceful habits. 
I do not believe this to be compatible with any attempt now materially and 
permanently to affect the territorial character of France, as settled by the Peace of 
Paris; neither do I think it a clear case (if we can, by imposing a strait waistcoat upon 
that Power for a number of years, restore her to ordinary habits, and weighing the 
extraordinary growth of other States in latter times, and especially of Russia) that 
France, even with her existing dimensions, may not be found a useful rather than a 
dangerous member of the European system; but these are the problems you are to 
weigh.”406 
 
Yet Liverpool was not easily convinced that wisdom lay in moderation and exposed: 
“[…] I think that while we attend so much to what is due to the feelings of the French 
Government, we ought not to be insensible to what we owe to Austria, Prussia, and 
our other Allies, and likewise to the public feeling in this country, which I cannot 
conceal from you will be grievously disappointed by the acknowledgment.”407 
                                                 
404 Wellington to Castlereagh, 11 August 1815, W.D. XII, p. 596-600. 
405 Knesebeck was a Prussian general and put forward the Prussian scheme. 
406 Castlereagh to Liverpool, 17 August 1815, C.C. X, p. 489-491; same also: B.D., p. 365-367. 
407 Liverpool to Castlereagh, 18 August, B.D., p. 368. 
 113 
While the British Ministry dismissed the exorbitant claims Prussia made, it also thought 
Alexander’s suggestion to be far too lenient. They preferred a compromise solution, like the 
Austrian proposal, which was not as moderate as the Russian, but not as harsh as the Prussian 
one either. It was thus evident that France would lose at least some territory. As we have seen, 
the First Peace of Paris had been concluded on the basis of France’s borders of 1792 plus 
some concession in addition to this. Now Castlereagh suggested confining France to the 
position she had held in 1790, which meant that she had to yield some land in Belgium and in 
Savoy with a populace of not even one million. Furthermore, Castlereagh acknowledged that 
France would have to pay compensation; not, however, twelve hundred million francs as 
demanded by Prussia, but merely half of this amount. Alexander approved of this scheme and 
Metternich, too, showed himself compliant. Wellington, with his prestige and power, had 
helped to gain the agreement of the allied statesmen and also endeavoured to persuade the 
British government to give their consent to Castlereagh’s proposal. 408  Reluctantly, the 
Ministry gave in and told Castlereagh: “Whatever may be the first popular impression on the 
result of the negotiation according to the principles which have been agreed upon, […] you 
will be most cordially and zealously supported and upheld by all your colleagues in this 
country.”409 Pitted against this united front, it was also evident that Prussia would not be able 
to implement her exorbitant claims. Pointing out that the French kingdom had not been the 
foe of the Coalition, Talleyrand, however, was not prepared to surrender anything at all. Yet, 
given that nearly one million allied soldiers were present in France, his reasoning was 
scarcely convincing. Being aware that the proposed peace conditions would be obnoxious to 
the French, he gave up his ministerial position. A new government was established with 
Richelieu, a very able man, as Prime Minister. Regardless, it was clear that the peace could 
not be as moderate as the one concluded in 1814.410  
 
An agreement was finally reached on 20 November, 1815 according to which France was cut 
down to the position she had held in 1790. She was compelled to pay reparations amounting 
to seven hundred million francs, which was more than Castlereagh had had in mind, but still 
much less than Prussia had demanded. Moreover, she had to part with the art treasures that 
Napoleon had stolen from all over Europe and hand them back to their former owners. 
Liverpool regarded this measure needful, as “whilst in that country, they must necessarily 
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have the effect of keeping up the remembrance of their former conquests, and of cherishing 
the military spirit and the vanity of the nation.”411 Needful or not, this step caused immense 
animosity and albeit both Castlereagh as well as Wellington were not really in favour of it, the 
French vented their wrath on the British representatives. France, furthermore, was to be 
occupied by 150,000 soldiers, of whom Wellington was to be in charge. And every fortress in 
the northern and eastern parts of the country was to be controlled by the British field-marshal 
for three to five years. The number of soldiers was considerably decreased in 1817, and in the 
following year the occupation was entirely terminated. Still, it was largely this measure that 
set the British Cabinet at ease and prepared them to acquiesce to the moderate peace 
conditions. Indeed, although the terms were not as magnanimous as the ones of the previous 
year, the statesmen had again displayed leniency, and it was Castlereagh and Wellington who 
largely accounted for this outcome. 412  “Napoleon could absolutely not comprehend why 
Castlereagh had advocated a moderate peace and wondered whether the British Foreign 
Minister was venally, fatuitous or simply harebrained, probably because, as Nicolson 
explained, “Napoleon was temperamentally incapable of understanding any politics other than 
power politics.”413 Snidely, he expressed: 
“One cannot understand how a sensible nation can allow herself to be governed by 
such a lunatic. After twenty years of war, after all the wealth which she has expended; 
after all the assistance which she gave to the common cause; after a triumph beyond 
all expectation;-what sort of peace is it that England has signed? Castlereagh had the 
continent at his disposal. What great advantage, what just compensations, has he 
acquired for his country? The peace he has made is the sort of peace he would have 
made if he had been beaten. I could scarcely have treated him worse, the poor wretch, 
if it had been I who had proved victorious!”414  
 
However, Castlereagh, as we have seen, had his reasons for promoting a moderate peace. 
Besides, he believed that the best guard against renewed French aggression lay in the 
perpetuation of the alliance as he told Liverpool: “It is the fear of our union that will keep 
France down, and the knowledge that the Duke of Wellington commands only the advanced 
guard of the force against which they will have to contend, if they again involve themselves in 
war.”415 Thus, on the same day the Second Peace of Paris was signed, the Big Four also 
concluded the Quadruple Alliance. It was more or less an agreement to continue the Treaty of 
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Chaumont, with Great Britain, Russia, Austria, and Prussia engaging themselves to protect the 
settlement from any hostilities on the part of France. If the Bourbons were again subjected to 
an ouster, the Allies would confer with each other. Moreover, it was decided that the powers 
should meet recurrently to consider any European questions – a stipulation that derived from 
Castlereagh’s conviction that private and cordial connections were the key to the safety of the 
Continent.416  
 
The Quadruple Alliance, however, was not the only alliance that was concluded at Paris in 
1815. A few weeks earlier, on 26 September, the Holy Alliance, which was developed by the 
Tsar, came into being. Alexander had already been moved by religious ideology in 1812 and, 
ever since his departure from Vienna, this personality trait had grown even stronger, and at 
this stage deeply influenced his thoughts and actions. He envisioned a Europe guided by 
Christian principles and was convinced that such a Europe would be a peaceful Europe. 
Accordingly, he produced a document that steeped in religious principles. Metternich 
conceived it to be a marvellous opportunity and by some changes to the wording he 
profoundly changed the whole meaning. It had turned into a declaration condemning the 
Revolution and its effects – and a pledge to fight them.417 As Kissinger aptly put it: “The Tsar 
had conceived the Holy Alliance […] as the proclamation of a new era […]; Metternich used 
it to announce the end of a revolutionary period […].”418 Emperor Francis believed Alexander 
to be a bit insane, but nevertheless acceded to the treaty. After all, an Alexander envisioning 
plans for a peaceful Continent was certainly more desirable than one pursuing other 
potentially perilous objects. Moved by similar thoughts, Frederick William III also agreed. As 
Castlereagh informed his colleagues at London: 
“[…] the Emperor of Austria felt […] great repugnance to be a party to such an act, 
and yet was more apprehensive of refusing himself to the Emperor's application; that it 
was quite clear his mind was affected; that peace and goodwill was at present the idea 
which engrossed his thoughts; that he had found him of late friendly and reasonable on 
all points; and that he was unwilling to thwart him in a conception which, however 
wild, might save him and the rest of the world much trouble so long as it should last. 
In short, seeing no retreat, after making some verbal alterations the Emperor of Austria 
agreed to sign it. The Emperor of Russia then carried it to the King of Prussia, who felt 
in the same manner, but came to the same conclusion. […] The fact is, that the 
Emperor's mind is not completely sound. Last year there was but too much reason to 
fear that its impulse would be to conquest and dominion. The general belief now is, 
that he is disposed to found his own glory upon a principle of peace and benevolence. 
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Since the point of Poland was disposed of, there has been nothing in his political 
conduct in the progress of arrangements which indicates another purpose, and he 
really appears to be in earnest. It is, at all events, wise to profit by this disposition as 
far as it will carry us; and this is peculiarly the feeling of Austria and Prussia, who 
hope to keep down, "now that they are compatriots," much of the spirit of frontier 
jealousy which has hitherto embarrassed them.”419 
 
Although Castlereagh regarded the Holy Alliance as “a piece of sublime mysticism and 
nonsense,”420 he induced the Prince Regent to dispatch a letter to the Tsar. The Prince Regent 
had no authority to commit his country to such a treaty, but he wrote to Alexander, assuring 
him that he personally ardently shared his outlook. In this manner, Alexander forged an 
alliance, which sought harmony by the implementation of religious principles. Nonetheless, 
the greatest benefit of the treaty was that Alexander himself devoutly believed in it.421  
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VII. CONCLUSION 
 
 
In British history Great Britain, because of Waterloo, appears as the saviour of Europe422, but 
we should keep in mind that Waterloo was not an isolated event, and was obviously 
influenced by Napoleon’s defeats of the previous years. Credit must also be given to the 
Prussians, as Wellington himself wrote the day after the battle: “I should not do justice to my 
own feelings, or to Marshal Blücher and the Prussian army, if I did not attribute the successful 
result of this arduous day to the cordial and timely assistance I received from them.” 423 
Additionally, an obviously vital factor in the final overthrow of Napoleon was the 
maintenance of the last Coalition, which, unlike the previous ones, survived the constant 
dissensions among the Allies. And this was not least thanks to Castlereagh, who took over the 
role as mediator between the Allies and protected the Coalition from dissolution. He had 
come to the Continent as a British statesman, but had quickly adapted to his surroundings and 
gradually changed his outlook from an insular one into a European one. Hence, there often 
was a discrepancy between the British Cabinet’s policy and that of the Foreign Secretary’s, 
which is clearly displayed, for example, in the Polish-Saxon question or the different attitudes 
towards the nature of peace. Nevertheless, he attained for his country an invaluable 
accomplishment: after years of being more or less ignored, he assured Britain her say on 
European matters, and he used it to contribute a good deal to the restoration of Europe. 
Although the Bourbons could not preserve their crown and the united Netherlands soon 
dissolved into Belgium and Holland, the majority of the agreements concluded at Vienna 
were to subside for over five decades. The negotiators, however, were to be subjected to 
condemnation for their neglect of popular feelings, even though the settlement turned out an 
outstanding achievement: after over two decades of warfare, the Continent was finally able to 
repose and live in peace.424  
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ABSTRACT 
 
Die vorliegende Diplomarbeit befasst sich mit der britischen Außenpolitik der Jahre 1813 bis 
1815 und ihrer Rolle im Krieg gegen Napoleon bzw. der anschließenden Neuordnung 
Europas. In der Einführung wird ein kurzer Überblick über die Revolutionskriege und die 
Napoleonischen Kriege bis 1812 gegeben. Darüber hinaus beschäftigt sich dieses Kapitel 
auch mit dem ‚Krieg von 1812’, welcher zwar außereuropäisch, aber dennoch ein 
Nebenprodukt der Napoleonischen Kriege war und von den Ereignissen dieser beeinflusst 
wurde, aber auch selbst einen gewissen Einfluss in Europa hatte. Abschließend behandelt die 
Einführung die politischen Gegebenheiten in Großbritannien und stellt das 1812 gewählte 
Ministerium und vor allem diejenigen Personen, die die Außenpolitik der nächsten Jahre 
prägten, vor. Anschließend wird über die Bildung der letzten Koalition, über die militärischen 
Ereignisse von 1813 und über Friedensbemühungen berichtet. Das nächste Kapitel beschäftigt 
sich mit der alliierten Invasion Frankreichs und den vorläufig letzten Monaten der Herrschaft 
Napoleons. Zunächst werden die Ziele des britischen Kabinetts sowie das erste persönliche 
Zusammentreffen des britischen Außenministers Castlereagh, der im Jänner 1814 am 
Kontinent eintraf, mit seinem österreichischen Amtskollegen Metternich und dem Zaren 
Alexander beschrieben. Ebenso behandelt dieses Kapitel die, von Differenzen geprägten, 
Beziehungen der Verbündeten zueinander, die Friedensgespräche, und den Verlauf des 
Krieges bis hin zur Restauration der Bourbonen bzw. zur Abdankung Napoleons. Dabei wird 
auch die Einstellung der britischen Öffentlichkeit gegenüber den Bourbonen sowie gegenüber 
Napoleon und einem möglichen Frieden mit diesem beleuchtet. ‚Pacification and Celebration’ 
behandelt zunächst einen anderen Kriegsschauplatz, nämlich Italien, und analysiert 
anschließend den ersten Frieden von Paris. Zudem wird in diesem Kapitel auch von den 
Siegesfeierlichkeiten in London und dem Friedensschluss mit den Vereinigten Staaten von 
Amerika erzählt. Letzterer bedeutete ja, dass Großbritannien seine Soldaten aus Amerika 
abziehen und eventuell in Europa einsetzen konnte, und erregte deshalb natürlich Aufsehen in 
Europa. Das fünfte Kapitel ‚The Congress of Vienna’, beginnt mit einer kurzen Erläuterung 
zu den Gegebenheiten in Wien und den Zielen und Strategien der Staatsmänner und geht dann 
zur eigentlichen, die Verhandlungen über Monate hinweg bestimmenden Frage über, nämlich 
der Zukunft Polens und Sachsens. Hierbei wird besonderes Augenmerk auf die Haltung 
Castlereaghs sowie des britischen Kabinetts gelegt und ihre Diskrepanz veranschaulicht. 
Durch die Uneinigkeit der Verbündeten in dieser Frage gewann Frankreich wieder an Einfluss 
und wurde sogar ein potentieller Verbündeter – und im Jänner 1815 kam es zur 
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Allianzbildung zwischen dem ehemaligen Kriegsgegner mit Großbritannien und Österreich. 
Die Krise gipfelte in Kriegsdrohungen, letzten Endes wurde aber eine Kompromisslösung 
gefunden. Kurz darauf kehrte Castlereagh nach London zurück, nicht viel später kam aber ein 
anderer auf den Kontinent zurück: Napoleon floh von Elba und seine Herrschaft der hundert 
Tage begann, was Gegenstand des letzten Kapitels ist. Napoleon fand schnell Anhänger, unter 
anderem seinen Schwager Murat, wodurch Italien wieder zum Kriegsschauplatz wurde. 
Inzwischen wurden die Verhandlungen in Wien weitergeführt und schließlich, im Juni 1815, 
wurden alle, auf dem Kongress getroffenen Abmachungen in der Kongressakte 
zusammengefasst. Nur wenige Tage später fand die berühmte Schlacht von Waterloo statt, der 
dann eine erneute Abdankung Napoleons und eine erneute Restauration der Bourbonen folgte. 
Nach massiven Auseinandersetzungen um die Beschaffenheit des Friedens, wurde mit dem 
Zweiten Frieden von Paris wiederum ein relativ gemäßigter Friede geschlossen. Auf die Rolle 
Großbritanniens im Krieg und in der Neuordnung Europas wird dann noch kurz in der 
Schlussbemerkung eingegangen. 
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